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ABSTRACT
John Henniger Reagan served the State of Texas as
judge, representative, Confederate cabinet member, senator,
and first Texas Railroad Commissioner from IB46 to 1903.
His ideas and arguments won him popularity in his home
state and recognition on a national basis.

He was best

known for his arguments against the centralization of
government and his defense of the rights of the individual
against economic and political infringement.
The study was limited to the consideration of the
ideas contained in Reagan’s speeches since the concepts he
advocated were nationally significant.

The study was

further limited to four speeches chosen for their typicality
of issue, theme, and development.
dealt with:

The four selected speeches

(1) the abuses of the railroads and monopolies;

(2) Reagan’s arguments against the Blair Education Act;
(3) a plea for the remonetization of silver; and (4) denunci
ation of the Force Act.

The analysis of these speeches

included a discussion of the background of the specific
issues involved, the audience composition and alignment, the
themes developed, and the proofs used in their development.
Finally his speeches were evaluated.
v

Reagan's political ideology was based upon two
primary concepts:

preservation of states' rights and

protection of the individual.

His themes were derived

from these two basic concepts and concerned the infringe
ment upon these basic rights.

Although Reagan offered

logical, ethical, and emotional proof to support these
themes, he relied most heavily upon logical proof, employing
most often example, authority, and causal relationship.

His

more than twenty years as a Representative in the lower
House, where he voiced his ideas on the pertinent issues of
the day with knowledge and intelligence, allowed him to
address the Senate with an already established ethical
stature.

He added to his established ethos by his indi

cation of good character and intelligence throughout his
speeches.

Reagan employed emotional appeals less frequently

than logical or ethical appeals.
An evaluation of effectiveness was difficult to
ascertain since Reagan's speeches were political in nature
and given to an audience that was influenced by such outside
elements as:

(1) the popular national will as reflected

through periodicals; (2) the will of the constituents who
elected the senators to represent their particular interests
(3) influence of special interest groups;

(4) partisan and

sectional alignments; and (5) other speeches given on the
same issue.

However, Reagan's speeches were undoubtedly

VIX

influential in the initiation of some early governmental
controls over monopolies and railroads, the defeat of the
Blair Education Act and the death of the Force Act.
These conclusions were drawn from Reagan's speeches:
Reagan's ideas in these speeches belonged basically to the
school of progressive idealism; the one exception was
Reagan's strict conservative tie with the past through his
states' rights concept.

There seemed to be evidence that

this conservative tie was a carry-over from his earlier
experiences in the Civil War and its aftermath.

Reagan's

progressive ideas were innovative and well supported.
History appears to vindicate most of his progressive con
cepts.

The final conclusion drawn from the study is that

John H. Reagan was a deep logician, a far-sighted intellectu
al and statesman of whom Texas, and the nation, should be
proud.

However, he apparently was not an outstanding

orator although his ideas were presented well enough to
influence the outcome of legislation that affected national
policies then and now.

INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Depression, drought, tremendous growth in the number
of immigrants, general increased population, westward
mobility of the people, organizations of labor, farmers,
and miners, and growth of tremendous corporate giants all
characterized the national scene when John H. Reagan was
elected Senator from Texas in 18$7»
He had already served his state as congressional
representative more than twenty years beginning in the
pre-Civil War period and including post-Reconstruction years
and the early years of economic upheaval.

But with the

imminent approach of the climax of some of the nation's
most crucial problems, including monopoly control, silver
remonetization, and the Republican's renewed attempts at
centralization, Reagan, always an outspoken contestant in
the debates surrounding these issues, decided to enter the
Senate.

Ben H. Proctor, in a biography of Reagan, stated

that with
. . . many crucial issues fast approaching a climax
in Congress, he (Reagan) wanted to be in a position
where he could best make his voice heard and his presence
felt. Tired by the labors which the boisterous unwieldy
House exacted of its members, he decided that the more

1

2
sedate, less crowded, and better organized Senate was
the place for him.l
Although he was treated upon his immediate entrance
to the Senate with less respect than he may have antici2
pated,
his stature soon increased with his determined
stand on issues of importance.

One historian describes

the period that saw Reagan on the senatorial stage in the
following manner:
Without denying that other decades have had their trials
outside of war, there is reason to maintain that during
the twelve years, 1885 to 1897, more and widely differ
ing problems pressed upon this country for solution than
in any other equal period, unless it be that following
the establishment of our government in 1789.-'
The same author further described those issues and their
importance on the national scene.
The contest for a silver standard, the regulation of
great corporations and monopolies, the rising strength
of organized labor, the awakening ambitions for an
aggressive foreign policy, the purification of politics
by a radical change in the methods of appointment to
office, are questions which will never sink into
comparative obscurity, whatever the future may hold

Ben H. Proctor, Not Without Honor: The Life of
John-H. Reagan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962),
p. ll.
2
Although Reagan had shown outstanding leadership
on all parallel committees in the House, he was the last
named member to the Senate's committees on Interstate
Commerce, Post Office, and Post Roads, and Coastal Defenses.
United States Congress, Congressional Record, 50th Congress,
1st Session, p. lo.
3
Davis Rich Dewey, The American Nation: A History of
National Problems. 1885-1897 (.New York: Harper and Brothers
Publications, 1907), p. xiv.

in store for us. Rather they will stand out as the
beginning of a new stage in our nation's history.4
John Henniger Reagan, Senator from Texas from 1$$6
to 1$91, was an active participant in the legislative
debates during that crucial period of change in the nation's
history.

Reagan was a veteran representative in the legis

lative halls and he spent the majority of his time on the
floor of the United States Senate speaking on the key issues,
the issues that occupied the greatest minds of the day and
that were shaping a new national destiny.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the
ideas that Reagan presented in selected senatorial speeches
on the great issues of the period.
JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Reagan was a study in a combination of progressive
ideas and conservative ties.

His two basic ideological

guidelines as expressed in his speaking seemed to bind him
to two eras.

His preoccupation with the conservation of

states rights through strict Constitutional construction
seemed almost reactionary when compared to his ideas that
stressed the rights of the individual.

Perhaps an expla

nation of the union of these two ideas can be seen in
Reagan's belief that the solidity of a political unit,

^Ibid.

i.e., the Democratic Party, was a necessity for the preser
vation of the southern rights; to him all efforts at
I

centralization seemed to be a move against the South.
5

Historians

basically refer to Reagan in two roles.

In

explanation of his defense of the southern rights and states
rights, his name was most widely mentioned as Postmaster
General of the Confederacy.

The second role was as an

anti-monopolist.
Reagan was an important figure on the Texas
political scene.
which he refused.

He was twice offered the governorship
He took a leading role in the re

establishment of the Democratic Party in his state and in
the revision of the state constitution.

Following the Civil

War, as soon as he was granted amnesty, he was sent back
to his pre-War seat in the House, and he was consistently
re-elected to that position for over twenty years.

When he

decided to run for the Senate, he was opposed by the long
standing incumbent Samuel Bell Maxey, ex-Governor John
Ireland, and Alexander Terrell, a respected state senator.
Reagan entered the race late, yet he won the heavily

c
^T. R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas
and Texans (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968),
pp* 399, £21, and John A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth,
1S77-1&9Q (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 19&8),
pp. ll$, 117, are examples.

contested battle

and took his seat in the Senate in 1$S$.

Once more the voters of his state had rewarded him for his
defense of the people and his attacks on monopolies.

He

had achieved this vote of confidence from his constituency
despite heavy adverse coverage during the campaign from
7
$
the Dallas Morning News, and the Austin Daily Statesman,
both of which questioned his judgment concerning many
issues including railroad regulations, monopoly control,
g
and prohibition.
The vote was 102 for Reagan who needed
only 69^^ votes for election.
Reagan's ideas and arguments had won him popularity
in his home state and had won him national recognition
also.

His states rights concept received some periodical

coverage because of his arguments in favor of decentrali
zation, but his defense of the rights of the individual was

For coverage of the campaign and voting see Austin
Daily Statesman (January 13, 20, 21, 26, 1S$7).
^Dallas Morning News (April 23, 25, May 15, August
14, 1S87).
d
Austin Daily Statesman (August 5» 11> 1387).
g
This coverage was also discussed in several
letters: Silas Hare to Reagan, May 16, 1$$7; Reagan to
Phelps, August 2, 1&$7; Reagan to Johnson, September 21,
1$$7. All are in Reagan Papers: Letters, Texas State
Archives. The Reagan Papers will hereafter be referred to
as R.P.
"^Austin Daily Statesman (January 27 and February 3>

1SS7).

--------------

nationally discussed.

His progressive arguments that

sought railroad and monopoly control through legislative
measures and his demands for the free and unlimited coinage
of silver, which he saw as a panacea for the ills of the
South and West, were covered by periodicals through the
nation.^

His fight for the rights of the individual

brought him an offer of a vice-presidential
the National Anti-Monopoly Party.

12

nomination by

He refused the offer

and remained a Democrat.
Reagan’s fight to bring on the initial politicoeconomic controls needed within this chaotic period was a
long-range and seemingly tireless effort.

While not always

popular throughout all sections of the nation, Reagan’s
ideas were certainly well-known.

He was a spokesman for

the people and was identified with their cause of individual
rights.

The newspapers were not always in agreement about
Reagan’s concepts. For example: the New York Tribune was
anti-Reagan on the railroad issue from start to finish.
Gerald Nash in ’’The Reformer Reformed: John H. Reagan and
Railroad Regulation,” Business Historical Review, Vol. 29
(1955) took much of his material from the Tribune. The
Baltimore Sun saw Reagan as "a bold fearless aggressive
opponent of the corporation influences and of centralizing
tendencies of the Republican Party," (February 2, 1$$7).
The Crawford County, Missouri Democrat (April 20, 1$91)
considered Reagan a true "servant of the people." Within
his home state, there were opposing views. For pro-Reagan
coverage see The Houston Post and for consistent antiReagan coverage see ballas Daily Herald.
12
Reagan to Henry Nichols, March 2&, 1&&4; Reagan
to James B. Weaver, May 26, 1S&4, in R.P.: Letters.

7
Although Reagan’s ideas were pertinent to the great
issues of the era of politico-economic change during the
years 138B-1391, a study of Speech Monographs and
Dissertation Abstracts revealed no previous treatment of
his senatorial speaking.

The present study was conducted

in order to ascertain how Reagan's senatorial speeches
contribute to an understanding of the issues about which
he spoke.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Two basic limitations have been imposed upon the
study.

The first limitation was on the number of speeches

chosen for special investigation and analysis.

All of the

texts of Reagan’s speeches to the United States Senate
were readily available in the Congressional Record.

These

were closely studied and four were chosen for their
typicality of issue, themes, and development.

The speeches

chosen dealt with railroad-monopoly abuse, the centralizing
efforts of the Blair Education Act, the silver coinage
issue, and the Force Bill, which sought interference in
the elective franchise rights of the states.
The second limitation imposed upon the investigation
was the decision to limit the study to the ideas contained
in Reagan’s speeches.

Reagan lived and spoke during

troubled times in the nation’s economic and political
history.

His contribution through the concepts he advocated

to the United States Senate were significant.

For this

reason, the study focuses only on the invention found
within Reagan’s speeches to the Senate and deliberately
excludes a study of style, delivery, and arrangement.

An

additional reason for the exclusion of delivery was that
although Reagan’s ideas and arguments received coverage
for their importance, little was to be gleaned from the
same sources concerning his delivery of the ideas.

There

was a scarcity of general references to his delivery and a
dearth concerning the particular speeches under consider
ation.

So any conclusion drawn about the delivery of

these speeches would be only conjectural and may or may not
have held true of these particular speeches.

Reagan’s

ideas were contained in the inventio of his speeches.

His

contribution to the nation's well-being was found in the
ideas he advocated and thus the focus of the study is upon
these concepts.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
General histories of the era and issues were consuited first for background knowledge.

Academic journals

13

within the field of speech were then studied for relative

13
^Quarterly Journal of Speech, Speech Monographs,
Southern Speech Journal, Western SpeechJournal were examined
for materials relative to the study.

9
materials.

One long biography"^ and several short bio-

graphical sketches of Reagan were available.

15

Two members

of Reagan’s family kindly granted interviews and shed
light on aspects of Reagan’s life and career.

Reagan’s

granddaughter, Mrs. May Reagan Orr Mathes, resides in
Beaumont, Texas.

She freely and graciously gave of her

time, as did Reagan's great-grandson James P. Ferguson of
Houston, Texas.
Texts of all Reagan’s speeches came from the
Congressional Record; that source was further studied for
materials relative to the issues, audience interaction,
and outcome of the speeches.
Thirty-two newspapers including The Houston Post,
the Dallas Daily Herald, the Galveston Daily Hews, the
Palestine Advocate, The New York Times, the New York
Tribune, the New Orleans Picayune, the Saint Louis Daily
Globe-Democrat, and the Baltimore Sun were examined for
materials pertinent to the study.

Periodicals of the time,

including Harper's Weekly and Nation, were consulted.

^Proctor, Not Without Honor.
15
'William McGraw, Professional Politicians
(Washington, D. C.: The Imperial Press, 19^0); Paul M. Angle,
A Pictorial History of the Civil War (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., lyh1?); W. D. Wood, Reminiscences of
Reconstruction in Texas and Reminiscences of fexas and Texans
Fifty Years A^o (n.p.j, l90£; other biographical glimpses
of Reagan's life were gleaned from histories and articles
on specific issues.

10
The Texas State Archives and the University of
Texas Archives were searched for materials.

Reagan’s

Papers, letters, speeches, clippings and microfilm were
consulted there along with other collections that were
useful to the study.

The most outstanding were the Hogg

collection, the Blake collection, and the Roberts collection.
After the materials were assembled, they were
examined to determine the setting of the speeches and to
reconstruct the pertinent biographical data necessary to
understand Reagan's background.

In analyzing the speech

settings, materials were sought which would provide an
understanding of the historical circumstances which called
forth the speeches and which would illuminate the nature of
the audiences to which Reagan spoke.

The biographical data

were investigated to provide an understanding of Reagan's
life which would shed light on the ethos which he brought
to the speaking situation; an attempt was also made to
determine those aspects of his political and social
philosophy which might provide further insight into the
positions which he advocated.
The speeches themselves were searched to determine
the principal themes which he developed and the kinds of
supporting material employed to develop those themes.
Supporting materials were divided into logical proof,
ethical proof, and emotional proof.

11
An attempt was then made to draw some conclusions
from the data yielded by the analysis.

Those conclusions

included an assessment of the immediate and long-range
effects of the speeches, but went beyond the questions of
effectiveness to consider also what Reagan's ideas and his
method of development revealed about the man and the causes
which he advocated.
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study was organized into six chapters:
Chapter I gives a biographical sketch of the speaker
and the background that shaped the concepts which found
voice in his senatorial speaking.
Chapter II presents an analysis of Reagan's ideas
and their development in his speech on railroad-monopoly
abuse delivered to the United States Senate on February 27»
1889.
Chapter III deals with an analysis of the ideas in
Reagan's senatorial speech on the fourth Blair Education
Act given on February 26, 1890.
Chapter IV is an analysis of inventio in Reagan's
speech asking for remonetization of silver.

The speech

was delivered to the Senate on December 30, 1890.
Chapter V provides an analysis of the ideas in one
of Reagan's last speeches to the Senate.

This speech dealt

with the Force Bill and was delivered on January 16, 1891.

12
Chapter VI presents a summary of Reagan's use of
invention within the four speeches examined in the study,
and draws some general conclusions from the investigation.

CHAPTER I
THE SPEAKER
John H. Reagan was tanner, farmer, surveyor,
lawyer, judge, state legislator, and national congressman
before the Civil War.

He was Postmaster General of the

Confederacy, and, for a short while, simultaneously
Secretary of the Treasury.
of Governor of Texas.

He twice declined the office

Imprisoned with Jefferson Davis, he

returned to be selected as the spokesman for the people of
Texas in the House of Representatives in Washington until
1$$7, when he was elected Senator.

It is his Senatorial

speaking from 1$&7 to 1$91 that is the object of inquiry
in this study.

The present chapter will describe John H.

Reagan’s lineage, experiences, and behavioral pattern that
will shed light on his Senatorial speaking.
JOHN H. REAGAN
In 1S17, Timothy Richard Reagan married Elizabeth
Lusk

1

and this marriage produced six children

2

who were

■^Unpublished data in possession of Mrs. May Reagan
Orr Mathes, Beaumont, Texas.
2
These children were John Henniger, Richard B.,
William R., Morris, Joseph D., and Sarah.
13

raised according to teachings of the Colonial American
O

Methodist Episcopal Church.

On October 3, I$l8, John

Henniger Reagan, the first child, was b o m in Sevier
County, Tennessee.^
Reagan’s family was poor; although Timothy Reagan
was an accomplished tanner, blacksmith, silversmith, and
5

locksmith,' his business acumen seemed to be small and he
was never quite able to provide for the needs of his
family.

As the eldest child, John H. was forced to take

on responsibility early in life and he worked with his
£
father at the tannery and later on the farm.
His father
taught him the rudiments of education and he attended
Nancy Academy at Sevierville, but his formal education
was interrupted by his father's business failure when
John was about thirteen.

When he was about sixteen years

of age John undertook the task of securing his own

3

^John H. Reagan to his children, written at Fort
Warren, Boston, June 28, 1 8 6 5 . This letter was written
while Reagan was imprisoned there.
It is in possession
of James P. Ferguson, Houston, Texas. This letter will
hereafter be referred to as Reagan to his children.
^Ibid.
5Ibid.
£
John H. Reagan, LLD., Memoirs: With Special
Reference to Secession and the Civil War CNew York: ‘The
Neale Publishing Company, 190b), p. 23, hereafter referred
to as Reagan, Memoirs.

education, and began it "by hiring myself to Major John
Walker for one year at farm work, at nine dollars a month,
payable in corn at two shillings a bushel."

7

With the

money secured from selling the corn, Reagan purchased
clothing and books.

Paying his board by working evenings

and Saturdays for Willis Franklin, who operated a farm,
extensive flour mills, and sawmills for a wealthy planter,
John Brabson,

Reagan was able to attend Boyd's Creek

Academy for two sessions.

In 1^36, Willis Franklin died,

and with him died Reagan's means of support.

Forced to

leave the academy, Reagan was then hired to take a flatboat
of produce and furniture down the Tennessee River to north
Alabama.

His first venture out of his home territory, the

assignment provided Reagan with a means of gainful employ
ment .
Upon Reagan's return home, Brabson hired him to
take on Willis Franklin's former position.

He worked at

the milling business from the winter through the summer of
1 $ 3 7 e a r n i n g enough to return to school at Southwestern

7ibid.
g
Ben H. Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 11.

9

Reagan to his children.

16
Seminary in Maryville."^

He applied himself diligently to

his studies and complained of a lack of time for the
inclusion of everything he wished to a t t a i n . ^

His

curriculum consisted of arithmetic, algebra, geography,
English grammar, Latin grammar, natural philosophy, moral
philosophy, logic, and rhetoric.

12

Logic and rhetoric

fascinated him and he avidly read about these subjects.
To supplement the knowledge acquired from books, he joined
a literary society "formed for the improvement of its
13
members in writing and speaking." '

The society met every

Friday afternoon, during which time two members read
original compositions, two gave criticisms, four debated a
previously selected question, and two persons criticized
the compositions and speeches as to language, manner, and
s t y l e . " I n this atmosphere, Reagan formulated the basic
principles of logic as his future guide, and shaped and
polished his writing and oratory, so important to his later
15
endeavors."
With the return of summer Reagan found

^ I b i d . The school is now Maryville College; it is
located at Maryville, Blount County, Tennessee.
11
Ibid.
l2Ibid.
13Ibid.

^Ibid.
15

Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 13.

17
himself once more without funds and without much hope for
local employment.

After a number of his classmates suggested

he go out of the state to seek employment with greater
l6
compensation,
he decided to accept the advice. He sought
and secured recommendations from the faculty and students
17
of Maryville Seminary. '
Reagan worked as a clerk and bookkeeper until the
season when the boats would "begin to run."

1$

On November 13,

1&3&, he again took employment on a flatboat to Decatur

19

and from there journeyed by train and stagecoach to Vicksburg
and Natchez.

He sought employment as a clerk in Natchez,

which depression had strongly marked, but he found none.
His poor physical condition prevented him from earning
wages at manual labor.

20

Since he had found no employment

and news of a tutorial position in the nearby countryside

1^

Reagan to his children.

■^A letter of recommendation by Augustus M. Foute
to his father Jacob F. Foute can be fdund in the original
at Maryville College. This is reproduced on microfilm in
Reagan Papers at Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas.
Also see: Keagan, Memoirs, p. 25.
1A
Peter L. Thompson to Reagan, August 1$, 1&3&,
in R.P., microfilm.
^ R e a g a n to his children. Reagan received his
regular pay plus $25 from his employer's son as a parting
gift.
20Ibid.

13
had reached him, he decided to investigate.

Concerning

his state of mind at that moment he wrote in his Memoirs:
On the way, when I had got out of the city, overcome
by a feeling of helplessness, among strangers in a
strange land, and without money enough to pay for a
night’s lodging, I sat down by the roadside and took
a hearty cry.21
He was offered two positions at this time, one as
tutor and one as manager of Dempsey P. Jackson’s plantation; he took the latter since the pay was higher
he remained in the position until May, 1339•
because of the treatment of the slaves.
’’complained of not having enough meat,”
Jackson with this problem.

22

and

He resigned

When the men
23

Reagan confronted

Jackson refused to alleviate

the condition and so Reagan resigned.
Reagan started out toward Alexandria, Louisiana, to
the home of General Isaac Thomas, a family friend.

Howp J

ever, a sense of adventure and the promise of a good job ^
in Nacogdoches, Texas, encouraged him to cross into that
newly-formed republic.

21

The job failed to materialize but

Reagan, Memoirs, p. 25*

p p

Reagan, Memoirs, p. 26.
the remainder of the year.

His salary was $500 for

23Ibid.
^According to Memoirs, the job offered by a
merchant named Colonel Jeremiah Strode, paid $300 per year.
In his earlier letter to his children, June 23, 1365, the
amount was $1000.

19
another friendship caused Reagan to trudge thirty miles to
Fort Lacy.

There he was involved in the Indian War brought

on by the Sam Houston-Mirabeau B. Lamar conflict.

25

Reagan participated in the Indian negotiations and
was particularly impressed with Chief Bowles who stated
that if he fought the whites he would be killed by them,
and if he did not he would be killed by the red man.
Reagan’s attitude favored race differentiation expressed in
some descriptive words found in his letters that stated
’’savages, and even semi-civilized people” were ’’suspicious
and jealous of persons of higher type and different race."
However, he respected Bowles and agreed with the Indian
Chief's concept that there should be means other than war
to settle disputes.

He also respected and honored Bowles

for his steadfastness of purpose once he had made a
27
decision. 1
Soon after the Indian conflict public attention was
focused on the fertile lands of Texas.

The County Surveyor

of Nacogdoches County stated:

25

For an excellent account of this conflict see
Anna Muckleroy, "The Indian Policy of the Republic of
Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVI (1922),
pp. 12S-TJZJ!7
PA
Reagan to his children.
27

children.

Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 30-32, and Reagan to his
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Land is the cry. Speak to one, his answer is land.
Inquire kindly of his family and he answers in Leagues
and Labors. The land mania is great. . . . W e have
shipped off the Cherokees.^o
Reagan answered the call of "land” and spent approximately
two years alternately surveying the land and battling a
2Q
"bilious fever."
He completed his survey of the counties
of Henderson, Van Zandt, Wood, Kaufman, the south part of
Hunt, Anderson County west of old Trowel Trace, and that
part of Dallas County which lies north of the Trinity
on
River, in March, 1S41,
and returned to Nacogdoches and
another Indian uprising.

The latter conflict was followed

closely by a depression that affected all economy including
surveying, so Reagan began to farm to supplement his
31
income^ and during this time was elected justice of the
peace and also Captain of the militia for his Nacogdoches
precinct.

32

Warren A. Ferris to his sister, Sarah Lovejoy,
October 8, 1$39. R. B. Blake Collection, Texas State
Archives, Austin, Texas.
^ R e a g a n to his children. Reagan probably had
malaria since much of the land surveyed was swampy.
•^John H. Reagan, Letter to his Father, March 3>
1B41, R.P., microfilm. Also see Reagan, Memoirs, p. 37.
•^ T h e Houston Post (undated) clipping in R.P.:
Printed Matter, Letters, and Circulars.
^^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 44• Also: Bonham Weekly
Chronicle, October 14, 1897 > clipping in R.P.: Printed
Matter.
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In 1843t Reagan accepted a position as tutor to
Colonel John Durst*s children. ^

The position as tutor

served as a mental stimulus for this man who had neglected
books for a long period of time.

He had access to the

excellent library in the Durst home and became acquainted
with a number of prominent men of state who visited in the
home.^^

The influence of these three factors, coupled

with Reagan*s insatiable search for knowledge, particularly
learning that dealt with logical presentation of facts,
caused him to begin to study political philosophy and then
law.

35

It was at this point that Reagan married a widow,

Martha Music, and shouldered the responsibility of her four
children. ^

His wife died within two years after their

marriage•
Around 1844, Reagan studying law by reading
Blackstone's Commentaries and using Webster’s Unabridged

■^Colonel Durst came to Texas in the early l800's
and became wealthy and prominent in Texas. For a fuller
account, see W. D. Wood, ’’Sketch of the Early Settlement
of Leon County, Its Organization and Some of the Early
Settlers,” Quarterly Journal of the Texas State Historical
Association/ IV (I96O), pp. 211-212.
•^ T h e Houston Post (undated) clipping in R.P .:
Printed Matter.
35
•^ Reagan, Memoirs, p. 51.
36
The Music children seemed to drop from the
picture, but Mrs. Mathes stated he provided for them until
they were adults.
Interview with Mrs. Mathes, April 18,
1971, at Beaumont, Texas.

22
37

Dictionary and Bouvier's Law Dictionary. 1

Since the

nearest lawyer was some sixty miles away, Reagan’s selfeducation went slowly, but, in 1846, he procured a license
to practice law in the district and inferior courts.

He

was elected in the same year to probate judge in Henderson
County.

38
By hard work and diligent single-mindedness, Reagan

educated himself.

The influence of an impoverished child

hood caused him to have a strong need for continuing upward
progress.

His strong colonial Christianity forced him to

be even more mindful to discipline himself for he feared
that he ’’might have added dishonor and disgrace to poverty
and toil."3*3
On February 19, 1846, President Anson Jones spoke
in Austin, to the people of Texas about the annexation of
Texas.

He captured the general feeling of the Texans when

he stated:

*' . . . (Texas) has become fixed forever in

that glorious constellation . . . The American Union. . . .
The final act in this great drama is now performed.
Republic of Texas is no more."^*3

The

So it was in the State of

37
-"Reagan, Memoirs, p. 51.
3^Ibid., p. 52.
39

Reagan to his children.

^President Anson Jones, Executive Record Book
Number 47, pp. 50-51, mss.
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Texas, rather than in the Republic of Texas that in 1&47>
Reagan began his public service.

He was elected as a

representative from the Nacogdoches district^ and served
on the following committees:

judiciary, public land and

land office, apportionment of representation, federal
relations and enrolled bills.
Reagan, in his Memoirs, related an incident that
illustrates his thoroughness as legislator and skill as a
speaker at this very early stage of his career.

He was

asked to prepare resolutions for the Federal Resolutions
Committee and was unaware that in so presenting them he
I p

was required to defend them.

Another member^

offered a

substitute for Reagan's resolution, speaking strongly in
favor of this substitution.

Reagan reported:

I was expecting some other member to reply to
him; but no one seemed to do so; and I saw all eyes
directed to me. It then flashed on me that having
made the resolutions I was expected to defend them.
I was a young and new member, and had never addressed
the House, but I made the best argument I could; and
when I sat down, M. B. Lamar, ex-president of the
Republic, then a representative from Webb County,
arose and said he had examined the resolutions with

^ This district was composed of what now comprises
the Counties of Nacogdoches, Angelina, Cherokee, Smith,
Henderson, Kaufman, Van Zandt, Rockwall, Rains, Wood, the
west half of Upshur, the north half of Dallas, and eight
and one-half miles in width of the south end of Hunt
County.
I

p

Benjamin Epperson, a Whig who was a member of
the legislature.
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care, and that they stated the views of the people and
of the South very clearly and correctly and that he
hoped they would be passed by the House unanimously
without the crossing of a t or the dotting of an i.
There were three votes for the substitute and the
resolutions were adopted,4-3
Reagan was defeated at the polls in the State
Senatorial race in 1&49.

Because he refused to sanction a

bill to validate clouded titles of settlers in the Peter's
Colony dispute, his popularity decreased enough to lose
the election by a small majority.
stated:

" . . .

In his Memoirs, he

I deliberately accepted defeat rather

than promise the people to do what I felt would operate to
their injury."^
In December of 1$52, Reagan married Edwina Moss
Nelms in Anderson, Grimes County, Texas.
" ...

45

Proctor stated

he found love and affection he had long done

without.

From her he acquired social grace and poise he
i/L
had never known. . . .
Six children were born to this
in
union; four of them lived to maturity.

^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 53•

^Ibid.
^Clarksville Northern Standard (February 5, 1$53).
^Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. $9.
^ O n e child died at birth and another at a very
young age. Reagan, Memoirs, p. 60; as reported in an inter
view between May Reagan Orr Mathes, at Beaumont, Texas, and
G.M.J.S., April IS, 1971.
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In the spring of 1#4$, Reagan had received his
regular license to practice law.

He was licensed to

practice in the Supreme Court of the State at the same
time.

In 1&57, he was licensed to practice in the Supreme
id
and inferior Courts of the United States.
He was elected
I

to a six-year term and served as district judge from 1&52
to IS 56.

In I& 56, he resigned the position of judge before

his term expired.

His reason was two-fold.

The first was

that the redistricting of the counties had changed the
electorate.

He stated that ” . . .

it would be fair to

allow the two newly added counties to have a voice in the
selection of their judge."

The second reason was that,

in 1$ 56, the legislature voted to increase judges’ s a l a r y ^
saying that the previous sum was not sufficient to secure
the best of legal talent for the bench.

Reagan’s resignation

4$

Ibid, p. 57* Reagan was the fifth person to
receive an honorary degree of doctor of laws from Tulane
University in Louisiana. He received this degree in 1896.
In 1903, he received the same degree from Baylor University
in Texas.
49

Reagan, Memoirs, p. 57. Also see: Crawford
County Missouri Democrat, April 30, 1$91. This action was
only a part of Reagan's demonstration of fairness, at the
price of personal cost, to his constituency.
It may have
been the reason that he continued to be referred to with
the title of "Judge" throughout his life, and even after
his death.
50
Gammel, Laws, Vol. IV, p. 249. Also see:
Governor Pease to Reagan, April £, and June 25, 1&56,
in R.P.: Letters. This was reported in Clarksville,
Texas, Northern Standard (April 26, IB 56).
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for these two reasons was immediately followed by his
announcement of candidacy for re-election, "giving as the
i
reason for my action that if the increased salary might
enable the people of the district to select an abler judge
it was my duty to give them a chance to do so."

51

He was

re-elected to district judge for another six-year term, but
this was not an easy victory, for the Know-Nothing Party
was making its final bid, in this race, for state-wide
power through Reagan's opponent, Harvard-educated John C.
Robertson.
spokesmen"

52
l

53

Reagan found himself one of the "leading
for the Democratic Party.

He tirelessly
i
5/,
traveled and spoke the length and breadth of his district y *
the people listened and were impressed.

Reagan had won the

election and the Know-Nothings were crushed in their Texas

^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 60; also: Bonham Weekly
Chronicle (October 14, 1897;•
52
y Letha Crews, "The Know-Nothing Party In Texas,"
M.A. Thesis, University of Texas, 1925. Platforms of
Political Parties in Texas, <ed. by Ernest William Winkler
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 1916).
^Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 94.
■^Edwina M. Reagan to her husband, May 11, 1356,
R.P.
^ E . M. Pease, Executive Record Book Number 276,
1353-1357, mss, p. 542, the official returns for the Ninth
District Judge were: Reagan 3,553; Robertson 2,050. For a
synopsis of Democratic success, see Clarksville Northern'
Standard (August 23, 1356). Also see: James M. Wiggins
to Reagan, August 5, 1356, in R.P.: Letters.

27
In 1857, Reagan’s name was prominently before the
people.

General Henderson, along with many other Democrats,

urged Reagan to run for governor, especially if Houston
should decide to enter the race, because they believed he
was the only man who could meet ’’Old Sam” in debate and
beat him.

Some clamored for him to contest the popular

L. D. Evans for Congress and thus to erase the KnowNothings from the political scene completely; still others
56
urged him to accept ei her nomination tendered him.
Reagan at first refused to consider their requests, for he
had been recently re-elected judge and " . . .

I did not

want to be placed in the position of seeking one office
while filling another."

57

However, he finally stated that

if he were nominated, he would not "feel at liberty to
decline the c o n t e s t . O n May 13, 1857, the Democrats of
the Eastern District, assembled at Tyler, Texas, nominated
Reagan for Congress.

59

Evans, the incumbent, was a man

•^Henderson to Reagan, March 31, 1857, in R»P«•
Letters; Reagan to Roberts, April 15, 1857; Reagan, Memoirs,
p. 6£; Clarksville Northern Standard (March 1A, 1357T*
:
57
'Reagan, Memoirs, p. 62.
^Rea g a n to Roberts, April 15, 1857, in Roberts
Papers.
59

Francis Richard Lubbock, Six Decades In Texas, ed.
by C. W. Raines (Austin: Ben C. Jones and Company, 1900),
pp. 212-213. Also see: Marshall, Texas, Texas Republican
(May 30, 1857), and Reagan, Memoirs, p. o2.
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with considerable political experience and was backed by
the Know-Nothing Party and thus by its leader, General Sam
Houston.

John H. Reagan was facing a difficult race

against the influence of "that fine old reprobate”
referred to Houston in later years.

as he

He was more diplomatic

at this point, however, for he stated:
I had necessarily to meet and overcome the influence
of General Houston, who had led the army of the
Republic to a great victory at San Jacinto, who had
been twice elected President of the Republic, and who
had served the State in the Senate of the United States
three terms. In combating his views I always did so
with great respect for his character, his distinguished
public service, and his greater age, dealing only with
the political principles involved in the contest and
never in personal unkindness .°1
Reports reached Reagan and other residents of East Texas
that Houston and Evans were touring the Northern counties
together.

Friends and supporters urged Reagan to begin

immediately on his campaign.^
Reagan proposed a joint campaign that would force
1
I
Evans to separate from Sam Houston. Such action would remove
Evans from his home territory and force him into the position
of verbally combating on a strange battlefield.

He sent the

&0
May Reagan Orr Mathes stated her grandfather, John
H. Reagan, constantly referred to General Sam: Houston by
this name. Interviewed by G.M.J.S., April 1$, 1971*
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 63 .

A.
T. Rainey to Reagan, May 18, 1857; and W. R. D
Ward to Reagan, June 3, 1857 > R.P.: Letters.
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proposed schedule to Evans with his request stating ” . . •
that if the dates and places of appointment did not meet
his approval, and he would prepare a list that suited him
I would join him in it.” *

As Evans was unable to decline

without an embarrassing explanation, he accepted in an
/Ii
unfriendly fashion
and the campaign was launched.
Reagan's first speech was at Palestine on June 6 ,
and he spoke briefly at Crockett before meeting Evans at
Woodville for the beginning debates.

65

Then the opponents

met in forty-eight joint discussions in thirty-six counties
by the first Monday in August.

66

Reagan's Democratic Platform was based on three
fundamental objections to the platform of the Know-Nothing,
or American Party.

Those objections were:

ought to be no religious test in politics;

(1) there
(2) the birth

place of a citizen should not be the test of his political

6 *5
■^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 63 .
^Austin, Texas, Texas State Gazette (July 11,
1857). This article is an interesting account of Evans'
irritation at Reagan's challenge.
65
Several of the debates are discussed in the
Henderson Democrat (June 27, 1857), anc^
‘t*ie Marshall,
Texas, Texas Republican (July 17, 1857).
^Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 63-64 . Also see:
McGraw, Professional Politicians, pp. 188-189.

William
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standing; and (3 ) secret political societies were un-

^17

American and unwise.
During the final debate at Jefferson, Reagan made
a dramatic finish by reading a letter handed him with a
note of permission for its usage, from Mrs. M. J. Claugh
of Marshall, that proved Evans ” . . .

had advocated dis

union as early as 1$50 and had eagerly desired that year
to attend the Nashville Convention composed of Southern
extremists.”

6$

According to Lubbock’s description:

Evans,

beside himself with rage, jumped to his feet and drew his
six-gun, denouncing Claugh for giving a private letter and
Reagan for using it.

Reagan also drew but facing him said

’’Judge Evans, let’s put up our six-shooters; I do not wish
to kill you, nor do I wish to be killed.
Congress, and I am going there.”

69

I want to go to

Reagan was elected by

an overwhelming majority by the Eastern District of Texas
to the United States Congress.

70

The Thirty-Fifth Congress to which Reagan proceeded
was filled with strife.

The Panic of 1$57 had shaken the

nation's confidence and intensified the sectional

67'Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 65- 66 .
6$

Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 97.

^Lubbock, Six Decades, pp. 21&-219.
^ A u s t i n Texas State Gazette (October 10, 1$57)>
and Clarksville Northern Standard (October 24> 1857.
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animosities.

The proposed admission of Kansas had widened

the gap between the North and the South.
Case

71

The Dred Scott

had not solved the nation’s slavery issue by a

Supreme Court decision and President James Buchanan was
72
determined to bring Kansas in as a slave state.
In
earlier years, extremists had harangued to half-empty
halls; now both Northerners and Southerners thronged to
Washington, believing in strength in numbers, to add support
to their representatives in the fierce slavery struggle.

73

There was still hope that a peaceful solution might be
found to prevent the irrepressible conflict between the
•Jl
two sections and cultures.

71

Chief Justice Roger B. Taney declared that since
Dred Scott was a Negro, he was not a citizen and, there
fore, could not appeal to the Supreme Court. Taney reasoned
that Scott was still a slave, that slaves were property and
under the Fifth Amendment Congress could not deprive people
of property without due process of law. Then he concluded
by declaring that states could exclude slavery from their
territory but Congress could not; consequently, the Missouri
Compromise of 1&20 was unconstitutional.
72
Alexander H. Stephens to his brother Linton,
January 20, 1$5$, in Richard Malcolm Johnson and William
Hand Browne,'Life of Alexander H. Stephens (Philadelphia:
J . B . Lippencourt, lB'/B;, p. 329.
73

Ben Perley Poore, Perley's Reminiscence of Sixty
Years In The National Metropolis, vol. I (Philadelphia:
W. A. Houghton, 1887)» pp. A-bO-340. <A description of
Washington at this time is found in sketchy form in George
W. Smyth to Reagan, September 15, 1&57> in R«P»: Letters.
^ I t was in 1&5S that Seward first used the term
’’irrepressible conflict.” See: Frederick Bancroft, The
Life of W illiam H. Seward (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1900), pp. 458-460.
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Reagan was nearly forty years old and no longer
the frail sickly young man who had come to Texas twenty
years before.

Proctor described Reagan's appearance in

185^:
Heavy muscled now and powerfully built; he appeared
rather stocky and much shorter than he actually was,
although well over six-feet tall. His broad, high
cheekboned face, bronzed and burned by the sun and
partially hidden by a full black beard and long lion
like mane, marked him with a certain fierceness and
ruggedness, or perhaps even stubbornness, so symbolic
of the frontier. And his most outstanding feature,
dark fathomless eyes, almost piercing at times, gave
ample warning to friend and foe alike to think well
and long before contesting him.75
During the first months in Congress, Reagan did little
1

speaking until he was sure of procedure and in full
ry/1

knowledge of detail involved in the issues.
Sectionalism continued to gain more and more
momentum and the Southern extremists were in favor of
filibustering to acquire additional territory from Mexico,
Cuba, and Central America, and for re-opening the African
slave-trade, to create additional slave States and to

7 *5

Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 101.
Wood, Reminiscences.

Also see:

Reagan to Roberts, September IS, 1&57, in
Roberts Papers., Reagan made his first motion in the House
on December 23, 1&57, hut was ruled out of order. He made
two attempts to introduce a bill on January 15 and 1&,
1&5&; he failed. On January 20, he introduced a bill
concerning Texas boundaries. United States Congress,
Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 171,

5137 32i; 345.----
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restore the balance of power between the North and the
South.

Upon his views being challenged on this point,

Reagan answered:
Now, in regard to the other question, as to
whether my sentiments favor the South, or agree with
the North, I desire to say this: That I have been,
and, I trust am, as faithful an advocate of the ,
doctrine of rights of the South, and of a strict
construction of the Constitution, as any man in the
country; and that whenever aggressions from any
source, or from any cause, shall be made on any of
the States, to strike down the rights of the States,
or deprive the people of any of their liberties, I
will unite with my people in any necessary movement
to protect their rights from aggression. I have
always professed to be a national man; and in twelve
speeches that I made in my district last summer, I
declared that I never'advocated a sentiment in Texas
which I would not advocate in every State, district
and township in the Union.
I repudiate all sectional heresies. I repudiate
everything that is not national; everything that
looks to the violation of the moral law, to build up
political parties, or sectional parties. . . .
I do
not love public life; and I would scorn it whenever
it is to be held by a sacrifice of that manly dignity
which ought to envelop every American freeman.
I
denounce fanaticism in the South with the same
distinctness that I denounce the fanaticism of
abolitionism in the North. They are both heresies.
They are alike dangerous to the Constitution and the
Union; alike dangerous to the mission of this great
and glorious Republic; alike opposed to every noble
aspiration of an American statesman and patriot.77
Reagan returned home after the 35th Congress
appalled at what he had witnessed.

He had seen the leaders

of the nation enraged, motivated by passion, and inexorably

77
1'Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd Session,
Part II, p . 1467.
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rosolved to uphold their own positions.

He had seen his

bills requesting frontier protection for Texas, reimbursement of Texas funds for expeditions against Indians,
79
settlement of the Texas-New Mexico boundary,
and the
go
impeachment of Judge John C. Watrus
ignored or repudiated.
He watched with alarm the bitterness brought on by the
defeat of the Cuban bill, homestead bill, the Post Office
appropriations, the Pacific Railroad, and internal
gl
improvements.
Reagan realized that men desiring union
and moderation were the only hope for the nation to con
tinue united.

For this reason, although he stated earlier
go
he would not seek re-election,
Reagan ran again for
Congress on this moderate and unionist platform.

When

Southern firebrands attacked him, influential citizens
such as George V. Smyth, J. W. Latimer, Samuel De Morse,
7g

Reagan was appointed to Indian Affairs Committee.
See: Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, pp.
31, 725, 1 0 7 2 , 1177» 1475, and 2nd Session, pp. 21&-219,
1046-1047, II64-I 4O7 .
79

Ibid., 35th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 321.

go
Austin Texas State Gazette (December 29, 1&5&
and February 16, 1859); and Clarksville Northern Standard
(January 8, and 29, 1859).
gl
Roy F. Nichols, The Disruption of American
Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948J,PP.
229-240.
Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 70, 72-73.
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do
and James W. Scott rose in defense. ^

Even Sam Houston

added to the praise that Reagan was a man of ” . . . genius,
di
integrity, and industry.” ^
Reagan won the Congressional contest and the
support of the Texans for the union and returned to the
political boiling pot of the 36th Congress of the United
States.

He stated:

1

I remained thus devoted to the Union until the
Republican party obtained the control of the govern
ment and answered our appeals for the protection
afforded by the Constitution, by saying they were in
the majority and that we had to submit; thus proposing
to substitute the will of a popular majority of the
people of the Union for the Constitution of the United
States, with its limitations on the powers of the
Federal Government.
I loved the American Union with
a passionate devotion, and witnessed with an aching
heart the unjust and unconstitutional crusade which
led to disunion and war. . . .
Up to this time I had
been an ardent Unionist, denouncing all schemes and
views favoring its disruption, whether they came from
the North or the South. But when we were told that
we must submit to the violations of the Constitution,
the overthrow of the rights of the States and the
destruction of three thousand million dollars worth
of property in slaves,— property recognized by the
Constitution, Federal and State laws, and by the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the Unites States,—
I could no longer agree to such a Union, and determined
to join in any measure which might defeat it.°5
do
Smyth was a former Congressman; Latimer was editor
of the Dallas Herald; Scott was part owner of the Houston
Telegraph and Texas Register; De Morse was editor of the
Clarksville Northern Standard. See: R.P., Clippings from
Galveston Civilian (April 26, 1359)» and lyler Reporter in
R.P., and Reagan to Smyth, May ll, 1359, and Smyth to
Reagan, May 21, 1359, in Smyth Papers.
^ Dallas Herald (April 17, 1359).
^Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 72-32.
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On December 14, 1&59, Reagan joined twenty-nine
Congressmen to issue a manifesto stating all arguments had
been exhausted and "that the primary object of each slaveholding State ought to be its speedy and absolute separation from the Union with hostile States.”

86

On

r

January 15, Reagan decided it was useless to remain in
Washington and he gave a farewell speech to the House.

He

still maintained:
I have to say in the end, that yet, almost hopeless as
it seems, I would be glad to see an effort made toward
conciliation. . . . Give us security in the Union.
Respect our rights in the common territories. So act
among yourselves as to let us know that we need no
longer live under continual fear of the consequences
of your actions.®'
Reagan had made a strong bid for the continuing
I

Union and had lost.

His destiny was now with Texas and

the South.

He was made a delegate to the Montgomery con88
vention along with Louis T. Wigfall and five others.

When he arrived Davis had already chosen, for their ability
and geographic representation, these men:

Robert Toombs

of Georgia as Secretary of State; Christopher C. Memminger

86

Marshall, Texas Republican (January 12, l$6l).

87
'Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2nd Session,
PP. 3^9-3977^----------SB
The five other delegates were John Hemphill,
General T. N. Waul, John Gregg, W. 0. Oldham, and William
B. Ochiltree. See: Clarksville Northern Standard
(February 23, lS6l); Austin State Gazette (February 9, 16,
lS6l).

of South Carolina, Secretary of the Treasury; Judah P.
Benjamin of Louisiana as Attorney General; Leroy Pope
Walker of Alabama, Secretary of War; and Stephen R. Mallory
of Florida, Secretary of the Navy.

Davis offered the Post

master General position to Reagan, who twice declined it
on the grounds that it would be newly-created, unorganized,
and without funds.

The people were accustomed to regular

service and would surely brand the Postmaster General as
incompetent.

Reagan stated:

” ...

while I would gladly

perform my duty to the Confederacy, I did not desire to
go
become a martyr.”
However, he was prevailed upon a third
time and accepted reluctantly ” . . .

instead of feeling

proud of the honor conferred on me, I felt that I was to
be condemned by the public for incapacity."

90

At first his ability to organize and administer was
loudly praised9^- but the inevitable occurred and the postal
department began to be bitterly assailed.

92

Reagan was

limited by a provision in the Confederate Constitution
go

Reagan, Memoirs, p. 110.

9QIbid.
9"4)allas Herald (April 21, 1&61); Austin Texas State
Gazette (April 27> 1861); Montgomery, Alabama, Weekly £ost
(.April lo, 1B61).
^Rich m o n d Enquirer (June IS. l$6l), Richmond Daily
Examiner (September 18, 19, 21, 1G61), and Nashville Banner
(September 20, l£6l) are good examples of the tirade upon
the postal department and Reagan.
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requiring a self-supporting Postal Department by March 1,

1^63 . He discontinued a number of small post offices,
reduced the franking privileges, drove hard bargains with
the railroads,

93

and increased the postal rates; in this

manner he managed to show a profit in his department.
Proctor summed up Reagan's position as Postmaster
General when he stated:
Yet against all opposition, against criticism and
abuse, against weariness caused by the never-ending
demands on his position during wartime, against the
demoralizing realization that the Confederacy was
being slowly but ruthlessly devastated, Reagan stood
unwaveringly performing his duties as best he could.
To the end, he remained loyal to his President, his
people and his new country.94
This loyalty was the exception rather than the rule.
Clement Eaton stated:
During the four year existence of the Confederacy,
fourteen appointees held the six cabinet positions.
Stephen Mallory and John Reagan were the only members
who retained their original positions until the end
of the war.95
Loyalty and full agreement are not necessarily
synonymous.

Such was the case with Reagan, the President

and other members of the Confederate cabinet.

Reagan

stated that he disagreed with the President "oftener" than

^Montgomery Daily Mail (April 29, 1361).
^^Proctor, Mot Without Honor, p. 140.
QK
Clement Easton, A History of the Southern
Confederacy (New York: The 5*ree Press, 1954)> p. 59.
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other members of the cabinet.

He offered to resign if he

was causing Davis embarrassment.

Davis replied that if

the cabinet should accept without question the opinions of
the President, he did not well see what their use could be
96
as advisors of the President.
The Confederacy’s days grew short and instructions
for its cessation began.

Reagan’s last instructions to

his postal department in Richmond, on April 2, 1365, con
cerned the destruction of some materials and the means of
preserving others.

The cabinet began its southward

journey to Danville, Virginia,
Carolina,

93

and Charlotte.

97

Greensboro, North

Lee had surrendered and the

cabinet was in danger; they now had a cavalry escort and
were fleeing to Washington, Georgia.

The cabinet members

99

left one by one until only Davis, Breckinridge, and Reagan
were left.

By then the situation was so serious that

96

Reagan, Memoirs, p. 162.

97

Ibid., p. 154* Also see: Joseph T, Durkin,
Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy Chief (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1954)> P» 33^..
^Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory, pp. 339-340.
99
At Charlotte, Attorney General George Davis
decided to remain and care for his children; Secretary of
Treasury George A. Trenholm, who was seriously ill, took
his leave; the faithful Mallory left for his home in
Florida; and at the Savannah River, Benjamin left them for
Louisiana. See: Reagan,Memoirs, pp. 203-224; Lubbock,
Six Decades, pp. 560-563; Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory,
PPT J& i= JIZ .
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Breckinridge ordered Reagan, who had been appointed
Secretary of the Treasury by Davis after Trenholm's resig
nation,'*'^ to distribute the silver coin among them.'*'^'*'
Breckinridge and Reagan left Davis only long
enough to complete their tasks in Washington, Georgia.

102

Reagan completed his first and rode on to join Davis in
his flight to Florida.

103

J

Lubbock was encountered on

this ride and joined them; thus it was that the Confederate
States of America ceased to exist entirely with the capture
of Davis, Reagan, and Lubbock by the Federal Troops.

Davis was determined that Reagan also accept
the Secretary of Treasury post. Although Reagan strenu
ously objected to holding two cabinet posts simultaneously
he finally accepted. Reagan, Memoirs, p. 209; Lubbock,
Six Decades, p. 565.
"^^Reagan, Memoirs, 214.
102
Reagan's postal tasks were few but the
Treasury was another matter. He paid the salaries of all
within the escort; handed over much of the Confederate
gold and silver to James A. Semple, a bonded naval
officer, and Mr. Tidwell, his assistant. He deposited
the funds of the Richmond banks in vault at Washington,
Georgia, and burned large boxes of Confederate paper
money. See: Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 213, 216; Lubbock,
Six Decades, pp. 56$-5fc>9; iLor a detailed account of the
Confederate bank funds, see: Otis Ashmore, "The Story
of the Virginia Bank Funds,” Georgia Historical Quarterly,
Vol. II (1918), pp. 171-197.
103
Davis had intended to go south to a point not
occupied by Federal troops, and then turn west to Texas.
Reagan, Memoirs, p. 212.
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Reagan was imprisoned at Fort Warren Prison,
Boston Harbour, Massachusetts.'^^'

He continued to feel a

close tie with Texans and he realized from newspaper
accounts that they were in danger of military government
and total Negro suffrage if they continued in their
embittered hostility to the Yankees.

In an open letter

for general publication on August 11, 1865, ^ ^ he wrote
to the citizens of Texas that they could avert disaster
only by renouncing slavery and secession and, if the Federal
Government required it, by enfranchising the freedman.

He

stated:
. . . to secure those desirable ends we must bury
past animosities with those of our fellow citizens
with whom we have been at war, and cultivate with
them feelings of mutual charity and fraternal good
will. . . . I know the painful struggles against
education, and habit, and tradition, and prejudice,
which such a course will require you to encounter,
and how hard it is for human nature to overcome such
difficulties. But my sincere prayer is that God, in
His goodness and mercy, may enable you to exhibit

For a vivid account of his life in prison, see:
Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 224-225; Reagan’s letter to his
children, June 2$, 1365. An interview with May Reagan
Orr Mathes with G.M.J.S., on April 18, 1971, also added
to this picture. For a more picturesque description of
prison life, see: Alexander H. Stephens, Recollections:
His Diary When A Prisoner At Fort Warren, Boston Harbour,
1865, ed. by Marta Lockett Avary (New York: 'Doubleday,
Page and Company, 1910), pp. 149, 210-211, 378-389,
457-458.
105
This letter is known as his Fort Warren Letter.
See: Reagan to Major General Hooker, August 11, 1865,
R.P., and New York Times (October 18, l8o5).
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this last crowning evidence, in the midst of your
calamities and sorrows, of your greatness and
wisdom.10°
Shortly after this letter was written, Reagan was
united with Alexander H. Stephens

107

for a visitation

period each day and gradually the prison restrictions
disappeared until they were released on October 12,
1865.^^

Upon arriving in G a l v e s t o n , R e a g a n was

informed that the attitude of the people of Texas was
cold.

Their animosity extended to the belief that

. . . every man in Texas who expects to be a candidate
for anything from governor to constable seems to
regard it as his duty to denounce you morning and
night, under the supposition that while in prison you
weakened in your devotion to the South and had come
out for Negro suffrage.H O
So John H. Reagan, the man Stephens described as
"a clever, upright, honest man . . . The real foundation
i

of his character are truth, integrity and energy" returned

1 r\£L

Reagan, Fort Warren Letter.
^■^Stephen’s, Recollections, pp. 457-531; Reagan
to Mrs. Solter, August 29, 18fc>5, in R.P.; Letters. Also
see: Dallas Herald (November 11, 1865); Boston Herald
(October 10, 12, 1865)•
■^^Boston Herald (October 12, 1865); and Dallas
Herald (November 11, 1865).
■^^Orders of Extension of Parole, October 28,
1865, in R.P.: Letters: and Galveston Flakes Daily
Bulletin (December 5, 1865).
^■■^This was ex-governor Henderson's statement to
Reagan, in Houston, just after Reagan's return. Reagan,
Memoirs, p. 234.
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to his home after four years of toil, imprisonment, and
self-sacrifice in behalf of the people of the South, only
to find he was denounced by his own people.

He returned

to Fort Houston, just outside of Nacogdoches, Texas, to
his wrecked home, burned fields, and his motherless
children.
i

Reagan foresaw what was going to happen in Recon
struction but his unpopularity was only enhanced when he
issued another public letter to Governor Throckmorton
along the same lines as the Fort Warren Letter.
fell on hostile ears.

112

The advice

Reagan farmed his land and on

May 31t 1366, he was married again to Molly Ford Taylor.

113

The Reconstruction did fall on Texan backs and
with it came a return of faith in R e a g a n . B u t as Reagan
11S
lamented, it was "Too late! Too late!"
At this time
General Griffin, in charge of the Department of Texas,
offered Reagan the governorship of Texas because Reagan

111

His wife had died, in Virginia, during the
Civil War.
1“|p
Reagan to Thomas J. Ward, September 2$, 1866,
R.P.: Letters; Dallas Herald (November 10, 1866);
Marshall Texas Republican (November 17, 1366).
"^Dallas Herald (June 30, 1866); Reagan, Memoirs,
p. 235; Reagan to Jeff Davis, May 21, 1867, R.P.: Letters.
R.P.:

■^^Reagan to A. G. Caultey, March 14, 1867, in
Microfilm.
■'■■'■^Dallas Herald (April 13, 1867).
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was a conservative man.

Reagan refused the offer stating

that only by choice of the people would he accept the

Reagan began to be active in politics once more,
toward the end of the Reconstruction for he believed that,
by a strong Democratic Party organization, Texans could
present a solid front and legally deter the Radical
power.

117
'

He worked diligently and arduously for the

Democratic Party and for the ratification of the 1$69 Texas
Constitution.

11$

In 1$74> Reagan, whose citizenship had
,
1]Q
been restored on December 27 > 1873 >
was selected as

Reagan, Memoirs, p. 240. The second time it
was virtually offered was in 1$7$ when there was a dead
lock in the Democratic Convention and Reagan was asked to
accept the nomination and almost certain election. Reagan
refused because his Interstate Commerce Bill was to be
introduced in the next session of Congress and he con
sidered this more important "to the interest of the whole
country." Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 245-246. Lubbock, Six
Decades, pp. 614-613"!
^■^Reagan to Burney, September 9, 1$6$, in R.P.:
Letters.
11$
Once more Texas was in the Union and the
people under the United States Constitution and Reagan
wrote " . . . there is a future for me, for my wife and
children, for my country." Reagan to Haynes, May 20,
1$69, in R.P.: Letters.
^ ^ U n i t e d states Congress, Statutes at Large,
Vol. XVIII, pt. 3, p. 529.
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the Congressional nominee for the Democrats of the First
Congressional District of Texas.

120

Although he was virtually elected, as the Demo
cratic nominee, Reagan campaigned hard against his
Republican opponent.

121

His platform was simple:
i

I shall endeavor to do everything to promote the
interest of my State, but while I shall resist un
democratic rules of policy, it will be my duty to
fight against the contest of war . . . to heal the
deep wounds of.the past, and restore fraternal re
lations. ^22
Reagan was elected on this platform of reconciliation and
sent to the House of Representatives from the State of
Texas to the 44th Congress of the United States, in 1875f

He remained in Congress as a Representative from
I
1$75 through 1$S7 when he was elected by the people of
Texas to the United States Senate.

During his years as

Representative, he served on the Committee on the Expendi
tures of the Post Office Department and, throughout his
i

term in the House, he served on the Commerce Committee,

^Galveston Daily Hews (September 3» 5* 6 , 1$74)»
121
His Republican opponent was Judge William C.
Chambers. Dallas Herald (September 22, 24> 26, 29> 30,
October 1$, November 1, 1&74; covers this campaign well.
^^Galveston Daily News (September 24> 1$74)
quoting his Jacksonville, Texas, speech.
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acting for ten years as chairman.
Reagan's Congressional career.

123

^

Many issues occupied

Among the foremost issues,

he was active in securing the necessary appropriations for
the improvement of southern rivers and harbors; he also
worked for the revision of the Revised Statutes regulating
(

“I p i

internal and ocean navigation.

He spoke for the re

uniting of the Union and defended the southern cause on
the floor of the House.

125

He worked toward securing the

^Reagan, Memoirs, p. 248. He was made chairman
on October 29, 1877; see: United States Congress, Con
gressional Record, 45th Congress, 1st Session, p. 197.
■^^For some of Reagan's work toward this betterment
of industry through improved rivers and harbors, see:
Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 3rd Session, pp.
1155," 1215, I P ^ I W O , 1512, 1571, 1622, 1639, 22$5,
2365-236$; 46th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 3399, 3434-3441,
4314-4315, 4338-4343, 4346-4347, 4379-4380; 46th Congress,
3rd Session, pp. 1356-3158, 1391, 1522-1538, 1612-1633,
1635-1663, 1665-16$7, 2232, 2387-2490; 47th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 4959-4961, 5058, 6145. One of his most
outstanding speeches on the floor of the House was made
in behalf of preserving the Pensacola Naval Yards, 44th
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 3217-321$.
125

In voting for the appropriations bill for the
Centennial on January 19, 1$76, Reagan addressed the House
asking for restoration of citizenship to the men of the
South who were still disenfranchized. Congressional
Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 507-568. 307so
see: Reagan, Memoirs, p. 242. For other instances of
speaking in defense of the Southern cause see: Conressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 386,
89-390, 610, 4035; 44th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.
702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 335, 696 ; 45th
Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 3275, 3799, $546; 45th Congress,
3rd Session, pp. 97, 198.

f
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"I

defense of the frontier of Texas.

Historians agree

that the most noted work of John H. Reagan, in the House
of Representatives, was that which was concerned with
securing the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act and
the regulation of railroads.
He presented the first bill on May 8, 1 8 7 8 , asking
the regulation of interstate commerce and the prohibition
of unjust discrimination by common carriers.

127

He summed

up the content of that bill and the concepts he fought for
in regard to its immediate passage and the later ramifi
cations of this regulatory legislation in his Memoirs.
He listed the following principles:
1. That railroads receive their franchises from
the public for the public good as well as for the
profit of the stockholders.
2. That monopolies and perpetuities are contrary
to the genius of a free people, and cannot be allowed
or maintained in this country.
3. That the political authority of this country
cannot, either in the States or Congress, create a
power, whether corporate or otherwise, superior to
the power and authority of the people themselves; one
which may oppress and wrong them without lawful remedy
and control; for all power is inherent in the people
and all just and legal government is designed to promote
the public welfare.
4. That railroad corporations are in an important
sense public corporations, and are always recognized
as quasi-public corporations.
1

1 oA

Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 295-297 7 218b, 4b 39- 4bZt.l. Also see: Reagan, Memoirs,
p. 242.
127
'Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 2nd Session,
pp. 3096-3097, 3275-3280; Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 243-244*

48
This is so:
5. Because they are created by the public political
authority to promote the public good.
6 . Because, for the purposes of their being, they
are clothed with the right of eminent domain. And/
this cannot be conferred under our constitutional form
of government on private persons or for private uses.
Private property can only be taken for public uses
and upon just compensation.
7. Railroad companies and others engaged in the
general transportation of merchandise are carriers
for hire.
8 . They are engaged in a public employment affect
ing the public interest.
9. Hence they are subject to regulation and
control by the political authority.128
He offered legal supportive authorities here and throughout
his prolific speaking on these topics.

12$

Reagan, Memoirs, pp. 243-244* Also see: Conressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st Session, p. 5029;
5th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 19-23; "Arguments and
Statements before the Committee on Commerce in Relation to
Certain Bills Referred to that Committee Proposing Con
gressional .Regulation of Interstate Commerce," United States
Congress, 47th Congress, 1st Session; United States Con- /
gress, House Committee Reports, 45th Congress, 2nd
Session, Report number &45.
129
Since this was one of the most debated pieces
of legislation to occupy the House floor during Reagan's
Congressional terms, it is not feasible to list all of
the pages in the Congressional Record that dealt with
Interstate Commerce and Railroad Regulations. For the most
illuminating materials see those listed in footnote 127
and in Congressional Record, 45th Congress, 3rd Session,
pp. 19, 93-102; 46th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 1079-1081,
1154-1155, 3409, 3936-3987, 4338-4343; 46th Congress, 3rd
Session, pp. 132-134. The Galveston Daily News (September
7, 22, 25> 26; October 4> 5; December 15, 20, 1878;
June o, 1879; February 20, 25, 1880) covered parts of the
debate and reaction of the people. For partial coverage
of the reaction in the North to these measures see:
New York Daily Tribune (December 6 , 7, 13> 1879 and
January 3, I 80O).
”
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Reagan served in the United States Senate from
1SSS to 1S91.

At this time he resigned to accept the

position as chairman of Texas' first Railroad Commission.

13 0

He served in this capacity until 1903, when he retired to
write his memoirs.

His decision to write the account him

self was probably best stated in a letter to a friend in
1900.

He said:

and . . .

"(I) . . . fought life's battles unaided

(preferred) to maintain this position during

the few remaining years.”

131

John H. Reagan were not many.

The years remaining to
On March 6 , 1905, the "Old

Roman” of Texas died of pneumonia.
In 1962, Dr. Ben H. Proctor published a biography
of John Henniger Reagan entitled Not Without Honor:
Life of John H. Reagan.

The

His closing is succinct and

apropos:
Thus died John H. Reagan, a man who came from
humble beginnings, who with unyielding tenacity edu
cated himself, and who by sheer determination and
integrity of character became one of the outstanding
men of his time. Throughout his life he had fought
the good fight; he had kept faith with his people;
he had remained true to his convictions. To Texas
and the South this made him a statesman, yea, even a
prophet. And, even in his own country, in death as
in life, he was not without honor . 132

130

Reagan, Memoirs, p. 249.

^Reagan to C. H. Jones, March 26, 1900, R.P.:
Letters.
132pr 0ctor, Not Without Honor, p. 301.

CHAPTER II
THE RAILROAD-MONOPOLY ABUSE SPEECH
TO THE SENATE, FEBRUARY 27, 1889
ISSUE AND OCCASION
By the late l870’s, railroads had become such a
vast, complex lifeline to the whole nation’s economy that
a series of problems arose.

A utility this huge, uniting

the great number of industries and the United States’
agricultural locales, needed some legal basis of making
order out of chaos.^

Railroad business practices were

in utter confusion.
Some 300 independent companies, large and small,
with a total capital of $ 2.5 billion in 1870, and
$4.2 billion in 1$78 > operated in a partly unexplored
corporate legal jungle, in which even the ’’honest”
entrepreneurs felt compelled to fight the predatory
type with every weapon of competition between many
lines serving major points. . . . small, short rail
roads were sometimes built solely to steal traffic

Not just the railroads were in a chaotic con
dition but the whole nation’s life was rife with unrest.
The scandalously corrupt and disputed Presidential election
was occurring, neglected State governments were hotbeds
of dishonesty, and a deep economic depression existed.
Unemployment was at an unmeasured high and competitors
in business were cutting each other's throat.
50
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away from the major roads in critical areas, with the
ultimate aim of forcing the big company to buy up the
parasite at a large profit to its promoters. 2
Although labor trouble created some national excitement
in 1377)

the real economic problem was rate setting.

Each railroad had some area of monopoly in transportation
and each railroad could, and did, levy high rates.

The

high costs had to be met by the captive shippers who had
no access to competing roads.

Under the fairest system,

the allocation of cost would have been impossible to
standardize because of the loading and unloading expenses.
A railroad could take a large load at a cheaper price
because a total car could be shipped and unloaded only
once, while smaller loads necessitated the delay of an
entire train at the destined points of the cargo.
Another complexity was the value of the shipped
merchandise.

If business was slow, the freight agent

could cut the price by altering the classification of
goods.

This ability of the freight agent to make on-the-spot

decisions was in itself an entanglement.

The whole intricate

situation abounded with potential and actual discrimination.

o

Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Railroads: Their
Origin and Problems, "Introduction to the J . and J • Harper
Edition," by Thomas C. Cockran (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. xiii.
•^Thomas C. Cockran, Railroad Leaders 1345-1390:
The Business Mind in Action (Cambridge: Harvard University
PressT 1933")', pp. 174-175".
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State regulation had been imposed but was generally
ineffective because the railroads crossed state lines.
Reagan supported the Interstate Commerce Act in the House
and saw it passed there.

In the Senate, a special com

mittee to investigate railroads was formed and was headed
by Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois.

His findings contained

the familiar abuses of high local rates, discrimination
between persons, places, and classifications of freight,
secret rebates, passes, and watered stock in the companies.^
The Reagan bill in the House and the Cullom bill in the
Senate were molded by conferences into the Interstate
Commerce Act which became law in January, lS$7.
The bill's language was vague.
rates would be "reasonable and just.”

It stated that all
It also prohibited

the common practices of rebates, drawbacks, and pools.
The railroads were required to publish rate schedules,
post them in their depots and file them with the govern
ment.

They were also to charge the same rate for short
£

and long hauls.

A five-man Interstate Commerce Commission

^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 4396-4423^United States Statutes at Large, XXIV, pp. 379-3&1Thomas Cooley, a judge from Michigan, William R.
Morrison of Illinois, August Schoonmaker of New York,
A. F. Walker of Vermont, and Walter Bragg of Alabama formed
the Commission.
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was formed to administer the act and enforce its prohi
bitions; the enforcement was to be achieved through
federal courts.
The law proved difficult to administer and enforce,
and the court was almost immediately inundated with com
plaints; ” . . .

over a thousand questions and complaints

poured in upon it in the first few months.”

7

The "short

haul provision" and the interpretation of "reasonable and
just" provided the courts with difficult problems.

Stover

stated in American Railroads:
Qualified though the new Commissioners were, the task
of applying the law to the complicated railroad rate
structure was like "cutting a path through a jungle."
Just what were "reasonable and just" railroad rates?
. . . The major flaw in the total regulation lay in
the lack of any effective means for the Commission to
enforce the decisions it might make. Its cease-anddesist orders were often ignored by the carriers, and
any resulting court action was slowed by appeals or
demands for new hearings.
In the nineties the average
court case lasted for four years and many dragged on
much longer.®
Informal rulings to railroads and refusal to give
informal opinions to shippers was the cause of much con
cern in the early years of the Interstate Commerce Com
mission.

The Commission decided it would "not express

opinions on abstract questions, nor on questions presented

^John A. Garraty, The New Commonwealth, 1677-1690
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966), p. Il8.
John F. Stover, American Railroads (Chicago:
University Press, 1961), p T T J
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by ex-parte statements of fact, nor on questions of the
q
construction of the statute, . • ."
But the Commission
"not infrequently broke this rule, as it did many others,
for the giant railroads.""*"^

According to one historian,^

a shipper to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission had
refused a preliminary opinion had three alternatives.

He

could forget about it, he could allow the Commission to
mediate with the road with a hope that a settlement would
be worked out and the railroad would be charitable,
he could initiate a formal case against the roads.

12

or

How

ever, the "last alternative of initiating a formal case
against the road, was incredibly expensive and time con13
suming for the average shipper." ^

The railroads met to

try to heal their own p r o b lems^ and at least some railroad

Q

Interstate Commerce Commission, First Annual
Report, December 1, 1&&7> Washington; File 459S> p. 25.
"^Railroad Gazette, Vol. 21 (August 30, l££9),
p. 565.
■^Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulations. 1&77-1916
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19o5),
pp. 55-56.
12
The Commission wrote in l£$7 that this the second
method of letting the Interstate Commerce Commission and
railroads mediate was the best method, stating: "This
method of disposing of complaints is believed by the Com
mission to be more useful than any other. . . ." I.C.C.,
First Annual Report, p. 26.

13Ibid., p. 56.
^Kolko, Railroads and Regulations, pp. 53-63.
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leaders felt that the "railroad system must heal itself;
no act of Congress, or repeal of any act of Congress, will
greatly help it."

15

But the Senate did attempt to alleviate
l6
some problems by amending the legislation
that caused the

flooding of the federal courts.
The federal courts were so overcrowded by 1$&9
that Congress attempted to straighten out some of their
problems by amending parts of the Interstate Commerce Act
and adding specifics.

The House had sent up a bill to

attempt the regulation through the third and seventh
amendments.

Senator Sherman had spoken at length in

behalf of the third amendment intended to strengthen the
section dealing with rate control but had dismissed the
seventh amendment that concerned state courts' jurisdiction
with approval but few words.

15

17
'

Senator Reagan from Texas

Speech of Charles Frances Adams, Jr., December,
lSSS, in C. C. McCain, ed., Compendium of Transportation
Theories (Washington: Kensington Publishing Co., 1&93)V
p T “O T 7 ”
1_6
House Bill S2$51 to amend an act entitled "An
Act to Regulate Commerce," approved February l+, 1$£7«
17
Relative to the third amendment, Sherman stated:
"There are two amendments to this bill not dis
posed of by the conference committee, one of which I shall
comment upon in a moment, and the other gives to the State
courts jurisdiction in certain cases of matters arising
under the interstate-commerce law. I am not prepared to
give any opinion upon the second amendment except to
express the general belief that in all questions of internal

56
obtained the floor to support Mr. Sherman's amendment and
to include a possible solution to the problem by supporting
the seventh amendment sent from the House.

The proposed

solution involved the sanction of Congress for the trial
of such cases to be allowed also in the State courts of
the person filing the complaint against the railroads.
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
As late as 1937» when railroads were still the
main artery of the nation's economy, experts continued to
discuss the confusion caused by the Interstate Commerce
Act's relationship to railroads.

A former member of the

Interstate Commerce Commission, Thomas F. Woodlock, stated
that
. . . the "public mind"— in that phrase I include the
public itself, Congress and the Interstate Commerce
Commission— has from the very beginning been con
siderably confused in dealing with this matter of
competition in the railroad industry, and . . . this

commerce local in character the State courts may properly
be intrusted with the enforcement of national law.
"There never has been any difficulty growing out
of the jurisdiction given to the State courts in suits in
which national banks are interested, and I do not believe
there will be any serious difficulty in conferring upon
the State courts jurisdiction in respect to the matters
of interstate commerce, reserving, however, the right to
appeal to or transfer those cases to the courts of the
United States." Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 2375.
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confusion is still one of the main ingredients in
what we call the ’’railroad problem.” 1°
Certainly the confusion existed during the beginning years
of this act's inception with a Senate majority of Re
publicans torn between anti-monopoly laws and loyalty to
the northern entrepreneur.

The railroads and Standard Oil

were two of the great trusts that forced these laws into
the foreground.
In 13$4> the Republicans ignored the trust problem
and Democrats only vaguely hinted at limiting monopoly
power but, by l£S$, Cleveland and Harrison both listened
to their constituency and spoke against the "iron heel"
of the trusts.
Some of the states, including Texas as an outstanding example,

10

were spelling out illegalities and

imposing specific penalties on violators of state anti
trust acts.

However, most of these states were either

located in the West or in the South, where few industries
existed, and so were ineffective.

They were also

IS

Thomas F. Woodlock, "Competition Within and
Without The Railroad Industry," Proceedings of the Academy
of Political Science, Transportation Development in the
United States, ed. by John A. Krout C^Jew York: The
Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 1937)>
p. 66.
^ T h e Texas Antitrust Act of 1$99 carried heavy
penalties against combinations restricting trade, fixing
prices, or limiting production. See: Fehrenbach, Lone
Star, pp. 621-622.

ineffective because most combinations were engaged in
interstate commerce.
But, with some of the Republicans espousing the
antitrust and interstate commerce laws, the Senate found
strange bedfellows in northern and southern leaders.
Senator Sherman of Ohio and John Reagan of Texas found
themselves now on the same side of the issue.

Sherman

spoke on the need to sanction the third amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act sent for senatorial ratification
from the House.
control.

This amendment dealt with monopoly

Sherman gave cursory treatment to sanctioning

the seventh amendment to the bill dealing with state
courts.

Reagan spoke in much the same vein as Sherman

but gave fuller treatment than Sherman to the seventh
amendment, which would confer ’’concurrent jurisdiction
with the United States courts . . .
competent jurisdiction.”

upon State courts of

20

Not all the Republicans were for monopoly control
and the proponents of strong third and seventh amendments
to the Interstate Commerce Act found opposition in two
outstanding Republicans.

Senator Platt of Connecticut

and Senator Hoar of Massachusetts were two of the most
outspoken opponents of these measures.

20

Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 23&1*..
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DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
One of the basic concepts that seemed to form the
nucleus of Reagan’s political speaking was presented in
his speech on railroad-monopoly control.

This concept

was that the rights of individuals must be preserved and
protected against economic and political infringement,
Reagan was a frontiersman as his father had been
before him.

In his youth, he had found gainful employ

ment in working to survey and carve the State of Texas.
He was a man of the land and of the people and was cognizant
of the problems of the people.

He was aware that this was

a new era characterized by an increased scarcity of land
and a rapid expansion of population.

22

21

He was also aware

that combined elements of land scarcity and population
expansion were forcing the people into a new frontier that
was completely changing their lifestyle.

The land was no

longer available so men turned to the rapidly increasing

21

In lSBO, there were five territories which had
less than fifty thousand inhabitants each, and, in 1900,
only Nevada and Wyoming had not passed the one hundred
thousand mark.
The western lands available for homestead
ing was being rapidly exhausted. United States Department
of Agriculture Year Book (1&&9), p. 327*
22
Between lB&O and 1900, twenty-six million people
were added to the population. This number was greater
than the entire number of inhabitants in 1&50. Davis
Rich Dewey, National Problems, 1885-1897 (New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1907), p. 5.

industrial complexes to earn their livelihood and thereby
increased again the advance of industry.

With this

advance of industrial employment came a need for transpor
tation of raw materials, finished products, and foods.
The increased need for these goods and services gave rise
to the railroads and to monopolistic corporate giants.
These monopolies infringed upon the rights of the
individual citizen all too often according to Reagan’s
concept and he identified himself with the movement to
eliminate some of those infringements through legislation.
Earlier in the House, Reagan had stated that "the Govern
ment has been run in the interest of specially favored
classes . . .

to the injury and oppression of those

engaged in agriculture, in the mechanical arts, and in
labor, and in professional vocations.

23

He had applied

himself to the task of trying to alleviate this injury
and oppression while in the H o u s e ^ and in the present
speech he was again concerned with the same task.

^Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st Session,
p. 4591.
2^Some examples of Reagan’s attempts to help the
individual may be found in his speeches reported in Con
gressional Record, Hearings of 1882, pp. 235-269; 47th""
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 4541—4543f 4959-4961, 5009,
5018, 5059, 5065, 6145, 6176, Appendix, pp. 130-142; 2nd
Session, pp. 306, 348, 381, 971-974, 1743, 2235, 3585,
2825; 48th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 117, 223, 1527,
1546, 2350-2352. Examples of newspaper coverage of
Reagan's work in this area may be found in Galveston Daily
News (April 1, May 14, 17, 18, 19, 23, 27, 21, 1882) and
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Reagan developed the theme of individual rights
by the use of a pattern reminiscent of debate.

He first

attempted to prove that the economic rights of individual
citizens were being infringed upon and then he spoke for
a plan to solve some of the economic problems through
political means.

He used the two amendments to House Bill

S2B51 as a divisional apparatus, -arranging the development
around the two amendments.
Reagan maintained that the small shipper of oils
was being discriminated against since the Standard Oil
Trust could, and did, ship their oil in tank cars at a
discounted price and that this same price should be
afforded all shippers or should be discontinued.

His

first disclosure of the discrimination theme was developed
through documented proof of attempted control of the
industry by the stockholders of Standard Oil.

The con

trolling stockholders of Standard Oil also owned the major
25
stock in subsidiary companies ' and in the railroads.

This

in the Dallas Weekly Herald (June 14, 2$, 1$$3)» Dis
cussion of the topic can be found in the letters of James
Jones to Reagan, May 1, 1$£2, R.P.: Microfilm; J. G.
Carlisle to Reagan, August 23, 1882, Reagan to' Roberts,
January 10, 1S$4, and Reagan to L. M. Swan, January 24,
1SB4, in R.P.: Letters.
25
'For example, Reagan pointed out that Standard
Oil manufactured and owned three-fourths of all tank cars
used for the transporting of oil by rail.
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multi-business ownership had become so large that the
stockholders were in a position to discriminate against
small companies at will and they were exercising this
power against smaller competition.

The smaller shipper

was forced to ship by barrel and thus paid twenty percent
more than the tank car shipper.
The theme was developed smoothly and with relative
thoroughness up to this point.

Reagan produced factual

evidence to substantiate his arguments.

However, he broke

his pattern by the inclusion of a long digression con
cerning the relative safety of tank cars as compared to
barrel transportation.

This passage was apparently

inserted to substantiate a rumor to the effect that tank
cars were unsafe and Reagan apparently introduced the idea
in anticipation of a point that might later be made.
Reagan realized the irrelevance of the argument to his
overall organization for he stated that it " , , . may be
as well here as elsewhere to discuss the question of
relative danger of transporting oil in tank cars and in
barrels.”

This might well have been good persuasive

strategy but it did not seem relevant to the organization
patterns which he had developed.

n Zl

Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd
Session, p. £380.

Reagan, having completed his thematic patterns to
augment his contention that the third amendment to the
railroad-monopoly control bill be upheld, turned to the
seventh amendment.

Here he again hoped that the Senate

would support the seventh amendment that would allow the
state civil courts to try some railroad-monopoly dis
criminatory cases.

At this point, Reagan attempted to

develop the idea that state courts should be used to
accommodate the "less-moneyed litigant” in suits against
the railroads and monopolies when economic infringement
by these parties occurred.

This theme was less lengthy

in presentation but was more complicated in development.
In this section Reagan not only spoke about the rights of
individuals but he also appeared to relate that theme to
another basic theme, the rights of the states to govern
themselves.
It must be remembered that the old statesman’s
background of political upheaval surely must have colored
his thinking on issues that concerned the rights of the
states.

He had begun his political career with con

troversy over the division of state and federal power in
the pre-Civil War Congress and he had continued the con
troversy through the years of the total disintegration of
the southern states, the reconstruction period and the
gradual resumption of these states rights.

He was aware

of any attempt to infringe upon these rights and he took
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every opportunity to defend and extol the states' right to
27
govern their own.
Although Reagan had worked in the House to secure
the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, which gave
more power to the federal government, he did so to protect
the several states of the south and west from the vio
lation of their rights by the northern monopolists and
railroad magnates.

He worked toward federal legislation

only after it became apparent that the laws of the states
could not control the railroad lines that crossed their
territorial boundaries.

Texas had the most stringent of

these laws and yet Reagan's home state could not gain
effective control of monopoly.

In the speech to the

Senate, he developed the theme that individual rights
were being violated and that a remedy for these violations
was at hand.

This remedy was to allow the state courts to

have the right of trial in the home state of the injured
party.

Such a procedure would not only expedite a quicker

clearing of the over-burdened federal courts but would also
put power into the state courts using nationally binding

^ F o r some examples of Reagan's comments and ideas
on states rights see: Congressional Record, 44th.Congress,
1st Session, pp. 50$, 610; 45th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 335, 69 d ; 45th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3275; 45th
Congress, 3rd Session, pp. 97-9$; 51st Congress, 1st
Session, p. 1724; 51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 917,
B546.

laws.

He attempted to develop this theme by the reading

of a source concerning civil cases with particular emphasis
on the situation of two banks.

His second theme was

stronger not so much in supporting evidence as in the
presentation of the plight of small claimants.
MODES OF PROOF
Reagan used logical, ethical, and emotional proofs
in the railroad-monopoly abuse speech.

The object of this

portion of the study was to examine these proofs and their
development.
LOGICAL PROOF
Reagan’s senatorial audience held a variety of
sectional interests.

At most times the audience was split

according to the section and/or belief of the immediate
speaker.

Reagan chose to use logical argumentation most

heavily in his attempt to convince the majority of his
senatorial audience that his ideas should be considered
for legislation.

He made use of reasoning from example,

authority, and causal relationship within the speech.
Reasoning from example
Reagan used a number of examples to support his
arguments within the speech.

He used examples to prove

the discrimination of the Standard Oil Company and the

railroads against the smaller shippers of oil.

As one

instance of discrimination, he pointed out that the small
shipper could not use tank cars since Standard Oil manu
factured and owned three quarters of all existing tank
cars, amounting to about four thousand tank cars, and the
next largest holder of tank cars was the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company,

These companies could ship their oil in

tanks, which gave them a twenty percent advantage since
the barrel shipper must also bear the weight of the barrel.
Specifically, the tanker shipped 400 pounds of oil at the
same price that the barrel shipper transported 325 pounds
of oil.

A second example of discrimination was the pay

ment of three-fourths cent per mile trackage to the tanker.
He used the South Improvement Company and rate tables from
affected rail routes as examples of that type of dis
crimination.

He also used the court cases of Rice vs. the

Railroads and the Railroad Company vs. Pratt as examples
of the discriminatory practices of railroads.

The example

used from the Pratt case dealt with suitability of the
type of haulage vehicle that the railways were ordered to
supply the shipper.

His example from Rice vs. the Railroad

was concerned with an oil producer's use of a wagon to
transport his oil forty miles because it was cheaper than
rail rates under the discriminatory practice procedure.
Reagan employed specific examples to prove the
growth of the giant corporation known as the Standard Oil
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and Trust Company and their control of subsidiary railroad
stock.

He listed the names and holdings of its trustees

who controlled "one-seventh of the railroads of this
country."

23

These stockholders owned and controlled an

aggregate of " . . . 19>144 miles of railway, with assets
aggregating $£12,350,167.24."
Reagan also used examples from newspapers from
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on two dates and one from
Denver, Colorado, to prove that tank cars were less safe
than barrels in shipping.

29

Most of the examples used by Reagan against the
monopolistic infringement on individual rights were
factual and applicable, and they supported his arguments.
However, one group of examples that was not strong tended
to discount the validity of the theme of tank car safety.

23

Reagan's examples included: H. M. Flagler and
Benjamin Brewster (trustees) were directors in the Minnesota
Iron Company with a capital of $20,000,000 and owned the
capital stock in the Duluth and Iron Range Railroad. H. M.
Flagler also was a director of Western Union Telegraph
Company which had capital of $30,000,000. He stated:
" . . . the trustees of the Standard Oil Company are
presidents and directors of in 9,493 miles of railroad,
with assets amounting to $ 14^,733,^33 .75 , while the
subordinate officers of the various corporations merged
into and belonging to said corporation are shown to be
presidents and directors of 9,616 miles of railway, with
assets amounting to $394,076,330.49. . . . "
He also gave
the amount of $90,000,000 in stocks as examples of the
capital and companies under their control.
^ T h e dates given were May 4th and August 27th,
from Philadelphia newspapers and May 14th from Denver.
No year was given nor was the newspaper name mentioned.

6g
He attempted to support that idea with newspaper examples.
The news items appeared to be weak evidence from which to
draw his conclusions.

It appeared to be unreasonable to

condemn tank cars as unsafe simply from the evidence of
three fires that had been attributed to wreckage of the
haulage vehicles.
Reasoning from authority
Reagan was a lawyer and a firm believer in the
letter of the law.

His speaking was characterized by

extensive quotations from laws and court precedents and
rulings to prove his arguments.

He relied extensively

upon this form of proof in his speech concerning railroadmonopoly abuse.

He read four somewhat lengthy passages

from the Interstate Commerce Commission's ruling in the
case of Rice against the Railroads to authenticate his
argument that discriminations against smaller oil shippers
existed.

He also read an extract from the ruling on a

similar case of the Railroad vs. Pratt on the same point
and added the authoritative proof of direct excerpts from
the hearings themselves in these two cases.
Reagan also read an excerpt from the First Annual
Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission asking the
national legislature for more binding laws if they required
"miles of equality and justice" between shippers.

He

further used a less lengthy excerpt from the then existing
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Interstate Commerce Act to prove that rate sheets showing
the locale, the classification of freight, and the
’’terminal charges’’ were to be available to large and small
shippers to avoid discriminatory practices.
These instances of the use of authoritative proof
were valid and substantially proved Reagan's arguments
concerning the existence of discrimination in shipping by
rail.
Reagan used two other instances of expert opinion
to substantiate the discrimination.
able reliability as proof.

Both were of question

In attempting to point out

that Standard Oil was a ’’powerful and evil” monster
corporation, Reagan read an excerpt from an address which
Judge Cooley, Interstate Commerce Commission president,
made to a meeting of the Boston Merchants; the statement
was published in the Buffalo Express, January 14, 1389.
Judge Cooley spoke generally of the curse of huge trusts
but Reagan inserted his own interpretation when he
interrupted his quotation to state that ”He (Cooley) un
doubtedly refers to this Standard Oil Company.”

Cooley

did not mention that trust by name and Reagan might well
have used the generality rather than the interpretation
more effectively.
Another authority that Reagan failed to establish
as valid was a pamphlet written by George Rice entitled
"Railway Discrimination as given to the Standard Oil
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Trust.”

The only qualification given this pamphlet was

that the pamphlet bore the author's name.
Reagan again used authority as a mode of proof
when he quoted a House member's words to state his own
case for use of state courts.

Representative Anderson of

30
Iowa had presented arguments^ for the use of state courts
in civil cases and Reagan presented an excerpt from this
speech as his only argument upon the point of legality
of state court usage in civil cases.

He stated that this

quotation was the "shortest method in which I can present
that subject."

Reagan did not attempt to qualify the

source of the quotation; he simply offered the excerpt as
"remarks . . . which contain a sufficient statement on
the subject."

Whether the remarks were the expert judg

ment of a man familiar with the position of state courts
vs. federal courts or were simply an opinion was in no
way made clear.
Reasoning from causal relationship
Reagan employed reasoning from causal relationship
three times within his railroad-monopoly abuse speech.
His first use pertained to the discriminatory practice of

30

The remarks centered around a case which Reagan
apparently was using as precedent. The case involved the
National Phquioque Bank vs. the First National Bank of
Bethal, Connecticut, reported at page 3$3> 14 Wall.
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the railroads in their mode of shipment.

He summed up

the cause and effect succinctly with this statement:
The railroads provide only one method for the ship
ment of oil, that is, in boxcars, for the smaller
refiner of oil, thus forcing him to accept barrel
rates with which he is unable to compete with the
Standard Oil Trust, using tanks.31
The second use of cause-effect reasoning was more
lengthy and involved.

Reagan presented the argument and

substantiated it liberally with examples that the Standard
Oil magnates were controlling many other related and sub
sidiary trusts, including railroads, and were thereby
causing injury to the nation’s economy.

He argued that

this trust was in control of much of the oil producing,
hauling, and refining industry and was crushing the small
competition.

After presenting his evidence and examples,

he stated:
I present this to show the wonderful combination
of capital concentrated in the Standard Oil Trust and
the railroads co-operating with it and using their
power to crush out the smaller refiners and shippers,
and to give the Standard Oil Trust and the officers of
these railroads the entire and exclusive control of
this vast business of refining, shipping, and selling
27,000,000 barrels of refined oil a year.32
Reagan asserted that the consolidation was causing a
situation in which "there can be no hope for healthy compe
tition."
•31
J Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 2379.
32Ibid., p. 23S3.
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His third use of this mode of proof was perhaps
the most vital proof in support of his second thematic
contention.

He stated that the individual citizen was

being denied political redress through the courts for
discriminatory wrongs inflicted upon them by the rail
roads and monopolies.

This situation was caused in part

by the refusal of the legislators to open the state civil
courts to the "less-moneyed litigants" so that those
litigants might have easier access to court action against
abuse.

He again summed up his causal relationship reason

ing in a succinct passage by observing:
If the law is right in providing for civil suits for
wrongs done by transportation companies, then it
follows as a logical consequence that justice requires
that the trials of those causes should be in the
courts most convenient to the parties injured.
It is
illogical and unjust to say that the parties shall
have a legal remedy and then to place the remedy so
far from them as to make it unavailable to them.-^
Reagan’s use of causal reasoning was logical in construction
and well-developed.

He followed a consistent pattern of

developing cause-effect relationship which made his reason
ing clear and easy to follow.
ETHICAL PROOF
Reagan may have had the status of a junior senator
at the time this speech was delivered but he had the

33Ibid., p. 2335
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reputation of a senior statesman in the area of antimonopoly legislation.

While in the House, he had fought

for anti-monopoly laws and had n . . . achieved national
prominence as a man of the people and as a staunch
OI
defender of their rights."-^ He had become sufficiently
prominent on this stand that the National Anti-Monopoly
Party and the Greenback Party sought him as a running
mate for their Presidential nominee Benjamin F. Butler.
However, Reagan had little respect for Butler because of
his Civil War record and refused their overtures.

35

He

also refused the nomination to the governorship of Texas
or to the Senate that year-5

in order to continue his push

to have anti-monopoly laws enacted in the House.

37

He was

strongly mentioned as a cabinet member under Cleveland

•^Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 252.
^"’Reagan to Henry Nichols, March 2$, 1$£4; Reagan
to James B. Weaver, May 26, l£$4; and Weaver to Reagan,
April 28, 188I+, in R.P.: Letters. For an account of the
National Anti-Monopoly Party and the Greenback Party see
Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency From 17&& to
1897 (New York: Houghton, Miffling and Co., 1898), pp.

7^
21=426.

For accounts of these actions see: Galveston
Daily News (May 1I+, 17, 1&, 19, 23, 1S§2); Paris Tribune
(.April 6, June 19 > 1882)', James H. Jones to Reagan, May 1,
l£$2, in R.P.: Microfilm.
37
^'He was nominated to the position of Repre
sentative from Texas by acclamation in l££2. Galveston
Daily News (May 31> 1$&2).
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because of his national reputation for work in the anti
og
monopoly field.?
Reagan's reputation on the monopoly
issue constituted a strong ethical appeal.
His character and intelligence were already
established prior to the occasion of his speech to the
Senate.

There were two limited overt attempts to reinforce

his ethos within the railroad-monopoly abuse speech.

Both

the attempts were apparently intended to establish good
will toward his audience.

He first attempted to praise

his audience by means of a somewhat negative statement.
He referred to the high position and intelligence of his
senatorial audience by stating:
The idea of presenting an argument to anybody, much
less to the American Senate, to prove that to make a
monopoly is t
’
'1
' '
’ rd that I
feel ashamed
He made one other attempt to arouse a feeling of
goodwill within his audience.

He referred to the powerful

position held by the members of the Senate through their
legislative rights and obligations.

He stated that

” • • . I judge no question as to the right of Congress to
confer jurisdiction on the State courts to hear and de
termine civil suits under this law will be raised."^

■^Dallas Weekly Herald (November 20, 1SS4).
39
Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd Session,
p.

23$4.

^QIbid., p. 2385.
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Although both attempts to arouse goodwill were
limited, they appeared to be direct endeavors by Reagan to
establish his ethos within the speech.

Reagan also de

veloped a certain ethical aura by maintaining his image as
a defender of the people by espousing the cause of the
states and their citizens.

He felt that there should be

equality in rates for all transporters of oil in particular
and for all shippers in general.

He also felt the less

affluent litigants should be afforded closer access to
courts of claim if justice was to be accomplished and he
stated this concept strongly.
Reagan's character and intelligence were already
established prior to the present speech through his earlier
political reputation in the field of anti-monopoly.

He

continued to maintain the position he had assumed as an
anti-monopolist within the speech itself.

Much of the

ethos in his speaking situation then rested upon his prior
reputation.

He made two rather limited attempts to establish

goodwill in his audience through reference to their intelli
gence and position as a body.
EMOTIONAL PROOF
In the railroad-monopoly abuse speech, Reagan relied
heavily upon logical argumentation and drew at least limited
support from ethical appeals, but the speech contained
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little emotional content.

He endeavored to arouse a

limited feeling of fear in his audience and made a slightly
stronger appeal to their feeling of compassion.
Reagan briefly employed a fear appeal in his
speech.

He did not try to arouse personal fear but made

a limited attempt to arouse within the nation's elected
leaders fear for the nation's economy and well being.
The objects of fear, in Reagan's concept, were the giant
monopolistic corporations which he described as those
which ” . . .

even now may be too strong to be subordinated

to the law or controlled by the government.”^

He feared

the demoralizing economic ramifications of these giant
corporate networks upon the people, particularly small
business people, of the nation.

He suggested that unless

monopoly control was forthcoming, ” . . .

it will dis

courage enterprise, it will demoralize the people and
cause them to lose faith in the wisdom and justice of
IO
Congress.”
This was an isolated emotional appeal and
was brief in presentation.
Reagan's strongest emotional appeal in the speech
was to the feeling of compassion in his audience for the
smaller litigants in railroad abuse cases.

^Ibid., p. 23 34
^2Ibid.

While the
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overall appeal to the compassionate feelings of his
audience for the smaller claimants was there, it was less
emotional than logical.

He presented facts that would

tend to arouse compassion but he did not attempt to
deliberately magnify the emotional content of these
facts.
Although Reagan made some attempts to arouse
emotion, these attempts were weak.

The nature of the

appeals was such that deemed emotion a minor role in
Reagan’s speech on railroad-monopoly abuse,
EVALUATION
One universal test of the value of a speech is
the effectiveness of the speech in achieving the stated
goals of the speaker.

In any political speech, the

interests of and influences upon the individual members of
the audience will affect the achievement of those goals
and will intensify the difficulty in isolating the effect
of the particular speech.

Within the congressional halls,

all speeches were of political nature and thus the effect
of the ideas presented in any single senatorial speech,
particularly when the debate was strong, was difficult to
ascertain.

Two of the basic elements that affect such an

audience were:

(1) the popular will of the nation as

depicted by the periodicals; and (2) the will of the
particular constituents who elected the senators to

7#

represent their interests.

In the particular case of

Reagan's speech to the Senate concerning railroad-monopoly
abuse, the basic influential elements were present and
combined with the personal and political influences
exerted by the powerful monopolistic special interest
groups to affect the voting on the bill.
Not only were these influences at work but another
difficulty in isolating the effect of a single speech
stemmed from the number of speeches given in support of
or in opposition to the bill.

Sherman of Ohio and

Senator Faulkner of West Virginia were the most outspoken
voices that joined Reagan's to attempt to get the amend
ments passed.

They were opposed principally by Senator

Platt of Connecticut and Senator Hoar of Massachusetts—
both men known as strong speakers.
Still another influence that warranted consideration
in an attempt to assess the effects of Reagan's speech was
his senatorial standing.

As a senior member of the House

of Representatives he had gained his reputation as a
strong verbal opponent to monopoly.

He delivered his

speech on this topic as a junior member of the Senate.

The

speech on railroad-monopoly control was one of his earlier
speeches delivered to that body.
Whatever the influences that affected the senators,
they voted to send this bill to joint committee with the
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House.

The announcement of the names of the men appointed^

to that Senatorial Committee foretold the future of the
bill.

Senators Cullom, Platt, and Harris were named.

least two of the men were highly prejudiced.

At

S. M. Cullom

had headed the drafting of the original Senate bill that
bore his name and he had no desire to see it changed.
Platt had been an outspoken opponent to the amendment on
the Senate floor.
The Committee was appointed on February 27, 1#$9>
and asked ” . . .

leave to present a report that requires

no action by the Senate” four days later.

On March 2,

1$89, the following report was read:
The committee on conference on the disagreeing
votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the
House to the bill (S2&51) to amend an act entitled
”An act to regulate commerce,” approved February 24>
1$S7, having met, after full and free conference have
agreed to recommend and do recommend to their
respective Houses as follows:
That the House recede from its amendments
numbered 3 and 7 . ^
Although efforts to curb monopolistic control of
economy failed in this particular legislative confrontation,

^ The managers of the Senate were S. M. Cullom,
0. H. Platt, and Isham G. Harris. The Managers on the
part of the House were Charles F. Crisp and Charles
O'Neill. Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd Session,
p.

2611.

^Ibid

SO
Reagan's arguments,
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joined by the voices of those

Senators and Representatives who had like desires for
monopoly control, continued to hammer at the giant net
works.

Yet for almost "twenty years after its passage,"

the Interstate Commerce Act remained ineffective and "did
not accomplish wide-spread rate reduction or eliminate
i/:
discrimination."
The Interstate Commerce Act was
described as one that satisfied popular demand for "the
governmental supervision of railroads" yet at the same
time was "almost entirely nominal."^

While the initial

efforts of Reagan and his contemporaries were unfruitful
in their control policies, they did constitute an opening
wedge for legislative control in economic affairs.
Ultimately, after a great number of years of struggle, at
least partial governmental control of the economy was
achieved.

The railroad regulation became a fact and opened

the door for other controls.

Kolko described the long

range effect of early anti-monopoly endeavors when he stated

^ E x a m p l e s 0f Reagan's later arguments on this topic
appear in Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 2469-24707 2b01-2bO2, 2bl+5; 2nd Session, pp. 2004-2006.

^ W i l l i a m Current Friedel, History of United States
Since I&65 , p. 184* Also see: Kolko, Railroads and
Regulations, passim, and Adams, Railroads, Their Origins,
passim.

^Ibid.
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" . . . federal railroad regulation was the first of manysuccessful efforts to create rationalization and stability
I
in the economy by political means.”
Reagan's ideas were among those early considerations
of extension of governmental powers to stem the rise of a
trend toward monopolized national economy and to make the
government cognizant of both the economic plight and the
rights of the individual citizen.
SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER
Railroads and monopolistic trusts were growing
rapidly.

State governments had tried to govern their own

economies and had failed because the state boundaries were
not coincidental with the railway and industrial boundaries.
Some legislators, including John H. Reagan, fought for and
achieved a "nominal” law to control interstate commerce.
This law proved to be ineffectual in railroad and monopoly
control because it was too vague.

The House attempted to

put some teeth into the law through the third and seventh
amendments to the House Bill S2$51«

Senators Sherman,

Faulkner, and Reagan spoke to the Senate to support these
amendments.

Reagan's speech to the Senate on this topic

was the subject of analysis in this chapter.

^ Kolko, Railroads and Regulations, p. 239.
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Two of Reagan's basic political ideological con
cepts formed the themes found within the speech.
developed his speech in two sections.

Reagan

The first section

dealt with both amendments on the Senate floor.

His first

theme of protection of the individual citizen’s economic
rights from infringement by railroad-monopoly abuse was
presented in both sections of the speech.

The second

theme of states rights was added to the second section of
the speech, and that theme asked that the State courts be
used in conjunction with the Federal courts to facilitate
more equitable handling of the cases that concerned
railroad-monopoly abuse.

This theme was less well-developed

but was present.
Reagan used example, authority, and causal reason
ing as logical proof.

His reputation as a defender of the

people constituted a strong ethical position to which he
added minimal attempts at ethical appeal within the speech
itself.

The attempts to arouse emotion were weak enough

to deem emotion a minor proof used by Reagan.
Evaluation of Reagan's speech was difficult since
it occurred during debate on the floor in conjunction with
Senators speaking both pro and con on the issue to an
audience influenced by personal and political pressures.
The legislation for which Reagan spoke was defeated by
joint committee decision without necessitating a senatorial
vote.

Although the efforts of Reagan and his political

contemporaries were not successful at the time, these
pioneer efforts for governmental control of the economy
were at least an opening wedge for legislative con
sideration of the individual rights of the citizenry.

CHAPTER III
THE BLAIR EDUCATION ACT SPEECH TO THE SENATE,
FEBRUARY 26, 1S90
ISSUE AND OCCASION
After the Civil War, leaders in both the North and
South increasingly recognized that something was needed to
reduce the high rate of illiteracy in the nation, par
ticularly among the freedmen in the South.

Reconstruction

governments had established public schools systems in the
South for these people but the economic depression coupled
with the political inertia that characterized the Southern
states until the late 1$70*s caused a failure of the
financial assistance necessary to maintain these systems.
Toward the end of the 1B70’s and the early lBBO's, those
involved in improving southern education became in
creasingly interested in securing national financial aid.
With the 1S77 Compromise, and the resultant cooperation
between Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats, the
South looked more favorably on this means of receiving
assistance in the Negro education problem.

One hundred

delegates from nine states interested in procuring these
BA

national school funds petitioned Congress in 1$7$> asking
for assistance from public land revenues for "immediate
and pressing" educational needs of the South.^

The idea

expressed at this point was that the duty of educating
this large mass of illiterate blacks belonged to the entire
country rather than the Southern segment.
Several bills were introduced in both Houses and
were killed through apathy in one or the other House.

By

lSSO, however, the Republican party favored federal aid,
incorporating the position into their national platform.
The Democratic party contended that common schools should
be "fostered and protected"; however, this statement
appeared in a plank which otherwise opposed centralization
2
of government control.
Senator Blair, a Republican who adherred closely
to party lines, took a new approach to federal educational
aid which would also aid the high-tariff proponents.
There was an increasing amount of surplus in the federal
treasury and, since the high-tariff Republicans and
Democrats alike feared a lowering of tariff, Blair in iSSl
introduced his first bill to aid education by direct

^■"Statements and Testimony," Senate Miscellaneous
Documents, 4$th Congress, 1st Session, No. $5, pp. 39-40.
2
Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson, National
Party Platforms, 1^40-1956 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 195b), pp. 56, 61.
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appropriations from the federal treasury.

This called for

appropriations of $105,000,000 to be distributed among the
states over a period of ten years; the basis of distri
bution was to be the illiteracy rate.

Blair discussed

this bill in the Senate in lSS2,^ but no action was taken
during this session.
The second Blair Education Bill provided for almost
complete state control rather than the joint federal-state
control of the first bill.^"

Discussion brought forth more

restrictions against racial discrimination in distribution
of funds.

The third Blair bill brought the situation to

a head with the periodicals of the nation taking sides.
The proponents’ statements were summarized by the New
Orleans Picayune:
In asking the passage of the Blair bill, it (the
South) only demands that the General Government
should recognize an obligation which rests . . .
equally upon all the sections, and which the South
has so far borne alone.5
Along with a few others, the Galveston News took the
opposing side in the South, bitterly denouncing the

3

Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 1st Session,
p . 227•
^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session,
p.

1479.

^New Orleans Picayune (February 19, 1386).
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bill,

and Nation opposed it in the North with such state

ments as:
The Blair bill is simply . . . the old hallucination,
’fifty acres and a mule,' which has caused more
briars and sassafras bushes to grow in Southern
fields than all else.7
Perhaps the most acid attack came from the Louisville
Courier-Journal which opposed "the vicious plan of Granny
Blair” who was backed by ’’political demagogue, trick
ed
sters . . . and professional philanthropists.”
The
seriousness of the proponents of this bill was evidenced
in one House Report that claimed that illiterate voters
held the balance of power in ten Northern and all Southern
states.

Q

On the floor of the Senate, those favoring the

bill asked,
As this illiterate citizenship is protected by the
constitution in the suffrage, why should not the
General Government . . . aid in preparing them for
its wise and intelligent exercise?-^
£
Galveston News (February 13, 15, l&GB, and
February 2$, 1G90) provide a good account of this feeling.
^Nation (January 21, l££6), p. 52. For an excellent
account of the felair bill opposition, also see: Nation
(August 1, l£$9), p. &4»
Louisville Courier-Journal, clipping in R.P.,
providing only the year 1SSS.
Q

’’Support of Common Schools,” House Reports,
49th Congress, 1st Session, no. 495, p. 21.
"^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st Session,
p. 1475.
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Those in opposition were quick in refuting the
constitutionality of the bill.

The Galveston News saw

this bill as the commencement of " . . • the gradual
extension of the National Government to supercede State
Government and even municipal government.^

Senator

Baynard of Delaware proposed that this type of legis
lation would "lead inexorably to the overthrow of the
whole theory of our form of government,"

12 and Senator

Beck of Kentucky saw it as a "pandora's box” and "(an)
entering-wedge to absolute Federal domination over edu13
cation in the States.” ^
The introduction of Blair's fourth educational
bill provided the specific occasion for John H. Reagan's
speech.
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
The Blair bill was debated on the Senate floor
from 1BB4 to 1890, when it was finally killed by a vote of
forty-two to thirty-six.
Although Federal aid to education was originally
suggested by southerners interested in educational

■^Galveston News quoted in Louisville CourierJournal (March 1, 1BS6), clipping in R.P.

12 Congressional Record, 4&th Congress, 1st Session,
p.

25S4.

13Ibid., p. 2540.
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assistance for their illiterate blacks, it soon was taken
up by high-tariff proponents, in both the North and
South, in an effort to use the growing treasury deposits.
The spending would reduce the possibility of lowering
the tariff rate.
The controversy over the Blair bill clearly
illustrates the divided mind of the post-Civil War
politicians in the South.

They were all Democrats, but

they were not all of one mind.

The Redeemer, or Bourbon,

faction of the South strongly fought for federal aid to
education.

These Redeemers placed their faith in the

business and industrial development and growth which founded
a necessary alliance with the Eastern section of the nation.
They expounded those views which would best expedite their
political and economic thinking.

The Blair bill was in

keeping with their ideas on governmental help.

Henry W.

Blair was the Senator from New Hampshire who proposed the
four educational bills, and he was supported by a number
of other northern and many southern high-tariff Senators.
Outstanding among the northern supporters were Republican
Senator Ambrose E. Burnside of Rhode Island, and Senator
Benjamin Harrison of Indiana.

Consistent support came

from the Senators from Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Florida, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia, but the
support was quite passive generally.

The open, vigorous
i

support from the South found voice through Joseph E.

90

Brown of Georgia, Wade Hampton of South Carolina, A. H.
Garland of Arkansas, and James Z. George of Mississippi,
who asked:

"Can you vote money to educate Indians, and

not have the power to vote money to educate Negroes and
white men?”^ 1'
The opposite element of the Redeemer in the South,
those southerners who wished to continue in the same
agrarian economic path that had always been the southern
means of livelihood, constituted the other side of the
audience position on the issue.

The agrarian-minded

faction wished to continue in the old-line Democratic
concept of extolling the virtues of low taxes and states'
rights based on direct constitutional interpretation.
One southern senatorial element formed a group that was
not outspoken against the Blair issue but consistently
voted against it.

These were the Senators from Missouri,

Maryland, and one each from Alabama, Tennessee, and
Kentucky.

Those who actively fought against this bill on
15
the Senate floor were Matthew Butler of South Carolina
and the two Texas Senators, Maxey and Reagan.

Aiding in

the defeat of this bill were the two Senators from

^Congressional Record, 49th Congress, 1st
Session, p . 1474.
15
Wade Hampton, the other Senator from South
Carolina, actively supported the Blair Act in direct
opposition to his State-brother Butler.
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Delaware, Thomas F. Baynard and Eli Saulsbury, who were
in sympathy with the agrarian South.

The opponents from

the South also found a spokesman in the Republican Senator
from Kansas, Preston Plumb, who said he could count on
his fingers those senators who really believed in the good
of the bill . 16
The proponents of the bill formed a powerful vocal
adversary and hostile audience to John Reagan’s senatorial
speech of February 26, 1S90.

Part of the southern seg

ment was fighting for federal aid in the huge job that
faced the sorely taxed funds of the smaller and more
populated southern states.

Their hostility as an audience

possibly sprang from the knowledge that a fellow Southerner
was speaking strongly against that aid.

This hostility

found further motivation when the opposing speaker was
not only a fellow Southerner but from a state that was in
possession of sufficient public land to support their
educational needs.

17

Texas also was sparsely populated

with both whites and blacks making the educational problem
smaller.

However, by the time Reagan spoke against the

fourth Blair bill, there was enough opposition to federal
aid to education to swing the vote against it.

The bill

■I Z l

Nation (March 11, 1SB6), p. 20$.
^ A l l e n J. Going, ’’The South and the Blair Edu
cation Bill," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
Vol.
No. 2 (September 1957), p. 28 .
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was opposed by " . . .

a combination of border and northern

Democrats, by agrarian states rights southerners, and ultimately by Republican leadership.”

13

DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
John H. Reagan summed up his developmental themes
in his final plea of the speech.
of the bill:

He asked for the defeat

”In the interest of the cause of education,

for the preservation of the rights of local government
to the States, to prevent converting the Federal Govern
ment into a popular despotism, and to avoid additional
fruitful cause of sectional agitation and strife, I hope
for the defeat of this bill.”
Reagan saw the Blair Act not only as the opening
wedge in complete federal control of the system of edu
cation but also as a complete breakdown of the total
federal system.

He feared the federal funding of the

schools would be the first step in replacing state and
local governments

with a central power strong enough to

change the entire form of government.
Reagan developed the theme that the existence of
the system of education, as it was established under the
autonomous state and local rule, was endangered rather
1d
Ibid., pp. 239-290, and Dewey, National Problems,
pp. 3 3 -9 0 .
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than financially assisted by the provisions of the Blair
Act.

He interpreted the segment of the bill requiring

” . . . the governors of the States to make elaborate
reports as to the school system of the several States, to
the Secretary of the Interior of the United States . . . ”
as being the intention to subjugate ” . . .
the inferior,
superior.”
ments:

19

...

the State,

to the Federal Government, the

Reagan developed this theme by two argu

(1 ) control of the money meant control of the

institution; and (2 ) federal assistance would weaken the
desire of the states to face their responsibility to
educate their own citizens.

The first argument was

developed through logical argument that control of the
money would mean control of the uses to which that money
would be put, i.e., courses of study would be prescribed,
textbooks would be chosen, and the duties of teachers and
administrative staffs would be supervised by central
control. Reagan also suggested that mixed schools might
20
result.
Reagan's second supporting argument for the theme
that education would be drastically altered was not as

51st Congress, 1st

20

The only one of these charges that was challenged
by Blair from the floor was the one concerning mixed
schools so they seem to take on validity.
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well developed.

He offered no proof that the states

would "relax their efforts and transfer the burden to the
Federal government"

21

and only asked what right Congress

had to tax one state to support the education of another.
The theme of preservation of the school system as ad
ministered autonomously by the state and local governments
was closely tied to more strongly supported theme of preser
vation of the right of local government by the state.
It has already been established that Reagan was
aware of the rights of the states.

One of the two

strongest themes within the Blair Act speech was the preser
vation of these states rights.

This theme was developed

fully using a strict construction as his basis for develop
ment.

He contended that the preamble of the Constitution

(the basis of authority claimed for the Blair Act) in no
way conferred on Congress the right " . . .

to aid the

establishment and temporary support of common schools."

22

He further developed the argument that such a position
transgressed the rights of the State governments as
prescribed in the Constitution.
with authoritative proof.

He supported this theme

Reagan maintained that this

funding, unlike an outright gift to the states of public

21

Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st
Session, p. Iy25.

22Ibid., p. 1722.
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land, would be an assumption of the jurisdiction of the
rights of the states to govern their own people,
Reagan presented another theme closely connected
to the preceding themes.

He felt that the Blair Act would

be the entering wedge toward a consolidated government
and the dissolution of the Federal system.

He made two

statements within the speech concerning the theme that,
if the ’’general welfare” clause of the Constitution was
interpreted to allow federal funding of schools, it would
remove all limits to the power of Congress.

Early in the

speech, he stated that:
This would of necessity destroy our constitutional
Federal system of government by destroying local
government in the states; and this would be the
beginning of a reign of anarchy or of despotism,
in the place and stead of our benign system of free
constitutional g o v e r n m e n t .23
Later he restated that centralization ” . . .

would impose

on the people of this country the curse of an imperial
p I

popular despotism, the worst of all despotisms.”

He

apparently felt that the statements could, and would,
stand alone without necessity of any more development than
a reminder of the Senate that experience had taught them
that there was a narrow boundary between ’’stable government

23Ibid., p. 1723
24Ibid., p. 1724
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and anarchy.”
theme.

He offered no substantiating proof of this

He may have felt that his ethical standing as a

veteran representative during the time he alluded to as
borderline ’’anarchial-stable” was enough proof of his
theme.
Another developmental theme was concerned with
additional sectional strife that would occur through the
passage of the Blair Education Act.

Sectional strife had

been a way of political life to the veterans of Congress,
including Reagan, for a number of years after the War.

It

had been relegated to a lesser place in the senatorial
foreground for a few years, preceding Reagan’s speech, by
the pressing economic problems of the era.

However, the

problem of sectional agitation was ever present and found
voice now in an issue that dealt primarily with the
illiterates of the South.
Although Reagan indicated that he wished to avoid
additional section strife through the defeat of the Blair
bill, he developed the theme that it existed by a com
parison of the Southern and Western educational systems
to Northern schools.

His theme was that sectional strife

would increase with the Blair bill passage because the
act itself had its origin in sectional agitation and was
discriminatory.
theme.

He used three arguments to develop this

The first was that the criticism of the southern

educational system was too harsh and basically unfounded.
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He supported this contention by a discussion of Texas as
a southern state which had always provided education on a
constitutional basis and had supported it monetarily.
This argument was developed as though all southern states
were in a similar position to the State of Texas; Reagan
failed to point out that Texas was less populated and was
an unusual Southern State in that Texas had public lands
available for funding schools.
His second argument concerned the fourteenth
segment of the bill, a passage that he deemed sectionally
discriminatory.

The territories and some new Western

states were to have the power to determine illiteracy by
unspecified evidence other than the census and this evi
dence would affect the amount of funding allowed to that
state.

Reagan saw this as a bribe to gain the vote of a

segment of the Western states.

He also pointed out that

the practice of allowing other evidence than the census
was again channelling the funds away from the illiterate
Southern blacks who had been the basis for the bill.
The third argument in support of Reagan's sectional
agitation theme dealt with the taxing of one state for the
support of another state's system of education.

He

attempted to develop this theme by alluding to the fact
that federal funding would eventually fall on the shoulders
of the taxpayer.

He stated that the present plan of taxing
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the internal wealth of a state to provide funds allowed a
more equitable tax program.

He attempted to substantiate

this argument by an example of Mr. Gould, a wealthy
financier whose children would receive the same educational
benefits under the Blair Act as any other taxpayer's
child.

This argument concerning inequality of taxation

was not fully developed.
MODES OF PROOF
John H. Reagan employed logical, ethical and
emotional proof within his speech against the Blair Edu
cation Act.

The object of this section is to examine

those proofs and their development.
LOGICAL PROOF
In his speech against the Blair Education Act,
Reagan relied most heavily upon logical proof to support
his contentions.

He employed reasoning from examples,

citation of authorities, and reasoning from causal
relationship as a means of substantiating his arguments.
Reasoning from Example
Reagan employed example to prove his second theme.
To support the argument that criticism of southern edu
cation was unfounded, Reagan used the example of Texas'
educational system.

He used specific examples of

constitutional provisions for education from.the time when
Texas was under the Mexican Constitution of 1827 through
the Texas Constitutions of 1836, 1845, 1866, 1369, and the

1876 Constitution that was then^^ in use. He specified
26 that were appropriated for schools, gave
the lands
specific amounts of money that were allocated for
schools,

27

and stated the number of months devoted to
p ri

education in the rural and urban areas.

On the basis

of the example- of Texas, he argued that other states were
capable of supporting their own school systems.

The major

problem with this argument was that the very evidence
presented in the example proved that Texas was the unusual
in the southern states.
To prove his contention that the bill was discriminatory, Reagan pointed out the names of the states

29

^ T h e Texas Constitution enacted in 1876 is still
in use.
There were then between thirty and forty million
acres of land that belonged to the common school funds of
the state, according to Reagan’s example, beside the land
given to the university of the state and beside four
leagues given to various counties that were not in the
school fund but used to that purpose.

27'The

aggregate of this funding amounted to
$3,359,347.39 in 1889.

28

These varied in location from five to ten months

per year.

29These

included South Dakota, North Dakota,
Montana, and Washington plus the Territories of the
United States.
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that would be aided and also suggested examples of
' 30
states^ that were discriminated against.

All of the

states mentioned were western in locale except Texas.
However, Reagan seemed to include Texas here as a western
state also.

The examples were apparently included to

affect the representatives of these relatively older
western states.

He used examples of the increase of

children in both older and newer states from 1&77 to 1837
to show discrimination on a state by state basis.
Reagan offered another example to prove that the
Blair bill would cause further sectional agitation.

He

alluded to the argument that the moneys that were fed
into the United States Treasury came ultimately from
taxation and if the central government paid for all the
state’s educational programs, rather than taxing their own
internal wealth, the tax program would be unbalanced.

He

used a single example to prove this contention and the
example was vague.

He attempted to point out that if Mr.

Gould, one of the nation’s wealthiest men, was not taxed
locally for schools, he would pay no more for educating
his children than any other citizen.

Although the example

could have borne connotative economic meaning had it been
developed further, it constituted instead a vague and

30

The states he used as examples to receive like
monetary aid were Colorado, Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas.
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meaningless insertion that tended to confuse the issue
rather than offer clarification.
Reagan used some examples to support his second
theme but he relied entirely on example to support his
last theme concerning sectional agitation.

While most of

his examples were well chosen to support his themes, the
one chosen to support the last argument was vague and
seemed to be irrelevant to the theme that it was intended
to support.
Reasoning from Authority
Reagan used authority to prove his contentions
that federal school funding was not constitutional and
that the states had a right to govern their own people,
including their education.

His reasoning on these themes

was that no exact grant of power existed in the preamble
of the Constitution, Article I, section £, which served
as the basis for the Blair Bill.

He argued that those

powers not relegated to the federal government were
reserved for the states and the people.

He directly

quoted Article I, section 8, clause 1, of the United States
Constitution which contained the ’’general welfare” clause.
The Blair Act was based upon that clause.

Reagan refuted

the claim that the passage contained constitutional power
for such action by stating:

’’Section 8 of Article I of

the Constitution specifies and enumerates the powers of
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Congress.

No power is found to aid in the establishment

and support of common schools,”

31

He further quoted

Article X of the Constitution to support this argument.
Reagan pointed out that Article X had been inserted as
early as 1791, at the first Congressional session and that
the amendment relegated all powers not specifically
belonging to the Federal government to the states.

Reagan

used one other authority to refute the constitutionality
of the Blair Act.

He read a quotation from James Madison,

a national founding father, concerning an early attempt
to invoke the "general welfare” clause.

The quote

directly substantiated Reagan’s claim that it was the
rights of the states, rather than the federal govern
ment, to regulate and support schools.

In order to further

prove his argument, he offered nine short direct quotations
concerning the interpretation of these sections of the
Constitution from Mr. Justice Story’s Commentaries on the
Constitution.

Reagan qualified Judge Story’s authority

as ” . . . probably as high an authority as there is on
this subject.”32
As authoritative proof of his contention that
Texas provided for education in her constitutions, Reagan

31

Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st
Session, p. 1722.

32Ibid., p. 1722.
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also used excerpts from the Mexican Constitution of 1$27>
the Texas Declaration of Independence from Mexico, and
the articles from the Constitution of 1&76 that were
pertinent to education.
Reagan’s choice of authoritative proof appeared
to be strong since he quoted from recognized documents
and Judge Story, a recognized authority on interpre
tation of the national Constitution.
Reasoning from causal relationship
Reagan argued that the loss of power over funding
of schools by the states would

placeall power into the

hands of the central governing

body. The effect

of the

power exchange would allow the central government to
” . . . proscribe the course of studies, the textbooks to
be used, and the duties of teachers and officers charged
with administration of the funds so appropriated, and
might require mixed schools of black and white children
. • .’’33

The last segment of that example pertaining to

mixed schools drew enough attention to cause Senator Blair
to break into the speech to ask Reagan if he thought the
bill itself contained an integration clause.

Reagan

admitted he knew it did not but was conjecturing
ultimate outcome of the bill.

33Ibid., p. 1724.

on the

104
Another usage of causal reasoning was applied to
support Reagan's claim that the educational system should
be left as it was.

The reasoning was that the present

system of education was turning out highly enlightened
men and had been doing so since the educational systems
of the states had begun.

Thus the effect of well educated

men as products of the present system of education by the
states should constitute cause enough to maintain the
status quo.

Since Reagan was addressing an audience com

posed of state representatives themselves schooled under
their respective state systems, the usage seemed applicable
and useful as proof.
Causal reasoning was also applied in Reagan's
concept of discriminating action outlined by the bill.
Reagan argued that the illiterate whites of the new west
would receive the greatest benefits of the bill and thus
cause the illiterate negroes of the south to be dis
criminated against once more.

Since education of the

illiterate southern negro had been the original intent of
the Blair bill, Reagan's reasoning was apropos.
Reagan's reasoning from causal relationship seemed
to strengthen his thematic pattern within the Blair Act
speech.

He employed cause to effect reasoning in present

ing the concept that central control of school funding
would cause central control of school operations.

He

again used cause to effect reasoning in his claim that the
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Blair bill would primarily aid the illiterate whites of
the west and the effect would be further discrimination
against the southern negro.

He employed effect to cause

reasoning by pointing out that the effects of state
school systems was well educated men and thus cause enough
to maintain the educational system as it was established.
ETHICAL PROOF
Early in his career John H. Reagan had established
his position as defender of the rights of the states by
strict construction of the Constitution.

Prior to the

Civil War, he had assumed the position in several addresses
to C o n g r e s s . T o the voters of his district, Reagan
stated, in 1$59> that if the rights within the federal
system were denied and ” . . .

the Constitution so

violated, and our rights so affected as to require us to
fall back on the reserved rights of the States . . . ” that
he would ” . . .

defend them by all means necessary.

35

Since the ultimate method was war, he upheld his position

•^Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 1199-12037 1466-1467»* 3bth Congress, 2nd Session,
pp. 3$9-394> were examples on the congressional floor
prior to the Civil War.
35
•^ Circular to the voters within the First Con
gressional District of Texas from Reagan, April 12, l£59,
in R.P«: Circulars, Pamphlets, and Speeches.
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by assuming Confederate duties and returned to Congress
to continue to uphold his original position on the
issue.

Outside of Congress, his support of states

rights was expressed in several of his addresses.

37

Reagan’s reputation as a guardian of the states rights
during his Congressional term followed him into the
Senate.

1$$7,

In reporting Reagan's election to the Senate, in

t]ie Baltimore Sun described him in this manner:

"In the House he had been recognized as a bold, fearless,
aggressive opponent of . . . the centralizing tendencies
3B
of the Republican P a r t y . W h e n the issue concerning
centralizing of power through educational funding came
into senatorial focus, Reagan again spoke out against
infringement upon the rights of the states.

In

lBBB,

he

firmly opposed the Blair bill for federal aid to education

^ For examples of his speaking to Congress in this
vein see: Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 5O7-50B, 610, 32l7-32lB; 44th Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 335»
696; 45th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3275; 45th Congress,
3rd Session, pp. 97-9$; 50th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.
202-205.
37
For some noteworthy examples of his theme of
states rights based on strict constitutional construction,
see: "Address to the People of Houston, Texas," on the
Conservative State Convention, January 23, 1B6B; "On the
Election Commission of IB76," Palestine, Texas, March 24,
1&77; "Address to the Confederate Veterans," San Antonio,
Texas, April 20, 1B77; "Memorial Address for General John B.
Hood," Houston, Texas, September 12, 1$79; "Address to
Texas Veterans," Palestine, Texas, April 21, lBBl. R.P.:
Speeches, 1B5B-19Q3.
•^Baltimore Sun (February 2,

1BB7).
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partially on the ground that it was an invasion of the
rights of the states.

39

So Reagan's reputation as a

states rights proponent had already been established
prior to the speech to the Senate against the Blair bill
in 1890.
Within the speech itself, Reagan attempted to
establish his good character by his advocacy of strict
obedience to the highest law of his state and his nation.
He also indicated that his belief in the federal system
should establish him as a loyal son of his country and a
defender of its inherent democratic qualities.

He

suggested that he was in favor of peaceful coexistence of
all sections of the land rather than in favor of a situ- .
ation fraught with animosity and strife along the lines
of sectionalism.
Reagan frequently and consistently suggested his
intelligence by demonstrating his thorough knowledge of
the materials pertinent to the issue involved.
The introductory remarks of the speech were a
direct attempt to establish good will.

He complimented

the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. Faulkner) and Mr.

39
^ Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 2bS-274. Also see: Millage L. Bonham to
Reagan, January 9, 1888, 0. M. Roberts to Reagan, January
16, 1888, M. F. Mott to Reagan, January 30, 1888, in
R.P.: Letters; Austin Weekly Statesman (January 25, 1888),
and Dallas Morning News (January 3, 1888).
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Coke, his Texas colleague, as having given " . . .

a very

learned and able discussion of the subject."^
Reagan's reputation as a defender of the rights
.of the states and as an opponent to centralizing forces
I
had been established prior to the present speech. His
attitude toward the particular bill on education had been
previously established through an earlier s p e e c h ^ to the
*

Senate.

He maintained the same attitude toward these

themes in the present speech.

He indicated he was a man

of good character and intelligence, and he attempted to
establish goodwill in the introduction of the speech.
EMOTIONAL PROOF
Reagan employed emotional appeals in this speech.
He attempted to create a feeling of pride within the
Southern Segment of his audience; he made a limited appeal
to scorn for his opposition; he appealed to the loyalty
of the Senators to their form of government; and he
attempted to evoke a feeling of fear.
Reagan displayed pride in his own state in what
appeared to be an attempt to stir like emotional response

^Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st
Session, p. Iy22.
^Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 268-274.
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in the representatives of other states.

Of particular

persuasive interest to Reagan were those Southern Senators
who favored the bill.

He first made a limited attempt to

discredit Mr. Blair by a reference to his use of only a_
priori reasoning without any proof and then attacked the
long denunciation of the southern school system made by
the Senator from New Hampshire.

Senator Blair’s denunci

atory speech had been a harsh criticism of the entire
institution of education in the south and Reagan replied
with a description of his own state with which he apparently
hoped to stir the pride of other southern Senators.

The

account appeared to be a plea from a proud old southern
statesman to evoke enough feeling of sectional pride that
the other southern Senators would recognize the folly, as
Reagan saw it, of selling their rights as states for the
price of school funding.
Reagan's use of the Constitution within his strict
interpretation established an appeal to the loyalty of the
Senators.

He presented a case that the bill was not only

questionable constitutionally but was actually designed
to destroy the federal system.

Thus if the Senators were

loyal to the present system of federalism, Reagan reasoned,
they would have to be against federal funding of schools.
In like context, Reagan attempted to arouse in his
audience fear of a "despotic” contralism, a fear that not
only would the right to govern their educational systems
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be a thing of the past but that all rights of statehood
would be dissolved.

He appeared to bolster this feeling

of fear by reminding the southern Senators subtly of the
hated rule of reconstruction.
He also pointed out to the Western sector that the
bill was created with built-in discrimination for some
states of the West and against others and the very word
ing made it an object that might be feared on an economic
and intersectional basis.
Finally, he made a limited attempt to raise a
fear of inequality of taxation to support the educational
system but this was a weak and futile attempt since the
funding was to come almost directly from import duties.
EVALUATION
A congressional audience poses a unique problem
in ascertaining the effectiveness of any one speech.

There

were so many speeches presented both pro and con on this
controversial subject that the effect of Reagan’s speech
must be combined with all those that refuted the bill.
Another complicating factor was the effect of the
periodicals reporting on the issue.

The reporting, in

turn, both influenced and at the same time reflected the
will of the people.

At first, the periodical literature

Ill
I n

favored the Blair Act,

then the popular will began to

Io

change.

To what extent the mass communication and the

will of the constituency affected their senatorial repre
sentatives is impossible to ascertain.
However, some conclusions can be drawn from the
actual voting pattern on the bill.

One possible result of

Reagan's speech was the acquisition of the Western vote.
In spite of the obvious bribe mentioned by Reagan in his
speech, the traditional Republican West voted against the
Blair Act.

As a result, many of the agrarian southern

states rights proponents, who at first had favored the
bill as the only possible means of combating the edu
cational problem, now realized that the "South . . . was
growing in prosperity and able to care for her own. • •
and a majority of these southerners voted against the bill.
The acquisition of more stable economy had some influence
upon the southern vote.

However, the amount of the funds

to be gained in their states might well have swung their
vote to the Blair Act if speakers, including Reagan, had
not pointed out major flaws in the bill.

The most notable

^ F o r an example of this reported material see
New Orleans Picayune (February 19, 1$&6).
^ N a t i o n (August 1, 13S9), p* &4* For full
coverage of the Blair Bill see Dallas Daily Herald and
The Houston Post throughout the years 1884-189t).
^Dewey, National Problems, p. 90.
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of these flaws was the attempt at centralization of power
and ultimate breakage of the political unity of the
Democratic South.
This bill had been debated from 1$$4 to 1&90 on
the Senate floor.

Soon after Reagan’s speech, and others

like it, the bill was finally defeated by a vote of
forty-two to thirty-six.
Reagan predicted within the speech that
” . . . if one of the barriers of the Constitution is
broken down by this act, the States will in the
future be told that as Congress appropriates money
to support these schools, it is right and necessary
that it should follow such appropriations by laws
regulating the application of this money and the uses
to which it is to be put; that it may prescribe the
course of studies, the textbooks to be used, and the
duties of the teachers and officers charged with the
administration of the funds so appropriated, and
might require mixed schools of black and white
children. . . .”45
Certainly much of his prophecy has been fulfilled.
Reagan's foresight was accurate.

The growth of laxity

that Reagan predicted on the part of the states in financ
ing their own schools did become a reality and a growing
problem.

Since the individual state officials did become

lax in accepting complete economic responsibility for their
schools, particularly in the expanding urban areas,

45
^ Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st
Session, p.” Iy24«
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federal grants-in-aid

Ifit

have opened the door to increasing

control of state schools by the federal government.
The defeat of the Blair Act had a long delaying
effect on federal school control.

But the United States

Constitution, the very instrument that Reagan used to
blunt the first attacks on federal interference in state
control of education, has been used, since 1 9 5 4 > ^ through
interpretive measures to achieve the same purpose.

An

analysis of whether the effect is "good1' or “bad” is not
the object of this section.

It is sufficient to say that

enough of Reagan's long-range prediction has come to be
fact to make an^uncomfortable nation over the past two
decades of American history.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
Following the Civil War, the high rate of illiter
acy, particularly among the freedmen of the South, was
recognized as a problem.

At the same time, federal monies

increased the treasury to a point that caused a trend
toward the reduction of tariff rates.

The high tariff

i /r

For example: the Federal grants-in-aid to the
State of Texas for education in 1972 amounted to $176,717>244
and an amount was proposed for 1973 of $ 1$4 >2$2 ,63#.
Governor's Recommended Budget for 1972-1973»
jn

Brown vs. Board of Education, Topeka (Kansas),
opened the educational integration doors.
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proponents espoused the cause of educational funding by
the federal government as a means of reducing the federal
treasury to assure the maintenance of the tariff rate.

At

this time, many southern educators felt that the South
should be aided in educating the large number of illiterate
blacks that had been poured into their educational systems.
Three previous bills, known as Blair bills, had been
killed in one House, or the other, prior to the intro
duction to the Senate of the fourth, and last, Blair
Education Bill.

Senator Reagan spoke in opposition to

the fourth Blair bill and it was with this speech that
the present chapter is concerned.
Reagan presented four developmental themes in his
speech:

(1) the preservation of the autonomous rule of

education by state and local governments;

(2) the preser

vation of the rights of states; (3) the retention of the
federal form of government rather than central despotism;
and (4) the avoidance of further sectional strife.

He

used examples and authority as logical proof of his argu
ments.

The first two themes employed less use of example

than authority but the last two themes relied heavily on
example as proof.

Reagan derived ethical appeal through

his reputation as a defender of states rights, a reputation
that was well-established prior to the speech.

His stand

ing on the particular educational act had also been
established by a prior speech.

His ethical appeal was
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enhanced during the speech through his attempts to ,
establish his good character as a peaceful man who was a
loyal national son, interested in the preservation of his
country’s democratic principles.

Reagan demonstrated

his intelligence by his thorough knowledge of materials
pertinent to the issue.

He also attempted to establish

goodwill through praise of his colleagues.
Emotional appeals were also present in the speech.
He attempted to arouse pride within the southern segment
of the audience, and he also made a limited attempt to
discredit his opponent with a feeling of scorn.

He

attempted to arouse loyalty to the federal form of
government and a fear of centralization.
The effect of Reagan's speech was difficult to
ascertain because of the length of time that the topic
had been under discussion and because of the changes
effected by the press and by fluctuating popular will.
Also his speech must be judged one of a number of oppos
ing speeches.

A possible immediate result was the winning

of the Western vote and some of the Southern votes through
Reagan's emphasis on the flaws within the bill.
was defeated.

The bill

Centralization was delayed by the defeat

but in the 1950's and 1960*s centralization of educational
power through constitutional interpretation, the very
weapon Reagan used in his argument to defeat the bill,

has become a fact that has caused an uncomfortable atmos
phere on the American national scene.

CHAPTER IV

THE SILVER SPEECH TO THE SENATE,
DECEMBER 30, 1S90
ISSUE AND OCCASION
The nation began, and continued, on the bimetal
standard until 1$7#, when the Bland-Allison Act put the
United States onto the gold standard alone.

The "hard

money" industrialists were naturally interested in main
taining the monometal standard.

However, the nation

struggled during the lSSO’s in the throes of a major
depression.

Farmers and ranchers in the South and the

West were hard put to maintain their lives much less
their land, crops, and stock.

Small businesses in all

parts of the nation were unable to keep their doors open.
These people felt that if silver returned, with its
inflationary effect, it would provide a panacea for their
ills.

The monometalists argued that failure to remain on

the gold standard would mean the silver standard
. . . would succeed the gold standard, and the
purchasing power of the American dollar would
decline to the commercial value of the silver
dollar— a drop of nearly 50 percent.!

"Kj. D. Hicks, G. E. Mowry, and R. E. Burke,
The American Nation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,

1964), pp7'I92-T9T:
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In order to appease the free silver men, the Republicans
devised an act that would blunt the free coinage of
silver.

Aware of Sherman's popularity in the West, the

Republican leadership engaged in a subtle game of com
promise between the differing pressure groups and gave
the act his name.
passed in 1390.

The Sherman Silver Purchase Act was
It contained provisions for buying the

approximate maximum domestic production of silver and
paying for it with treasury notes.

The notes were to be

redeemable, at the discretion of the Secretary of the
Treasury, in gold or silver coin.

It was pointed out by

some Democrats and free silver men that the silver was
not to be minted into coin and therefore this act was an
empty gesture.

Since the sound money men insisted that

gold be the redemptive metal, the amount of money in
circulation did not increase materially and the price of
silver continued to drop.

2

The men who had loaned the money that sustained
the nation's economy and the conservatives of both parties
argued for the return of the single metal standard so
that their investments would not lose value.

The debtors,

who were more numerous but not so influential, and the

2

Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A Social and
Political History of American Finance, l3b5-l&79'
(Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 19&4), pp•
113-119, 142-144, 162, 222-224, 403-404, passim.
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inflationists who were in position to gain, agitated and
argued for the unlimited coinage of silver which they
3

thought might have allowed the economy to level off.
The times bespoke a chaotic atmosphere of economic
upheaval that made the isolation of the single issue of
silver difficult.

Perhaps the most enlightening account

was the financial policy stated by the economists
Friedman and Swartz in a blunt analysis of the silver
issue:
1.

The overall effect of the liberal movement

toward inflation was actually deflationary since it dis
couraged foreign investment in this nation and led native
investors to seek foreign markets.
2.

Although conservatives wanted stabilization

of the dollar value, their dominated instrument, the
Treasury, actually caused the opposite effect.

Basically

this self-destructive action was effected by buying up
bank notes themselves, thus decreasing the volume of
these notes on the market.
3.

The conservative-controlled Treasury also

attempted to force silver on to the market.

However, this

attempt only devaluated the American dollar on the inter
national market and caused an unbalanced market and the

3Ibid.
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exportation of gold.

The problem could have been avoided

simply by buying and stockpiling the silver.
4.

Friedman and Swartz concluded that the way

people think about money can be the most important element
of contention.

Fear that the silver purchase by the

government threatened the gold standard and national
inflation was groundless.

The silver could have been

absorbed indefinitely without serious threat.^
But this analysis was made with the benefit of
hindsight and the problem as a whole was less easily seen
at that time.

Certainly the Sherman Silver Act did not

quiet either side in the currency controversy.

Rather it

seemed to add fuel to the fiery oratory on the Senate
floor where it was condemned as a log-rolling device to
secure the western vote for the McKinley Tariff Act.

5

Reagan's speech occurred in the year after the
act was passed.

He asked for an amendment to the silver

act allowing free coinage thereof.

The Senate passed the

free coinage bill by a vote of 39 to 27.

Fifteen

Republicans voted for, and one Democrat, Wilson of

^Milton Friedman and A. J. Swartz, A Monetary
History of the United States, 1&67-1&90 (Princeton:
University Fress, National Bureau of Economic R. E. S.,
1963), pp. 120-133.
^For Reagan's discussion of the Tariff Act, see:
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, Index.
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Maryland, voted against the measure.

It did not pass the

House and so continued to be an issue into the Twentieth
Century.

6
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
The top ranking Republicans had given the Sherman

Silver Act as an inducement to the Western segment of the
Senate audience and had received in return the Western
vote that secured the McKinley Tariff Act.

The Sherman

Silver Act of 1890 had seemed at least a step in the
direction of aiding the American economy.

Many Southerners,

including Reagan,' had spoken in behalf of the Silver Act
early in 1890, but by December of that year when Reagan
again addressed the Senate on the Silver Act, sentiment
had begun to change heavily.

The act had not increased

the flow of money but had decreased the gold in the
national treasury.

These actions occurred only two years

prior to the panic and major depression of 1893•

The

silver issue now split the party lines and became a
sectional issue once more.

The politicians were incapable

of organizing the diverse groups.

One historian stated

£
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 1323.
7

Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 2829-2834> bi73-6l76.
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" ...

in most important votes on the greenback and

silver issue before 1896, party lines in Congress disintegrated.”

The debates were marked with "party

chaos" and "the majority that pushed it through was non9

partisan and almost wholly sectional."
Senator Sherman of Ohio, and Blaine of Maine
spoke steadily and strongly against bimetalism.

Senator

Hoar of Massachusetts, Senator Hiscock of New York, and
Senator Edmund of Vermont were three of the most out
spoken of the conservatives.
The senators from Kansas, Idaho, Colorado, and
Nevada strongly upheld the silver coinage concept and
formed a receptive audience to Reagan's speech although
they were generally thought to adhere to Republican lines.
Senator Plumb of Kansas, Senator Mitchell of Oregon,
Senators Jones and Steward of Nevada, and Senator Daniel
of Virginia were all strong debators, joining Reagan's
fight for free coinage of silver.
The party lines were down and the sections and
ideologies formed the basis of division on the silver
issue.

The Northern conservatives, whether Democrat or

Republican, wanted the gold standard and verbally fought

Garraty, New Commonwealth, p.
9Ibid.

249.
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on the Senate floor for it.

The West and South banded

together forgetting the Republican West and Democratic
South in the united stand for free coinage of silver.
DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
Reagan employed four basic themes in his speech
asking for remonetization of silver.

These themes were:

(1). that the money-class and the monometalists were the
same group; (2) that this group was infringing upon the
economic rights of the people through the original
demonetization act and through a continuing of the mono
metal program;

(3) that the same group was infringing on

the rights of the populace by introducing a bill that was
attempting to detain action on the silver issue as well as
attempting to centralize power; and (4) that these actions
had no basis in constitutionality.
Reagan's development of his first theme was based
upon example and causal reasoning.

He suggested that this

group had secured the passage of the first demonetization
act of 1&73 with a resultant slump in the economy that
caused great economic stress to the debtor class.

He

then stated that the same group had passed the 1&7& and
the 1&89 silver bills in order to limit the amount of
silver coined and by this method to maintain silver as a
commodity such as "wheat and cotton" with its basis of
redemption in gold.

Since this had been the resultant
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effect of the two previous bills, the theme was credible.
He then offered a less well-formulated and documented
supporting argument that the present bill was designed
to help the same class once more since they had been
hoarding the silver and the present bill forced the
government to buy it at their prices.

This would " . . .

enable them to make a speculation off the Government and
the people, while at the same time they prevented silver
from being made money in the full sense • . . that is,
a unit of value receivable for all debt, public and
private.""^
Reagan’s sympathy and interest were with the
agrarian South and the land and mineral-rich West.
Within his own state he had worked toward the early survey
of the land and the later growth of Texas' land and
mineral resources.

He now proudly represented a state

that was a combination of both these elements of survival
and growth.

He was identified as a friend and defender

of the average citizen in all sections of the nation.
These were the people who were not suffering under a great
and growing depression."*''*'

Reagan saw the monometal program

^Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 879.
^Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, The American Nation,
pp. 191-193.

as one of the fundamental causes of this problem.

The

farmer, rancher, and the small business man needed a more
abundant flow of money in order to maintain their hold
ings and raise their economic standard.
demonetization had ” . . .

The act of

caused a reduction in values

of all property and products of about 33 percent; it took
from the people about one-half of the metal money of the
world; and it increased the burdens of all indebtedness
from one-third to one-half."

12

Reagan indicated that he

was aware that this would cause monetary loss to the
moneyed class but he reminded the senators that they had
shown no thought of the average citizen when they in
creased by " . . .

33 percent the indebtedness of the
13
debtor class by a law." J Coupled with the intense feel
ing of loyalty toward, and frustration over his inability
to help these people, Reagan also believed that the
program that had supplanted bimetalism was unconsti
tutional.

He saw the monometalists’ program as a breach

of the Constitution and he argued that until silver was
again freely coined and "silver can be restored to the
place it occupied under the Constitution" the issue would

12

Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 8§1.

13Ibid.
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be perpetuated on the Senate f l o o r . ^

Reagan apparently

felt strongly on this issue for he had often spoken
before

15

on the
the topic and he continued to do so after

this speech,

16

Reagan was also aware of the opposing element
within his audience and their effort to supplant the issue
with one more to their liking.

One of the issues that was

presented in an effort to supplant the silver issue was
that of federal control of elections within the states.
Reagan admonished the Senators that in allowing this to
happen they were injuring the economy of the nation.

He

warned then that
. . . in the present condition of the country it
seems to me that, instead of spending our time in
the discussion of a bill providing for elections
and providing to strike down the rights of the states
to provide their own election laws, we had better be
considering the means of relieving the threatened
financial disaster of the country’s (sic).17
However, Reagan seemed to fall into the same trap he
warned against for he included a long statement concerning

14Ibid., p. 879.
15
For examples of his speeches and remarks on the
silver issue prior to this speech see: Congressional
Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 2829-2834, 6032,
6174.-6175, 6l80; 51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 113-115*
1^
For examples of later speeches and remarks on
this issue see: Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 917-9207 1285, 1291-1292, 1306, 1313.

17Ibid., p. 879.
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the election bill.

In this segment of his speech he

developed the theme that the bill was based on unsure
constitutional grounds.

lg

The measure also was illogical

in its centralization concepts since the central govern
ing body to supervise the elections must still be drawn
from the inhabitants of the several states which the bill
itself deemed incapable of rendering fair election pro
cesses.

The theme appeared to be inserted in answer to

previous speeches.

The theme was developed concisely and

was not so much further developed as restated along
previous lines after a taunt from the floor about minority
rights.
Within his speech Reagan developed the themes
that the monometalists and the moneyed class were the
same individuals.

These individuals were infringing

upon the citizens' rights and were doing this unconsti
tutionally.

Apparently in answer to a previous speaker,

he also argued that the proponents of centralization
through federal election control were interfering with
economic legislation; he reaped some of the fruit of his
own warning by inserting the theme of discrediting the
franchise bill.

lg

He felt that the section of the Constitution,
Article I, section 4» did not constitute basis for the
bill.
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MODES OF PROOF
Reagan again used logical, ethical, and emotional
appeals in the speech asking for remonetization of silver.
LOGICAL PROOF
Reagan made use of example and causal relation
ship within the silver speech.

He also made limited use

of authority as a proof.
Reasoning from example
Several times within the speech, Reagan compared
silver to other commodities that must be purchased with
gold.

He gave specific examples of those commodities as

"corn,” "wheat," "cotton," and "pork" to be valued by
gold.

Each of the commodities used as examples having

par value with silver under the gold standard were
necessities of life.

Three of them were staple foods and

the other a basic commodity necessary for clothing.

In

this manner, Reagan appeared to be assuming silver was
also a basic necessity of life through his choice of
comparative examples.

These examples also had further

connotative value since Reagan spoke in behalf of the
people of the agrarian South and West and these were the
basic economic staple crops of these sections which were
as necessary for their economic health as silver, according
to Reagan, was necessary for the nation's economic health.
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Reagan considered the monometal program to be a
"legislative crime" that was perpetrated upon the nation.
He spoke of the nation's economy prior to the demoneti
zation as being in healthier condition than following the
act.

The demonetization of silver resulted in an unhealthy

economic state of being that had pauperized the laboring
class according to Reagan's reasoning.

He gave examples

of results of the silver demonetization act as bank
failures, bankruptcy, and the inability of the people to
pay their debts or taxes.

He cited that " . . .

newspapers

all over the country, from Maine to California and from
the Lakes to the Gulf, were filled with advertisements
of land other property for sale for taxes."

19

Reagan reasoned that the monometal program had
been passed initially, in 1&73> without many politicians
being cognizant of the actual demonetization of silver
intended by the Act.

The political ignorance argument was

substantiated by Reagan when he cited President Grant's
actions following his signing of the act.

The specific

examples used were Grant's message to Congress, on January
11+, 1$75, advising the establishment of three more silver
mints to be located in Chicago, Saint Louis, and Omaha.

19

Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, p. SyS.

20Ibid.

20
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This message was sent the same day Grant signed the silver
demonetization act.

The second example used was Grant’s

letter to Mr. Crowdy sent eight months after the act's
passage; the letter contained materials showing ignorance
of the single metal standard.
The ’’laboring classes” and the "new and powerful
industrial organizations" wanted the remonetization of
silver according to Reagan's statement.

He supported

this claim with examples of "a convention which met in
St. Louis" and demanded "free and unlimited coinage of
silver;" the "National Alliance" which met in "Ocala,
Florida" demanded the same free silver as did "sub
alliances and granges all over the country" and "labor
organizations of various kinds."

21

The choice of examples used to prove Reagan's
arguments appeared to be clear and relevant.

He chose

examples that were down-to-earth yet expressive of his
ideas.
Reasoning from authority
In comparison to his usually abundant employment
of authorities as proof within his speaking, Reagan was
frugal in his usage of authority in the silver speech; he
used authority only three times to support his arguments.

21Ibid., p. $79 .
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As proof of wording he wished to refute, he did read a
portion from the silver bill as reported by the Finance
Committee of the Senate.
In attempting to prove the ignorance of some
House members concerning the intent of the first silver
act, Reagan used the testimony of the ’’Honorable Mr.
Kelly of Pennsylvania" who was a "member of the committee
which reported the bill containing the provisions for the
suspension of the silver dollar.”

Representative Kelly

stated in the House on March 9, 187$, that he was ignorant
of the fact that stoppage of silver coinage was the intent
of the act.

Reagan went on to state that "like testi

mony" was borne by "many other Representatives and
Senators, including Mr. Blaine, the speaker of the
House."

This use of Kelly's testimony perhaps would have

borne more weight if Reagan had simply used Kelly's
statement bolstered by Blaine's "like testimony."

The

insertion of the nebulous "many other Representatives and
Senators" seemed to detract from the authorities used to
substantiate the point.

Representative Kelly's position

on the relevant committee would have carried at least a
vestage of authority and certainly Blaine of Maine was
an important political figure in the House.

Although only

Representatives were named as authorities, "many other . . .
Senators" were referred to as also having stated ignorance
of the bill's effect.

This authority was very close to
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the members of the audience Reagan addressed and this
authority was apparently used to arouse interest through
accusation.

Reagan did not judge the present Senate but

employed authority from a closely related source.
Authority as proof was used a third time by
Reagan when he was speaking on the interpolated theme
that minority rights were being infringed upon by the
passage of the election bill.

He referred briefly to

Thomas Jefferson's statement concerning the rights of
minorities.

The idea was undeveloped but provoked several

minutes of questioning by Senator Spooner asking for
clarification of Reagan's concept of minority rights.
Reasoning from causal relationship
Reagan reasoned that the demonetization of silver
was causing an economic depression.

He argued:

It caused a reduction in values of all property and
products of about 33 percent; it took from the
people the use of about one-half of the metal money
of the world; and it increased the burdens of all
indebtedness from one-third to o n e - h a l f . 22
He went on to develop this causal reasoning by speaking of
specific effects of demonetization.
One of the consequences of the demonetization of
silver was that after the fall of prices caused
by it (sic) it required double the amount of the
products of the soil, double the number of days'

22Ibid., p. 373
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work, to pay either the public or the private
indebtedness of the country.23
He stated that demonetization caused ’’the nation to
suffer" from "great financial embarrassment" for several
years.
Causal reasoning was applied to Reagan's argument
that legislative ignorance caused the passage of the
first silver act in 1$73»

He argued that ignorance on

the part of political figures, particularly the legis
lators and the executive had caused them to make into
law the monometal program.

He then presented another

step in his reasoning from cause-effect relationship
when he stated that although ignorance had caused the
initial step, the Senate, in iSyB, in a subsequent act,
had deliberately caused a continuation of the monometal
program by amending the House silver act of 1&7$.

The

amendment caused silver to remain on a commodity basis, to
be purchased by gold, rather than allowing the silver to
regain its monetary exchange value.
When Reagan spoke about the election bill, he
stated that it was the purpose of those who brought the
bill to the Senate floor to cause centralization of power
and secondly to disallow debate on the important economic
issue of silver.

23Ibid.

The effect of centralization he divided
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into the claim that the act would remove the sovereign
power from the people and would strip authority from the
citizens.

He further reasoned that the bill was intended

to gain "partisan advantage, to sustain a party repudi
ated by the people, and to hold power whether the people
will it or not."2*1' He went on to state that its effect
"is to strike down self-government; it is to tell the
people you are no longer honest enough and intelligent
enough to be trusted with the passing of laws and
executing them for the election of your own officers."

25

His last use of causal reasoning was less well
developed.

He simply referred to the force bill as an

issue that should take lower precedence than the silver
issue since the silver remonetization was a means of
"relieving threatened financial disaster" and the force
bill was causing a delay in that action.
ETHICAL PROOF
As early as 1877» Reagan took a stand on the silver
issue.

He made this early stand against the moneyed class

with his anti-monopoly speaking in Congress.

He saw the

situation as one in which the division of riches and

2Z|Tbid., p. 880
25Ibid.
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poverty could be laid directly at the feet of multi
millionaires who had used the vote of the same poor they
had established to legislate laws to protect themselves.
He observed that there ” . . .

were no beggars till

Vanderbilts and Stewarts and Goulds and Scotts and
Huntingtons and Fisks shaped the action of government.
Then the few became fabulously rich and many wretchedly
poor.”

He laid the blame for these problems partially

on the monopolies, partially upon the tariff and "upon
the demonetization of silver."

He stated that remoneti

zation of silver and the expansion of currency circulation
would "decrease the dependency of the people upon the
moneyed interests . . . "

27

The next year, 187$, Reagan

spoke in behalf of the Democratic Party’s position and
denounced the Republicans as having advocated "class
legislation" including "high tariff, tight fiscal policy,
demonetization of silver" and aid to monopolies since
1861.

2$

Throughout his years in the House Reagan missed

few opportunities to urge the remonetization of silver.

29

^Galveston Daily News (October 2, 1$77), and
Dallas Daily Herald (1877), clipping in R.P.
27Ibid.
28
Galveston Daily News (September 22, 26, 29, and
October 5, 187$)•
29

Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 1st Session,
pp. 47, 2343, 2693-2695, 4561-4502; 51st Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 5$$7, 6032, 6034, 6167, 6174-6175, 6180.

Eight months earlier he had stated to the Senate that in
"this absence, this dearth, of currency” the Treasury
should remonetize silver.

30

He stated that the demoneti

zation of silver had been "based on class interest . . .
It has been a policy of caring for the rich and taking
care of the interests of the rich at the expense of the
poor, at the expense of the middle class, at the expense
of the toiling millions . . .

31
of this country."^

The

present speech was thus not Reagan’s maiden speech on the
demonetization issue.

His reputation as a defender of the

"masses of people" against the "avaricious, ambitious
gatherers of gold," was long-standing prior to his
December, 1&90, speech.

His character was already

established as the defender of the people’s rights, the
enemy of centralization, and the exponent of the idea of
silver remonetization as a means of restoring a healthy
national economy.
Within the speech Reagan upheld his previously
established position by referring repeatedly to the
economic plight of the people whose rights were being
infringed upon by the "creditor classes."

He directly

attempted to identify with the people and their will by

30
^ Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st
Session, p7 4240.

31Ibid., pp. 4240-4241.
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stating ” . . . I think I represent the feeling of the
masses of the people . . . ” and he then identified that
will as being the remonetization of silver.

He further

attempted to establish his position as one that had the
’’interest of the great American public” as its basis
rather than ’’any class interest.”
Reagan also added to his ethical stature by
repeatedly evidencing thorough knowledge of pertinent
materials of the issues.
Reagan attempted to establish good will only once
throughout the speech.

He referred to the ’’American

Senate” as the "greatest legislative body perhaps upon
earth today."
Reagan's ethical character as a friend of the
people was established prior to the present speech.

In

the speech, Reagan attempted to add to the ethical stand
ing by establishment of himself as spokesman for the
people and for the "interest of the great American people."
He evidenced thorough knowledge of his topics in the
speech.

Reagan overtly attempted only once to gain audience

goodwill.
EMOTIONAL PROOF
One of the basic emotional reactions Reagan
attempted to arouse was that of compassion.

He attempted

to awaken enough feeling for "the great American people"

that the free coinage of silver would be reinstated as an
alleviating measure for their suffering.

He spoke to

the Senators of the depression that had followed the
demonetization of silver.

When ” . . .

bankruptcy covered

32
the country with a pall of d e a t h , t h e
pay their taxes and " . . .

people could not

newspapers all over the

country, from Maine to California and from the Lakes to
the Gulf, were filled with advertisements of land and
33
other property for sale for taxes." ^

Later in his speech

he again referred to the financial illness of the country
when he stated "We know that this is . . . difficulty
O/
among men engaged in business in obtaining money,"
and
when he spoke of the problems of "the producing and
laboring classes of the country."

35

Another instance of emotional proof came in an
appeal to the loyalty of the Senators.

He reminded them

of their representative capacity by suggesting that the
principles of representative government were founded on
the will of the people and that they were honor bound to
do that will.

He stated that " . . .

32Ibid., p. S7S.
33Ibid.
3Zt'Ibid., p. £79.

35Ibid.

the people are

sovereign; they are the government making power; . . .
they are the law-making power through their representa
tives . . . "3^

He further cited that the will of the

people was to return silver to the position it held
"from 1792 to 1373" as "money, the unit of value for all
37
public and private debts."
He took this form of
reasoning another step further, inferring that if loyalty
to the people's will was not present, then the Senators
might fear the reaction of their constituents.

He did

not explicitly state that they need fear replacement but
he reminded them subtly that " . . .

they (the people)

are capable of making and administering governments that
will give peace and security to society and protection
3$
to life and to property."^
threat.

He continued with an implied

The senators now working on this bill would, in

the near future, stand for re-election.

He noted that

the people were cognizant of the facts surrounding the
silver issue and that
They mean to stop that swindle. They mean to
stop the use of this Government to promote the
fortunes of the few at the expense of the many.
They know that the free and unlimited coinage of
silver is of more value to them, and likely to give

36Ibid., p. 330.
37Ibid., p. 379.
3SIbid., p. 330.
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larger relief by the increase of the volume of
currency, than any limited amount that may be
agreed to.39
He scarcely needed to draw the conclusion from this
statement.
Reagan made attempts to arouse compassion for the
people.

He made a limited attempt to stir the loyalty of

the Senators to the people they represented.

He also

attempted to elicit a limited reaction of fear for their
positions as elected representatives.
EVALUATION
As was the case with the speeches discussed in
Chapters II and III, the effectiveness of the silver speech
must be judged with the recognition that other speakers
also advocated remonetization of silver.

The silver issue

had long been a topic of public interest and d e b a t e , ^ and
this factor also tended to make the effectiveness of
Reagan’s speech difficult to isolate.
Reagan had spoken before on the silver i s s u e ^ and
had advocated most of the concepts which he developed in

39Ibid., p. 379.
^Unger, The Greenback Era, passim.
^ F o r examples of Reagan’s remarks and speeches
concerning silver see: Congressional Record, 50th
Congress, 1st Session, pp. 47, 2343, 2693-2695, 45014502; 51st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 4240-4241* 5337,
6032, 6034, 6174-6175.
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this speech.

These concepts stemmed from the premise

that the monometalists were the creditor class and this
class was seeking the continued demonetization of silver.
Reagan saw the remonetization of silver as a panacea for
the economic ills of the common man.

There was little new

ideological material presented but Reagan restated
strongly and compactly his previous themes on the silver
issue.

One new idea that Reagan incorporated into the

December speech presented was that the silver issue had
begun through legislative and executive ignorance.

He

presented concrete proof of President Grant's ignorance
of demonetization of silver but he was vague in his proof
of the legislators' like ignorance.
Reagan's ideas on the silver question incorporated
progressive idealism.

He spoke for the individual rights

of a "sovereign people" and against a powerful central
governing force that suggested the old royalist idea of a
power outside the people.

He spoke against a "money-

class" within the economic and societal structure.

He

conceived of such a class as drawing not only its suste
nance but also its ever-growing power over the individual
citizen from the same citizen who was being forced to
contribute to the growth of that power.

He laid the

blame at the door of legislators who had conceived and
executed the monometal program partially through ignorance.
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Reagan predicted within his speech that the silver
issue would remain a problematic thorn in the legislative
side until silver was returned to what Reagan considered
its proper and constitutional role of valued currency
along with gold.

Apparently the majority of the Senators

agreed with him for the immediate result of a vote of
thirty-nine for and twenty-seven against the bill evidenced
partial agreement.

However, the House of Representatives

failed to pass the Act at this time.

The monometal

program did, as Reagan suggested, continue to be a legis
lative t o p i c ^ until bimetalism once more returned as the
financial basis of the United States economy.
Although it would be an impossible task to prove
the monometal program was exclusively, or even primarily,
the cause of an economic distress, it surely was a contri
buting factor.^

The United States faced two great

depressions before the remonetization of silver was
effected.

One of the economic lows followed Reagan's

speech by less than two y e a r s . ^

The panic of 1#93 was,

^ R e a g a n remained in the Senate less than one year
past the passage of the Silver Act by the Senate in
December of 1&90, yet he spoke on the topic five more
times. Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session,
pp. 917-9207 1285,
1306, 1313.
^Friedman and Swartz, Monetary History, passim.
^Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, American Nation,
p. 91.
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according to history, one of the worst that ever confronted
the nation.

During the years Reagan addressed the Senate

and following his senatorial terms, the United States'
trade with other nations was affected by an unbalanced
market and exportation of gold as a result of the silver
demonetization law.

45

the first World War.

The second great depression followed
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, under an

amendment to the A.A.A. Program which authorized him
" ...

to reduce the gold content of the dollar and to

coin silver . . . ,

finally remonetized silver.

Since

Roosevelt was viewed as a redeemer for the nation's
economic ills, at the time of low economic ebb, perhaps
Reagan's ideas and reasoning can be said to be affirmed
by later history.
The silver issue, as most great economic problems
are wont to do, took on political ramifications.

Both

political party platforms, in 1892, contained planks
concerning silver and soon after the conventions, the
I
Senate again passed a bill for the free silver coinage.
A5
^Friedman and Swartz, Monetary History, p. 132.
i£
* Henry A. Graff and John A. Kraut, The Adventures
of the American People (New York: Rand McNally and Co.,

1968), p.'l^y.---^ A t this time, eighteen Democrats and eleven
Republicans voted for the bill and eighteen Republicans
voted against the silver monetization bill. Congressional
Record, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, p. 5719.
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The bill was killed in the House once more.

In 1S94 and

1396, silver was one of the major issues in the campaigns
and the issue was discussed freely in the legislative
id

bodies and by the populace.

The issue continued to be

politically mentioned into the turn of the century but
was not resolved until the 1930's.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
The national economy was at a near depression
stage in the last months of 1S90 and the southern and
western segments of the nation were the hardest hit
financially.

The agrarian South and the mineral rich

West felt that the remonetization of silver would allow a
freer flow of money and economic stimulation would result.
The earlier Sherman Silver Act had not resulted in remoneti
zation or in improved economic conditions.

By the time

Reagan addressed the Senate on December 30, 1S90, political
party lines were down and the South and West were banded
together for economic survival.

Reagan addressed the

Senate and employed four developmental themes in an
attempt to gain the majority vote from that body for free
silver coinage.

The themes were:

(1) the monometalists

and the moneyed class were the same group; (2) this group
was infringing upon the economic rights of the people

^Pu b l i c Opinion, Vol. XVII, pp. 212-3OS.

through demonetization of silver; (3) that the same group
was infringing upon the popular right by attempting to
deter action on the silver issue as well as attempting
centralization; and (4) that these actions were un
constitutional.

Reagan basically used example and causal

reasoning as logical proof but also included limited
usage of authorities as proof.

Reagan's ethical character

as defender of the popular rights, enemy of centrali
zation, and exponent of the concept of remonetization of
silver was established prior to the speech.

He attempted

to add to his ethical reputation within the present
speech by identification with the popular will and the
best "interest" of the nation.
attempt to gain good will.

He also made a limited

Reagan further added to his

ethical stature by evidencing thorough knowledge of the
issues involved.

He made use of emotional proofs, and he

attempted to arouse compassion for the people and made a
limited attempt to stir a feeling of loyalty within the
legislative group for their respective constituents.

He

also made a limited attempt to elicit a reaction of fear
within the audience that they might personally lose their
respective legislative positions.
The direct effectiveness of Reagan's speech on
silver, in December, 1$90, was difficult to isolate.
However, his speech, in conjunction with other persuasive
measures, had the immediate effect of Senatorial passage

of the act.

Reagan restated strongly and compactly within

the speech the theme that he had expressed in earlier
speeches to the Senate.

He added only one new argument,

which was his emphasis on the ignorance of legislators
and the executive about the demonetization of silver.

He

predicted that silver would continue to return to the
Senate floor until the obvious economic stress of the
populace was relieved by a return to the bimetal standard.
Since the issue did return repeatedly to the Senate floor
until the 1930’s when F. D. Roosevelt reinstated silver
as money, history seems to have proved Reagan to be
correct in his ideas presented within the speech.

CHAPTER V

THE FORCE BILL SPEECH TO THE SENATE,
JANUARY 16, 1S91
ISSUE AND OCCASION
Federal election laws, or force laws, were born
during reconstruction days.

They were never truly

effective and they heard their own "death knell" some
twenty-two years later in the speeches of opposition on
the floor of the United States Senate.'*'
The "Invisible Empire," or the order of the Ku
Klux Klan, began in Tennessee before the former Con
federates were replaced by the reconstructionists.

It

spread throughout the South in a sweeping movement of
counter reconstruction.

The organization was designed to

terrorize Negroes through its ghoulish dress, ominous
official titles such as "dragons," "furies," "nighthawks,"
and by the weird ritualistic meetings and night rides.

^Ellis Paxton Oberholtzer, A History of the United
States Since the Civil War (New Yorlcl The Macmillan Co. ,
1937), p. 13#; Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 139&-1433.
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Along with the terrorizing of the Negroes went the
ostracism of radicals from society and business, the
purchase of votes, violence against the Negro, the
glorification of the Caucasian race and the adulation of
white womanhood.

Through these methods, the Klan moved

to counter every phase of Radical Reconstruction in the
South.

Whippings, murder, lynchings, and drownings

were hazards faced by Negroes and white militiamen who
undertook to support the congressional reconstruction in
the South.^
If this reconstruction was to be possible, it
became apparent that the lawlessness that was destroying
economic and political stability in the South had to be
diminished.

The several states began to pass "Ku Klux

laws,” but these were relatively ineffective.

Therefore

Congress, in 1$70, passed one law designed to protect the
franchise rights of the Negro and in 1&71 passed another
3

law to reinforce the previous year's act.

The "Third

Enforce Act" in 1$71,^ made it treason to be active in the
Ku Klux organizations.

However, the counter-reconstruction

2
Hicks, Mowry, and Burke, The American Nation,
pp. 39-40.

3

John Hope Franklin, Reconstruction After the
Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago fress, 1961),
p. 16b.

4Ibid., p. 167.
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forces had already established their stronghold through
political pressure, economic strictures, and violence.
They had bested Radical Reconstruction in its formative
years.

The South began to elect the former Confederates

to local, state, and national political office.
The concept of federal interference in state
elections took second place to the expanding economy of
the North and the growing economy, with its problems, of
the South and the West.

But the issue reappeared, closely

intertwined with the currency and tariff acts, during
Reagan’s terms in the Senate.

At this time it became
5

known as the ’’Force Act” and ’’the bayonet of the polls."
That the Negro and the Republicans were being restricted
in their voting privileges in the South was an accepted
fact and the Republicans were preparing an attempt to
change this southern policy.

In his A History of the

United States Since The Civil W a r , Oberholtzer stated:
The Federal government might interfere and give
supervision in the states to elections of repre
sentatives in Congress, a fact stated and restated,
and confirmed by exercise, during the period of
Reconstruction. But in the administration of
President Hayes the practice had been abandoned.
It was determined that the game was not worth the
candle. More evil than good had come from such an
assertion of Federal authority. Now, after an
interval during which the South had been reborn
industrially, and had accommodated itself to a new

^Charles E. Russell, Blaine of Maine, His Life
and Times (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., lyjjij,
p. 187.
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economic and social order, it was gravely proposed
to revive measures which had so fired the anger of
the people and disturbed the peace. Republican
"Bourbons" wished to make "bloody shirt” speeches;
radical Northern politicians thought that they saw
in the issue which should be raised fresh oppor
tunities to discredit the Democratic party and
prevent it from again coming into power.°
The Republicans started a program reimposing the election
restraints of reconstruction days, and this "force act"
was calculated to provide federal supervision of Con
gressional elections to protect, by military force if
7
necessary, every legal voter.'
In the election of 1&90, the Democratic party
received a larger number of votes than it had for many
years.

It came closer to being the majority party rather

than the minority party.

Accustomed to wielding House and

Senate power, the Republicans searched for an issue that
would restore the heavy majority power to them.

They had

succeeded in the years following the War by waving the
"bloody shirt" to those northerners who were not party
indoctrinated.

The staunch Democrats would not be per

suaded by these tactics but the middle-of-the-road voter
previously had been persuaded and might be persuaded once
£
p. 116.

Oberholtzer, United States Since Civil War,

7
'On the face of the bill, it was to pertain to
all sections on a non-partisan, non-sectional basis.
The New York Times (March 17, 1$90).
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more.

Therefore, the Republicans again brought out the

sectional interest issues.

In particular, the voting

rights of the citizens were brought back into political
g
focus.
The voting rights problem had as its central
theme the black vote, or rather the infringement upon the
black voters.

The "bloody shirt" tactics did not work,

however, for a Democratic majority was returned to Congress
in 1391.

Reagan continued to fight^ the attempt of the

Republicans to interfere in federal elections and in so
doing, to discredit the Democratic Party's southern strong
hold.

He summed up well his concepts, the issue, the

speech, and occasion in his Memoirs:
One of the last measures with which I was
concerned was the "Force Bill," which involved danger
to our political system. This was in 1&91. The bill
under consideration was one drawn ostensibly to
regulate by Federal authority the election of the
members of Congress, and the President and VicePresident of the United States. I believed this
measure to be unconstitutional, subversive of the
form of the Federal Government, and that it endangered
popular liberty in this country. Senator Evarts of
New York had made a well-considered speech in favor
of the bill, and evidently expecting that it would
become a law made an earnest appeal as to the duty of
the people to obey the Constitution and laws. The
next day he was followed by Senator Dixon of New
Jersey, who also favored the bill. I feared the
g
Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 1429.
9

Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session,
pp. 451-4^u, i>79-5^3, &I+V-B4B. For good coverage see the
Austin Statesman Weekly (January 30, 1$90). Also covered
in Walton to Reagan, August 12, 1&90, and Reagan to
Greenwood, February 11, 1&91, R.P.: Letters.
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effect of the speech of Senator Evarts, if unanswered,
on public opinion, and endeavored to have an answer
made by Senator Gray of Delaware, Senator Morgan of
Alabama, or some other of our stronger speakers.
Those to whom I spoke said such a speech could not be
replied to without time for preparation and con
sideration. When I could get no one else to under
take it I determined to try to answer it myself
rather than let it go to the public unanswered. And
in probably twenty minutes after I reached the con
clusion I began my speech without notes or documents
of any kind; and under such conditions closed the
general debate on this great q u e s t i o n . 10
The issue was the old one of sectional difference and
Republican versus Democrat.

Here was an attempt to con

trol by federal interference, backed by threatened force,
the election process in the South.

Here was a Republican

attempt to once more discredit the Democratic party, which
had had the misfortune of backing the losing side in the
Civil War.

The issue may not have been within the ex

perience of the newcomers to the Senate but was certainly
within Reagan's experience.

The speech was given to a

Senate which seemed to need reminding of the problems of
sectional differences that had once ended in War.

The

Senators appeared to be on the brink of allowing these
differences to merge once more and perhaps to be magnified
through elective franchise interference.

The occasion was

offered to one of the oldest statesmen from the South, a
man who was aware that the sectional differences needed to

“^Memoirs, pp. 246-247
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be guarded against.

He grasped the opportunity and

occasion to attempt through this speech to forestall such
action.
AUDIENCE COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT
The Democrats fought passage of the Federal
Election bill in the House in every way possible under
parliamentary procedure.
They made dilatory motions, stayed away from
sessions, and demanded interminable roll calls. . . .
No other measure called for such exercise of dis
cretion, good nature and aplomb on the part of a
speaker as did the Federal Election Bill which was
finally passed and sent to the Senate.H
Senators Sherman of Ohio and Chandler of New Hampshire
both introduced Federal election bills in 1&90.

Both men

had been particularly active in open hostility to the
South.

Senator Hoar, the advocate of Republican Party

policy, took up the battle for the "Force B i l l . " ^

How

ever, the country was not favorably disposed toward this
bill.

Well-known Republicans in the South were fearful of

the consequences and let this be known.

The press con

demned the "force bill" as an attempt to revive sectional
animosity and as a scheme to gain Republican advantage in

■^Oberholtzer, Since the Civil War, p. 117•

12
(New York:

Lester Burrell Shippee, Recent American History
The Macmillan Co., 1924)> P« !??•
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the Congressional elections and in the forthcoming
Presidential election in 1892.

The effect of the intro

duction of this bill coupled with monetary problems— both
tariff and silver— caused a change in the Senatorial
audience that Reagan faced.

H. T. Peck, writing a history

of the times, stated:
The election, therefore, proved to be veritable
cataclysm. The Republican majority in the House
was swept away. When Congress met in 1891, the
Democratic Representatives numbered 235, and the
Republicans only 88; while in the Senate the
Republican majority was reduced from 14 to 6. A
significant fact was the strength which had been shown
in the West by a new party which now became known as
the "Populists," who elected nine representatives and
two senators.
In the South, out of 121 members,
there were only three Republicans. Even in New
England, the Democrats secured a fair majority.^
When the force bill appeared before the Senate,
the Republicans from the West united with the Democrats to
prevent the force issue from holding up the silver issue.
In the next session, it was again debated with Senators
Hoar and Evarts of New York leading the debate.

It was

at this time that Senator Reagan spoke against the Force
Bill in the Senate.

Harry Thurston Peck, Twenty Years of the
Republic: 1885-1905 (New York:
Dodd, Mead and Company,
T9o6), p. 214.
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DEVELOPMENTAL THEMES
Reagan developed three basic themes within his
speech against the force bill.

His first theme was that

the constitutional power to elect their own officials
belonged to the states and that the force bill was an
attempt to usurp the rights of the states.

His second

theme was that the democratic system of government was on
trial with the force bill.

His third theme was that

partisan politics was the cause of conflict.
Reagan approached his states rights theme by
possible dual construction of the article of the Consti
tution that provided for the election of Representatives
and Senators.

The Article’*"**' first stated that the power

to regulate the time, place, and manner of holding
elections was to be prescribed by the states but it went
on to state that "Congress may, at any time, by law, make
or alter such regulations.”

Reagan attempted to clarify

the obvious conflict within the article by explaining the
early history of the clause.

Some of the states had

hesitated to send delegates to the Continental Congress
and the question arose whether the States might not decline
to elect Senators and Representatives and thus dissolve the
Union.

Reagan argued that, so long as the states were

"^United States Constitution, Article I.
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providing representatives to both Houses of Congress, the
first rule of states' power to elect these officers
prevailed.

He further developed the theme by suggesting

that "any just interpretation . . .

any reasonable

interpretation” would admit that, so long as the discharge
of the duty by states existed, Congress had no right to
usurp the power of those states.

He further stated that

since the War there had been a prevalent opinion by one
faction that the Constitution had been changed and that
the rights of the states had been "substantially obliter
ated."

However, according to Reagan the belief was an

untruth and nothing had superceded the tenth Amendment,
which granted power to the states over that which was not
specifically given to the central government.
The theme was not a new one with Reagan.

He had

stated the concept of states rights through strict
15
Constitutional interpretation many times ' before but
this was the most thorough development of the theme that
he had presented to the Senate.
Reagan's second theme was that the democratic
system would be endangered by the passage of the force

15

For some examples of speeches and remarks upon
this theme see: Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 507-50&7 ;52±7-3218; 44th Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, pp.
335, 696 ; 45th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 3799, 8546;
50th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 2202-2205, &069-8070;
51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. &78-SS1.

bill.
theme.

This theme was closely tied to the states' rights
He developed the theme by a discussion of the

principles of the sovereignty of the people and their
capacity for self-government.

He compared the sover

eignty of the people with other forms of sovereignty and
asked who were to be the governors if not the people of
the states.

This portion of his development of the theme

was a restatement from an earlier speech
the same topic.

which contained

However, the remainder of his thematic

development within the speech was a presentation of new
argument on the theme.

He suggested that the proponents

of the bill saw Congress as responsible for "the morals,
the habits, the individual conduct of the citizens of
17
the United States." '

He further suggested that these

proponents saw Congress in a position to act as though
there were "no Constitution, no States, no State boundaries
no State laws, no State rights."

1$

He repudiated his

opponent's claims by reminding the Senate that the indi
vidual citizen was subject to the laws of his own state
and that "neither Congress nor the Federal courts can take
jurisdiction of him” as proven by "a long line of decisions

pp.

Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session,
----- --------17Ibid., p. 1430.
lgIbid.
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made by the United States Supreme Court.

He concluded

his development of the theme that the people were sovereign
and that they were capable of self-rule within their own
states by the argument that if the theory of this bill
were true, Congress would not only be responsible for
interference in the elective franchise, bribery, and
corruptions" that occurred within the states but would
also be called upon to punish "murder . . .
arson" and "all crimes in the catalogue.”

robbery,
Reagan felt

that Congress would not wish to carry the law to that
extreme but argued that in principle the force act would
bestow this responsibility upon Congress.
Reagan’s theme that partisan politics was causing
conflict was developed strongly through causal reasoning,
example, and analogy.

Reagan reasoned that centralization

was not a new topic to be presented to the United States
Senate.

He reminded the Senators of the Federalist Party,

"under the lead of some strict consolidationists," had
attempted a like usurpation of power from the citizens
and had been "buried in the tomb of the Capulets" never
to be "resurrected by the name of Federalist."

He

developed this partisan theme further by stating that the
Republicans were " . . .

arguing in the same set phrases

that they did fifteen years ago when the Republicans of
New England were controlling this continent . . . "

^ I b i d . , p. 1430.
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Reagan admitted that it was unfortunately true
that sometimes the elective franchise was interfered with
in every state in the Union and even tentatively admitted
that it "may be" that there was more of this in Southern
States than elsewhere.

He stated that, if it were true,

it was because the Republican Party had for political
purposes conferred the right of suffrage upon "a people
not capable . . .

of exercising that right,”

He vividly

reminded the Senate of the transgressions upon the rights
of southerners by the Republican Party during the Recon
struction.

He asked:

"Are political exigencies to induce

us to commit a greater crime than has ever been committed
. . . to the right of suffrage by striking down the sovereignty of the States and of the people?"

20

Reagan carried the theme of conflict caused by
partisan allegiance one step further.

He suggested that

money was one of the roots of partisan conflict and he
deplored the fact that all parties recognized money "as an
agency in elections."

He then used ancient Rome’s decay,

including her "hired legions," as a basis of comparison
for what could happen to the United States if partisan
politics was allowed to control through the "instrumen
tality of money."

20Ibid., p. 1 4 3 1 .

MODES OF PROOF
Reagan employed logical, ethical, and emotional
proofs to support his arguments against the force act.
It is the object of this section to examine the proofs
used.
LOGICAL PROOF
Reagan utilized authority and analogy several
times within his speech against the force act as logical
proof.

He also made a limited use of example and he

relied extensively upon causal relationship for logical
proof.
Reasoning from example
Reagan identified specific examples of type of
crime for which Congress would be held responsible if the
force act was fulfilled.

These examples of crimes were
21
’'murder,” "arson,” and "robbery."
He specified that

these were "moral" crimes and drew the conclusion that
Congress would be held responsible for not only these
examples but for "all crimes in the catalogue."

22

He

developed this argument to explain that Congress, if the
force act passed, would be responsible for the moral fiber
of all the citizenry.

These particular types of crime

21Ibid., p. 1430.
22Ibid.

l6l
were obviously chosen by Reagan to serve as examples since
they ranked high on the societal list of immorality along
23
side "bribery and corruption" ^ within the states’ elective
process.
Examples were used as logical proof one other
time.

Reagan argued that the force act would not only

affect the Southern section of the nation but would also
r

affect other sections of the country in an adverse manner.
i

He listed the States of New Hampshire, Nebraska, Minnesota,
Colorado, New Jersey, and Connecticut as having "political
troubles."

While these examples did not have further

developing materials, and the description "political
troubles"2^- was ambiguous, they were used to fulfill a
purpose.

The states named were Western and Northern in

locale and were also Republican in partisan partici
pation; thus the use of them as examples of areas to be
affected by the force act appeared to be strong logical
argumentation aimed at the Republican representatives of
those sections.
These two instances constituted Reagan’s only use
of this form of logical proof within the present speech.

23Ibid
2^*Tbid

Reasoning from authority
This form of logical proof was less abundant in
the speech on the force act than in most of Reagan's
Senatorial speeches.

He directly quoted from the Consti

tution only three times.

First he read the section that

spoke of congressional power to regulate or alter the
election process "except as to the places of choosing
25
Senators." '

The section was the one upon which the

force bill was based.

The second reading was a repetition

of the first with additional materials from the Consti
tution that Reagan seemed to feel was necessary.

The

rereading appeared in no way to shed more light on the
meaning of the passage but was apparently used to emphasize
his point.

He then gave an historical review of the

reasons the founding father had inserted this section
which Reagan felt was the only provision of the Constitution
of the United States "of double and doubtful construction
like this."26
At this point, he explained that the article was
provided by the early Congress as a means of perpetuating
itself for "some of the States were very slow, very tardy
in sending their Representatives to the Continental

25Ibid., p. 1429.
26Ibid., p. 1427.
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Congress . . . " '

He turned once more to a quotation

from the tenth amendment of the Constitution, which
stated that those powers not delegated to the United
States government, "nor prohibited to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively or to the people.”

23

Another use of reasoning from authority was
employed.

In developing the idea that the newly en

franchised freedmen were not qualified voters yet were
given the franchise right, Reagan argued from the
authority of a Republican leader’s view.

He stated that

the late Senator Martin from Indiana and "other distin
guished Republicans" had "declared that the black people
were incapable of intelligently exercising the elective
franchise."

29

The particular authority chosen was that

of a well-known Republican who served in the Senate during
the period of reconstruction.

This reasoning from

authority apparently had a dual purpose.

The first was

to establish that the people of the South faced the grave
problem of the elective franchise being bestowed upon an
ignorant mass of voters.

The authority chosen had the

further connotative value of pointing out the extent of
wrong that could be perpetrated deliberately by one section

27Ibid.
od
Ibid., p. 1423.
29Ibid., p. 1431.
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of the nation upon another section if the power be
centralized in one segment or group.
The three quotations from the Constitution and a
quote establishing the cognizance of the wrong perpetrated
earlier by the Republicans upon the South provided the
only use of authority as a mode of proof in the speech
against the force bill.
Reasoning from analogy
Reagan used this form of argument when he spoke
of the Republican position on the force bill as being
similar to those "fifteen years ago when the Republicans
30
of New England were controlling this continent."^

He

concluded that the position was indefensible now since
the "star of the empire is on its way westward, that no
section of the country, that no half-dozen States are any
31
longer to control the destiny of this great Republic."-'
He also compared the United States of 1&91 to
Rome at the time of its decadence and fall.

He spoke of

the power of money to allegedly "buy" the legislators and
even the President.
However, this may be, the fact that money is
recognized as an agency in elections by all
political parties in this country is a palpable
and it is a mournful fact. Rome held the name of

30Ibid.
31Ibid., p. 1430
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a republic for three hundred years after liberty
was dead and despotism was e n t h r o n e d , 32
Having established the relationship of the two
governments as similar in their despotic desires and
actions, he further pursued the analogy, now tempering
it by asserting his trust that the analogy was a possi
bility and not yet a reality.

His conclusion was that

"Rome reached the point where the government was put up
for sale to the highest bidder.

I trust we are not to

have our hired legions to take charge of this Government
33
through the instrumentality of money." ^
Reagan used analogy one other time.

When speaking

about the Republicans1 repeated efforts at centralization,
he warned them that the people had already repudiated
the "idea and the promoting Republican party at a very
recent day."

He continued this line of reasoning with a

rather blunt, and certainly uncomplimentary, analogy
concerning the Republican segment of his audience:
But that warning voice seems not to be heard, and
one listening to the debates in this body has his
mind involuntarily turned to what Napoleon said of
the Bourbons, that they never forgot and never
learned anything.34
Reagan apparently intended the analogy to reflect the
attempted usurpation of power through centralizing

32Ibid., p. 1431.
33Ibid.
3/|Tbid., p. 1430.
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legislation that the Republican party had repeatedly
backed.

He saw the Republicans' attempt to centralize

power once more through the force act as an attempt to
gain a stronghold over the people, despite their will,
through control of the elective franchise power.

Reagan

viewed the force act as an attempt to replace "the
sovereignty of the people" with a power outside of the
people.

Perhaps Reagan's use of the particular analogy

of the Republicans and Bourbons would seem peculiar if
he had not used Napoleon's famous derogatory statement
as cause of the analogy.

Another purpose served by the

statement, was the continued effort on the Republicans'
part to attempt to acquire central control through
legislation.

Reagan reasoned that they "never forgot"

centralization and "never learned" the will of the people.
Reagan used reasoning from analogy three times
within the speech.

This form of logical proof was used

less frequently within his speaking than example,
authority, or causal reasoning, yet he apparently used
analogy to attack the reputation of his life-long foe, the
Republican Party.
Reasoning from causal relationship
One of the numerous tools used by logicians includes
the tracing of lines of cause and effect.

Reagan, who had
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been described as "a deep logician"

35

made extensive use

of causal relationship in his speech against the force act.
He attempted to show that the complete downfall of
the Federalist Party was effected by the efforts of
"Hamilton, the elder Adams, and Knox"^

who he described

as "extreme consolidationists" to usurp the power of the
people and centralize that power.

He argued that the

cause of their downfall was the enactment of the "alien
and sedition laws" that constituted an attempt "to
interfere with the liberty of the citizen" and thus
constituted an attempt to "overthrow our system which
recognized the capacity of the people for self-government
and their sovereignty. . . . "

37

This action had "caused

the burial in the tomb of the Capulets of the party which
3g
enacted it. . . . "
He concluded that the proponents
of the force act had "gone far beyond”

39

what "any

Federalists of that time ever dreamed of."^3

33Culpepper, Virginia, Exponent (April 16, 1&$5).
* Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, p. 1430.
37Ibid., p. 1429.
3SIbid.
39Ibid.
^°Ibid.
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He stated that the cause of the "double and
doubtful construction" of the single constitutional clause
upon which the Force Act was founded was the tardiness of
some of the States in sending representatives to the
Continental Congress.

The tardiness had caused the

national forefathers to insert the statement that Congress
could make laws concerning the elective process, to
counteract the State's decision not to send representatives
and thus dissolve the Union.

However, Reagan argued that

so long as the States fulfilled their Representative and
Senatorial obligations, the Congress had no right to
enact such laws.
Reagan further argued that partisan allegiance
was the cause of conflict concerning the elective pro
cesses.

He asserted that if the senators "could forget

that they have political and party ends to accomplish by
violating the Constitution we should be in a very much
safer condition than I feel the American people are
tonight."^
In attempting to establish a causal relationship
between the Republican party strong-arm tactics and the
Southern problem with Negro voting, Reagan developed an
involved cause-effect pattern.

He stated that the

Republicans deliberately, and knowingly, initiated the

41Ibid., p. 1430
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cause when they gave the right to vote to an immense
number of freedmen who were incapable of'voting intelli
gently.

The Republicans compounded their wrong by dis

enfranchisement of the ex-Confederates and by teaching,
through propaganda, the Negro to hate and to distrust the
Southern Whites among whom they must live.

Reagan

contended that the effect of these early Republican
wrongs was the root of the present day political problems
in the South.

Within the context of this causal reason

ing, Reagan gave vivid first-hand descriptive detail of
the results of the Radical Reconstruction.

He had lived

through these times and was recalling actual experiences
to an audience comprised generally of men who knew the
period involved only through hearsay.
John H. Reagan used causal relationship extensively
in his refutation of the Force bill.

While some of his

causal reasoning was complex, it never lacked clarity of
detail or purpose.
ETHICAL PROOF
Reagan’s entire political career produced a repu
tation as a staunch southern statesman devoted to the
cause of states rights and political equality for all
sections of the nation.

Although he had believed in the

Union enough to say almost upon the eve of the Civil War
”1 repudiate all sectional heresies.

I repudiate everything
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that is not national . . .

Reagan believed enough in

the rights of the States to join the South in secession
from that Union.

After the War, Reagan worked toward

the consolidated Democratic Party front to counteract
the harsh Reconstruction rule of the Republican Party.
He believed enough in the Democratic Party, upon whose
platform he served for his entire life as a member of
Congress, to turn down an offer of the vice-presidential
candidacy of the Anti-Monopoly P a r t y ^ even though he
espoused their economic ideology.

As a Representative

in Congress Reagan defended the cause of the southern
states a number of t i m e s . ^

He based his defense upon

strict constitutional construction aimed at preservation
of the rights of the states.
Therefore, when Reagan addressed the Senate to
refute the force bill, an effort to usurp states rights,
his reputation as a staunch defender of states rights
was already established.

His ethos was enhanced by the

Io
^ Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd Session,
p. 1467.
^ R e a g a n to Henry Nichols, March 28, 1384;
Reagan to James Weaver, May 26, 1834; and Weaver to
Reagan, April 28, I884, in R.P.: Letters.
^Congressional Record, 44th Congress, 1st
Session, pp. 507-508, 3217-3218; 44th Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 702-704; 45th Congress, 1st Session, p. 696 ;
45th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 8546; 50th Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 2202-2205, 8069-8070; 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, pp. 878-881.
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fact that he spoke from personal experience.

Here was a

man who had lived through civil strife and had served as
representative of his people's ideas before, during, and
after the Civil War.

He was speaking to his less

personally experienced audience concerning the force act
which he saw as a possible renewal of sectional strife.
Within the speech, Reagan made one of his rare
attempts to deliberately and directly establish his
character to his senatorial audience.

This did not occur

as a part of his prepared speech text but was in answer
to a question from the opposing group.

Senator Hoar, a

member of the Republican Party, disliked his role as a
member of the minority group.

Hoar asked "if Reagan had

given up any of his political principles when he had been
in the minority for twenty-five years?"
lightly and humorously.

Reagan answered

He treated the attack as if it

had been directed personally to him, rather than toward
his party.

He then answered seriously, using the attack

to his advantage.
I have never been the advocate or promoter of
monopoly. I have never been the advocate of
centralization. I have never been the advocate or
promoter of injustice and oppression. I have
advocated what I understood to be the constitutional
rules of right, and I had no occasion to change my
principles.55

45Ibid
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The rarity of Reagan’s direct reference to himself and
his position was enough to call special attention to the
strength of his feelings about a cause that conjured so
many unpleasant memories from the past.
The reply may also have been a defense of his
character based on his reputation as an outspoken
defendant of the southern position and the rightness of
this position.

He indicated that since he was upright

and the causes he rallied to for twenty-five years were
just and right, this cause also should be considered
in the light of justice and righteousness.
Reagan further attempted to establish his good
character by invoking the blessing of God upon the cause
that he served.

That he felt God was on his side was

indicated through the words of his prayer:
I pray God for the good of our country, for the
good of humanity, that this great Republic, standing
as the great exemplar for the lovers of liberty all
over the world, may not be stricken down in the house
of its friends by the passage of such a law as this,
that the world is not to be taught that the Senate
of the United States believes the people of the
American States incapable of self-government.4°
He used another method of establishing his good
character, and that was an offer to give his own life for
the cause for which he argued.

After describing the evils

the force bill might bring about, he asked the Senate
i A
^ Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 2nd
Session, p . 1431.
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not to allow these evils to be wrought upon the nation
and added:
I pray not, Mr. President; I suppose life is
as dear to me as it is to most people, and those in
near relation to me are as dear to me as to most
people; but, as God is my judge tonight, if I could
save the American people from this act by giving up
my life, I would surrender it as freely as I ever
performed any act in my life.47
He thus presented himself as a man of good
character.

He also created a positive image as an

ethical speaker through his thorough knowledge of the
materials pertinent to the issue and his good sense in
choice of materials presented.
He also made a limited attempt to establish good
will through his complimentary reference to at least one
of his opponents.

He complimented Mr. Everts of New York

on his ability as a logician.
Reagan’s reputation as a defender of his section
of the country through advocacy of their states rights was
already established before he spoke.

He added to his

ethical stature by supporting those rights in an effort to
save the nation from more sectional strife.

He presented

himself as a man of intelligence and good character.

He

made a limited attempt to establish audience good will.

w ibid
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EMOTIONAL PROOF
Reagan appealed to the emotions of "loyalty,”
"justice," and "fear" in this speech.
He appealed to the audience's loyalty to the form
of government proposed by their forefathers.

The latter

were presented as men who in "the formation of our
government," entered upon a great experiment "of trusting
the formation of the Government to the people themselves."
He also appealed to the audience's loyalty to the
id
Constitution "which we have all taken an oath to support."
The same Constitution, he argued, gave those power not
specifically delegated to the national government to the
states.
He further appealed to their loyalty to their own
constituents who would lose the power to govern them
selves and to make laws concerning themselves and who would
even lose the power of selecting their own representatives.
This constituted an appeal to the emotional stimuli of fear
also.

Specifically, it was an appeal to the fear that

someone outside the people themselves would become the
governing power.

To prove this argument, he spoke of

the possible dissolution of the Democratic party and
inferred the dissolution of the Republican party also.

^Ibid., p. 1429
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Finally, he appealed to his listeners* sense of
"justice.”

The citizenry must be allowed to continue,

through the existing laws to govern themselves and to
continue to have the freedom to adhere to the party
lines of their choice.
He first summed up the good which would be ac
complished by a vote against the force bill.

He asked

the Senators who would govern under the enacted law, and
he further pleaded that it might be their will that the
people of the various states "may be allowed to exercise
the right which they have for more than a hundred years
enjoyed here, that they may be trusted to carry on their
State governments, and that they may not be held incapable
of doing s o . " ^
He then put his opponents in a position of appear
ing to do harm to the audience; in fact, he suggested that
their position was an attempt to dissolve the very body
composed by his auditors.

He compared the Republicans'

proposal to what occurred just prior to the downfall of
Rome.
He then put himself and his cause in good light
by invoking God's blessing on a cause that he felt strongly
enough to die for.

49ibid.
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Reagan appealed to the loyalty of the Senators to
their forefather's established mechanisms of selfgovernment, to the Constitution and to their own consti
tuents.

He attempted to establish a sense of fear that

the people would no longer be sovereign and an outside
force would govern.

He appealed to the senators' sense

of justice to the populace; he asked that they be allowed
to continue to follow the partisan politics of their
choice.
EVALUATION
Since Reagan's speech closed the general debate
on the force bill and was applauded from the galleries it
may be assumed that the address was effective in stirring
the audience's attention and approval.

Another indication

of this approval was the defeat of the force bill.
Again it must be remembered that the voting result
was a product of many factors.

However, Reagan's speech

was one of the few given against the force bill and thus
it was less difficult to isolate the direct result of
defeat of the effort to centralize elective franchise
power and break the solid Democratic South.

50

50

In January 1&91» the bill was put aside for the
more economically important issue of silver.
It did not
return. Ibid., p. 912.
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The nation was suffering under economic depression
and had already displayed a change of attitude toward the
Republican party and their more than twenty years reign.
The Democrats had gained a majority the preceding year.
There was little doubt that the force bill was designed
to break the Democratic stronghold in the South since
this single-party strength had helped achieve the existing
majority.
The Republicans sought an issue that would evoke
enough emotion to swing the northern Democrats back to
the sectional voting pattern.

However, the senators'

thoughts, by now, with the exception of a handful of men
like Reagan and Sherman,

51

were products of a generation

removed from personal war experience.

Senator Hoar,

52

who was one of the most outspoken proponents of the force
bill, had not known the actual war as an adult.

Reagan

had known the war, had lived it, and his arguments were
persuasive partially for this reason.
Reagan saw the force act as a threat not only to
the Democratic party but as a threat to the entire framework
of the federal system as perhaps the result may have been
if the force act had passed.

■^Buck, p. 267.
52

Peck, Twenty Years, p. 214; and, Congressional
Record, 51st Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 1398-1433•
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The fear that it might become a law had the
resultant effect of causing most of the southern states
to tighten the constitutional provisions for elective
franchise qualification.

The poll-tax, literacy test,

and ’’grandfather clause” were results of the fear of the
act.

53

If fear of the force act could force such changes

in southern elective politics, it is certainly impossible
to estimate the changes the passage of the act might have
wrought.
SUMMARY OF CHAPTER
Federal interference in the elective franchise
system of the states had been met with violent opposition
during the Reconstruction period.

It was now seriously

put forward by the Republicans twenty years later in the
form of what the southerners labeled the "force act."
The force act was seen by one historian as an effort to
allow the "Republican Bourbons" to make "bloody shirt"
speeches and to "discredit the Democratic party and
Cl
prevent it from again coming into power." ^
The Democratic party had gained the majority in
Congress and the Republicans sought an issue that would

^Dewey, National Problems, pp. 162-173.
'^Oberholtzer, Since Civil War, p. 116.
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swing the majority back to them.

However, the West was

seeking financial succor which they felt would be ac
complished through silver coinage and they saw the force
act as an interference in securing the necessary silver
legislation so the western ideas were joined with those
of the south when Reagan addressed the Senate in
opposition to the force bill.
Within his speech, Reagan developed three themes:
(1) the constitutional power to elect their own officials
belonged to the states and the force act was an attempt
to usurp the states rights; (2) that the democratic
system of government was on trial with the force bill;
and (3) that partisan politics were the cause of conflict.
These themes were supported by logical proof,
including reasoning from example, authority, analogy, and
causal relationship.

Causal relationship was relied upon

most extensively to support Reagan's arguments.
Reagan's reputation as a staunch Democrat who
believed in the rights of the states was already established
before he addressed the Senate upon the force act.

His

ethical stature was further enhanced by the fact that he
was speaking about personal experiences gained during a
time in past history that a similar law had been enforced.
Within the speech, Reagan made one of his rare efforts to
attempt overtly to establish his character by direct
reference to his personal beliefs.

He used another

180
method of establishing his good character when he offered
to give his own life for the cause for which he argued.
He also created a positive image as an ethical speaker
through his thorough knowledge of materials pertinent to
the issue.

He made a limited attempt to gain audience

goodwill.
Appeals were made, within the speech, to the
audience's feeling of loyalty to the Constitution, federal
form of government, and to their constituency.

Reagan

attempted to arouse a feeling of fear that the power to
govern themselves would be removed from the people and
he asked that the populace be allowed to follow the
partisan politics of their choice.
Reagan's efforts to discredit the force bill as
shown through his senatorial speech were joined with other
persuasive elements to cause the force act to be taken
from the legislative dockets.

The effects of fear that

the bill would be passed caused the southern states to
take precautionary steps against the Negro voter including
the levying of poll-tax, the insertion of the literacy
test and "grandfather clause."

It was impossible to

ascertain the possible resultant change had the force act
gained the status of law.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
..SUMMARY
John Henniger Reagan was an important figure on
the Texas political scene for over half a century.

He

served his state as judge, representative, Confederate
cabinet member, senator, and first Texas Railroad Com
missioner from I&46 to 1903.

He was twice offered the

governorship of Texas, and twice he refused.

He took a

leading role in the re-establishment of the Democratic
Party in his state and in the rewriting of the Texas
Constitution of IB76 .
Historians refer to Reagan in two basic roles.
Each role reflects his political concepts.

His ideas

were a combination of progressive idealism and conserva
tive ties.

He was referred to as a strong defender of

states rights, with particular emphasis on the rights of
the South and the West, through strict constitutional con
struction and he was also viewed a defender of the rights
of the individual against economic and political infringe
ment.

lBl

1S2
Reagan’s ideas and arguments won him popularity
in his home state and recognition on a national basis as
well.

His states rights concept received a degree of

periodical coverage because of his arguments pertaining
to decentralization of government and his defense of the
rights of the individual were nationally prominent.

His

progressive arguments that sought railroad and monopoly
control through legislative measures and his demands for
free and unlimited coinage of silver, which he saw as
the panacea for the ills of the South and the West, were
covered by periodicals throughout the nation.
Reagan’s struggle on behalf of economic controls
needed during his tenure as United States Senator seemed
to be a long-range and tireless

effort.

popular throughout all sections

of the nation, Reagan's

ideas were well-known.

While not always

A spokesman for the rights of the

states and for the individual rights of the people, he
was closely identified with both causes.
Although Reagan's ideas

were pertinent to the

great issues of social change during the years

1&&7-1&91 ,

no previous study of his senatorial speaking was found.
The present study was conducted in order to understand
how Reagan's senatorial speeches contributed to an under
standing of the issues about which he spoke.
limitations were imposed upon the study.

Two

The first

limitation restricted the study to four speeches chosen
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for their typicality of issue, theme, and development.
The second limitation was the decision to consider only
the ideas contained in Reagan’s speeches since the con
cepts he advocated were nationally significant.
The method employed was to examine the collection
of speeches and other materials in the Congressional
Record, and histories involving the pre-Civil War period,
the war period, and post-war period to the turn of the
century.

Periodicals, government documents, biographies,

and other data pertinent to the speaker, the speeches,
and parallel historical development were examined.

The

materials were organized to present the background of the
man and an analysis of the four speeches chosen for
typicality:

(1 ) the railroad-monopoly abuse speech;

(2) Reagan's speech against the Blair Education Act;
(3 ) a speech asking for remonetization of silver; and
(4) his speech against the force act.

The analysis of

these speeches included a discussion of the background of
the specific issues involved, the audience composition and
alignment, the themes developed, and the proofs used in
their development.

Finally his speeches were evaluated.

Reagan's political ideology was based on two
primary concepts:

preservation of states rights and the

protection of the individual from infringement upon his
economic and political rights.

These two basic ideas
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produced the themes used in the speeches analyzed in the
present study.
The first concept of preservation of states rights
was expressed in Reagan’s railroad-monopoly speech.

He

contended that state rights should be upheld through use
of the state courts for trial of abuse cases involving
monopolists and railroads.

Such a procedure would not

only expedite a quicker clearing of the over-burdened
federal court dockets but would also put power into the
state courts by providing them with nationally binding
laws.

The states rights concept appeared in the Blair

Educational Act speech in Reagan’s themes concerning
preservation of the state and local autonomous rule over
schools.

He developed the idea that the existing edu

cational system and all the rights that belonged to the
states were endangered by the federal funding of schools.
The Force Act speech again made use of Reagan’s states
rights concept.

He saw the force bill as an effort to

revoke the fundamental right of the states to elect their
own officials.
The concept of the rights of the individual
citizen gave rise to several themes in the four speeches.
Reagan urged the use of legislative procedure to eliminate
infringements upon the economic and political rights of
the people.

In the first speech he spoke against the

economic domination of railroads and monopolies over the
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small oil shippers and he demanded protection for the
political rights of these individuals through opening the
state courts for the smaller, less wealthy litigants in
abuse cases.

He also presented this particular idea in

the themes employed in the silver speech.

There the

villains were the moneyed class and monometalists who
were infringing upon the economic rights of the people
through the monometal program.

He again voiced his

belief in the speech of the individual rights when he
argued that the sovereignty of the people and their
right to govern themselves was in jeopardy.
Reagan presented another theme in his Blair Act
Speech and the Force Act Speech that gave evidence of his
concern for the sectional and partisan interests of his
audience.

He attacked the discriminatory nature of the

Blair Act funding clause that offered the "new" West a
definite advantage over the Southern states with their
illiterate blacks.

In the Force Act Speech, he developed

the theme of political partisan allegiance that was
causing conflict in the legislative halls.
Reagan offered logical, ethical, and emotional
proof to support these themes.

He relied most heavily

upon logical proof, employing most often example,
authority, and causal relationship.
but with less frequency.

He also used analogy

His more than twenty years as a

Representative in the lower House, where he voiced his
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ideas on the pertinent issues of the day with knowledge
and intelligence, allowed him to address the Senate with
an already established ethical stature.

His adherence

to his already established reputation as defender of
states rights and advocate of the rights of the individual
citizen added to his ethical character.

His ethos was

further enhanced by his attempts to gain the goodwill of
the audience, but this was an unusual occurrence.

He

indicated throughout his speeches that he was a man of
good character and intelligence through his knowledge and
his devotion to the laws and precedents of the nation.
Reagan used emotional appeals less frequently
than logical and ethical appeals.

He made limited attempts

to invoke the feeling of fear, loyalty, and justice within
his senatorial speeches.

He made a much stronger appeal

to the compassion of his audience for the individual
whose rights were being infringed upon politically and
economically.
An evaluation of the effectiveness of Reagan's
senatorial speaking was difficult to ascertain.

In any

political speech, the interests and influences upon the
individual members of the audience will affect the achieve
ment of the stated goals of the speaker and will intensify
the difficulty of isolating the effect of a particular
speech.

The political nature of congressional speeches

further complicated the picture, and thus the effect of
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the ideas presented in any single speech, particularly
when the debate was strong, was difficult to ascertain.
Several of the elements which affected such an audience
were:

(1 ) the popular national will as reflected through

the periodicals; (2 ) the will of the particular consti
tuents who elected the senators to represent their
interests; (3 ) influence affected by special interest
groups involved in the issues; (4 ) partisan and sectional
alignment; and (5 ) the number of speeches on the same
issue given in conjunction with the speech to be analyzed.
However, some generalized effects of Reagan's ideas
coupled with those of his fellow speakers can be seen.
These included the initiation of some early governmental
controls over monopolies and railroads, the defeat of the
Blair Educational Act with the result of continuation of
state funded and controlled schools and the death of the
Force Act that was an effort to break the solid Democratic
South.
CONCLUSIONS
Reagan's ideas in these speeches belonged basically
to the school of progressive idealism; the one exception
was Reagan's strict conservative tie with the past through
his states rights concept.

There seemed to be evidence

that this conservative tie was a carry-over from his
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earlier experiences in the Civil War and the aftermath
of that war.

He repeatedly referred to "the narrow

boundary” between stable government and anarchy and to
the Republican regime ”of fifteen years ago.”

He appeared

to be aware of every attempt to centralize power and
viewed each new attempt as an attack against the rights
of the states, particularly the southern states.

Since

he had earlier witnessed legislative sectional strife
turn into the holocaust of war, perhaps he was somewhat
sensitive to any sectional agitation or legislative
source of sectional agitation.

Whatever the cause of

his sensitivity, it occasionally caused Reagan to insert
a clause concerning state rights into otherwise system
atically logical arguments on another issue.

The

irrelevance of the interpolated sectional material,
whether spontaneously caused by a question or taunt from
the floor or whether inserted in answer to a previous
argument from the preceding speaker, seemed to detract
from Reagan's speech although it furthered his image as
a watchful opponent of centralizing concepts.

Reagan's

dogmatic espousal of the concept of states rights and
strict constitutional construction forced him into the
role of spokesman for the position of the South.

If the

name "southern apologist" simply refers to a person who
states the popular position, in his belief, of his section
of the nation, then Reagan should bear the title.

However,
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if the name implies any necessity to feel that the South
had erred prior to, during, or after the war, then it
would be a misnomer.
His deep devotion to his Southern states rights
theme may have also caused him to appear to a casual
observer to be lacking in tact toward opposing members
of the Senate.

But considering the deep feelings this

old statesman must have had, with his psychological war
wounds re-opened by his Republican opponents' sectional
legislation, the tactlessness assumes a different aspect.
Tactlessness denotes a person not aware of his attack on
his opponent.

Reagan seemed acutely aware of any insult

he hurled at his fellow legislators.

His antagonism was

deep-rooted and found expression through both direct and
subtle barbs aimed at his opponents.

These opponents

must have been doubly obnoxious to Reagan since the
majority had known the war through hearsay, rather than
personal experience, yet they were legislating upon issues
which resulted from the war and which entailed long-term
ramifications.

Reagan's one conservative tie seemed to be

a genuine product of past bitter experience and tended to
color the man's speeches whether detrimentally or as an
)

aid to support a relevant theme.
Reagan's progressive ideas were innovative and
well supported.

They evidenced intelligent, far-sighted

thinking and a great deal of research, and thorough

preparation to produce the political concepts which he
presented to his senatorial audience.

History appears to

vindicate most of his progressive ideas.

That monopolies

and railroads required governmental control is now beyond
dispute.

They are still powerful, even with control by

an outside legislative power, and operate under cover of
subsidiaries and puppet competition.

Yet, the initial

congressional control Reagan asked for did place a
restriction on corporate giants.

The railroad commission

of Texas is still one of the most powerful political
units in the State.

Reagan's ideas about the monometal

program were also vindicated.

He stated that silver

would remain an issue before the Senate until bimetalism
was returned and this proved true; silver remained an
issue until 1934 when Roosevelt remonetized it.
The issue of federally supported schools did not
die with the Blair Act's death, as Reagan had hoped, but
exists today.

Since the issue of school funding and

control is not yet decided, eight decades later, it is
impossible to say whether he was correct in his assumption
that federal funding was synonymous with complete federal
control.

Almost certainly the system, had it changed at

that historical point, would have evolved differently.
Vindication, or evidence of a bad choice of sides, belongs
to yet another generation or more.
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Interference in state election laws was an intense
issue that has since proved the generally accepted
desirability for federal nonintervention in intrastate
affairs.

However, the issue is still unsolved today.

The federal government at a relatively recent date removed
the poll tax assessment and federal intervention in state
processes has been in focus again in Reagan’s home state
with the federal court decision nullifying Texas candidate
filing fees.

The states have maintained some of their

rights and the federated union Reagan cherished still
remains.

The Constitution remains the basic law of the

land but Reagan’s plea for strict interpretation has
apparently fallen out of favor in recent years.
The final conclusion drawn from the study is that
John Henniger Reagan was a deep logician, a far-sighted
intellectual and a statesman of whom Texas, and the
nation, should be proud.

However, he apparently was not

an outstanding orator although his ideas were presented
well enough to influence the outcome of legislation that
affected national policies then and now.
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